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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has long interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to protect 
the states from private lawsuits based on federal law. 1 At the same time, it has 
alleviated the rule-of-law problems with this immunity by holding that, at least 
in certain circumstances, a suit against a state official challenging the official's 
violation of federal law is not a suit against the state and thus is not barred. This 
principle, which the Supreme Court has said "gives life to the Supr~macy 
Clause," 2 has become known as the Ex parte Younl "exception" to the 
Eleventh Amendment,4 even though it did not originate with that case.5 The 
limits of this exception were elaborated in Edelman v. Jordan,6 in which the 
Court held that the exception does not extend to suits seeking "retroactive" 
relief "which requires the payment of funds .from the state treasury." 7 Later 
cases have read Edelman as establishing that suits seeking "prospective" relief 
from a state official's violation of federal law are not barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment, while suits seeking "retrospective" or "retroactive" reFef are 
barred.8 
In perhaps the most often quoted passage from Edelman, the Court admitted 
that "the difference between the type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment and that permitted under Ex parte Young will not in many instances be that 
1. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14 (1890). 
2. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64,68 (1985). 
3. 209 u.s. 123 (1908). 
4. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984). 
5. See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 
1683 (1997). 
6. 415 u.s. 651 (1974). 
7. /d. at 677. 
8. See generally Part II, infra. I use the terms "retrospective and "retroactive" interchangeably, as 
the Supreme Court appears to do in this context. 
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between day and night. " 9 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was 
closer to the mark when it wrote that drawing the distinction that has evolved 
from Edelman "is more like examining a subject in that half-light called the 
gloaming, where to identify it accurately one needs to have the instincts of 
Argos, Odysseus' dog, who recognized his master dressed as a beggar upon his 
return home after twenty years' absence." 10 The truth is that even Argos would 
have difficulty navigating the Supreme Court's doctrine in this area. 
The inadequacies of the prospective-retrospective distinction have long been 
noted by scholars 11 and lower courts, 12 but until now the courts have muddled 
through and scholars have focused their attention on the many other problematic 
aspects of Eleventh Amendment doctrine. 13 The difficulty of explaining the 
Court's results as applications of a rule turning on prospectivity has led the 
lower courts to assimilate the prospective-retrospective terminology as short-
hand for a rule barring suits seeking damages a.nd damage-like monetary 
remedies from the state treasury. 14 Commentators, too, have understood the test 
this way. 15 Insofar as the distinction operates merely to bar suits for damages 
9. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2040 
(1997); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105; Guardians Ass'n v. 
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582,604 (1983); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690 (1978). 
10. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Perales, 50 F.3d 129, 130 (2d Cir. 1995). 
II. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1480 (1987) 
(referring to the "ad hoc mishmash of Young and Edelman" and the Court's "incoherent" case law in 
this area); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign 
Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 88 & n.353 (1988) (referring to "the much criticized distinction drawn in 
Edelman v. Jordan" and citing articles attacking it). 
12. See, e.g., Perales, 50 F.3d at 130. 
13. Scholars giving more-than-passing attention to the prospective-retrospective distinction include 
Ann Althouse, When to Believe a Legal Fiction: Federal Interests and the Eleventh Amendment, 40 
HASTINGS L.J. 1123, 1140-52 (1989); William Burnham, Federal Court Remedies for Past Misconduct 
by State Officials: Notice Relief and the Legacy of Quem v. Jordan, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 53 (1984); 
Jackson, supra note 11; Norman B. Lichtenstein, Retroactive Relief in the Federal Courts Since 
Edelman v. Jordan: A Trip Through the Twilight Zone, 32 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 364 (1982); Eric B. 
Wolff, Note, Coeur d'Alene and Existential Categories for Sovereign Immunity Cases, 86 CAL. L. REv. 
879 (1998). Articles giving passing consideration to the issue include Amar, supra note 11; William 
Burnham, "Beam Me Up, There's No Intelligent Life Here": A Dialogue on the Eleventh Amendment 
with Lawyers from Mars, 75 NEB. L. REv. 551, 560-63 (1996) [hereinafter Burham, "Beam Me Up, 
There's No Intelligent Life Here"]; Daniel J. Cloherty, Exclusive Jurisdiction and the Eleventh 
Amendment: Recognizing the Assumption of State Court Availability in the Clear Statement Compro-
mise, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1287, 1297 (1994); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other 
Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 
1203, 1268-69 (1978); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A 
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against 
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1119-27 (1983); Louis E. Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the 
Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CAL. 
L. REv. 189, 214-21 (1981). 
14. See, e.g., Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1253 (5th Cir. 1988), discussed infra text 
accompanying note 263. 
15. See Burnham, "Beam Me Up, There's No Intelligent Life Here", supra note 13, at 560 n.31; 
William Burnham & Michael C. Fayz, The State as a "Non-Person" Under Section 1983: Some 
Comments on Will and Suggestions for the Future, 70 OR. L. REv. 1, 22 ( 1991 ); Jackson, supra note 11, 
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and similar monetary relief, the rule is relatively straightforward (although even 
in this limited sphere, the Court's application of the distinction is not without its 
problems). Some commentators have criticized even this limited version as 
unprincipled and unjustified, 16 but few have dwelt on its incoherence. The 
Court's more recent articulations of the test have aggravated the doctrinal 
problems by seeming to bar all retrospective relief, whether or not monetary, yet 
there has still been little commentary. This is not surprising. The severest of 
these problems have been posed by decisions appearing to find seemingly 
retrospective forms of nonmonetary relief to be prospective. Since most Elev-
enth Amendment scholars believe that the Court has interpreted the Amendment 
far too broadly anyway, 17 the scholarly community has not gotten exercised 
about aberrant decisions that limit the Amendment's reach. 
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, however, suggest that the neglect of 
these doctrinal problems can no longer be regarded as benign. The first case is 
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho. 18 The plaintiff in Coeur d'Alene was an 
Indian Tribe which claimed that federal law gave it the beneficial ownership of 
certain submerged lands. The Tribe sought an order prohibiting officials of 
Idaho from interfering with its rights. 19 A fractured Supreme Court decided that 
the claim was barred?0 Justice Souter, writing for four dissenters, agreed that 
the relief sought was prospective,21 as apparently did Justice Kennedy and the 
Chief Justice. The dissenters would have found this a sufficient reason for 
permitting the suit to go forward,22 but Justice Kennedy argued that suits 
seeking prospective relief should be dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds 
if, in the court's view, they unduly infringe upon the values underlying the 
Amendment.23 The controlling opinion in the case, however, was Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence, which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined?4 Justice 
O'Connor criticized Justice Kennedy for "unnecessarily question[ing]" the 
"basic principle of federal law" that the Ex parte Young exception applies 
"where the relief sought is prospective rather than retrospective," 25 but agreed 
at 88-93; Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception", 110 HAR.v. L. REv. 102, 126-27 
& n.l68 (1996); Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1715. 
16. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 11, at 1479-80. 
17. See Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1694 n.42 (citing scholars critical of the holding of Hans v. 
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)). 
18. 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997). 
19. See id. at 2032. 
20. See id. at 2040. 
21. See id. at 2040 (Kennedy, J.); id. at 2051 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
22. See id. at 2052 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
23. See id. at 2038-39. 
24. See id. at 2048 ("JusTICE O'CoNNOR's view is the controlling one."). 
25. See id. at 2028, 2045, 2046. The Court actually said that "a Young suit is available where a 
plaintiff alleges an ongoing violation of federal law, and where the relief sought is prospective rather 
than retrospective." !d. at 2046. On the relationship between the requirement that the violation of 
federal law be "ongoing" and the requirement that the relief sought be prospective, see infra text 
accompanying notes 397-99. 
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nevertheless that the relief sought by the Tribe was barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.26 Courts and commentators disagree about why exactly the concur-
ring Justices found the relief sought by the Tribe to be barred, but some have 
read the opinion as holding that the relief was barred because it was retrospec-
tive.27 If so, then Coeur d'Alene simultaneously reaffirms the prospective-
retrospective test as a "basic principle of federal law," but contorts the concept 
of retrospectivity beyond recognition by finding a seemingly prospective form 
of relief to be retrospective. 
Among the courts to interpret Justice O'Connor's opinion in Coeur d'Alene 
to hold that the relief sought by the Tribe was retrospective was the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, whose decision in Paraguay v. 
Allen28 led to the second recent Supreme Court decision that necessitates a 
re-examination of the prospective-retrospective distinction. The Republic of 
Paraguay sued George Allen, the Governor of Virginia, and asked the court to 
halt the scheduled execution of its national, Angel Breard. 29 The Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations, a treaty to which the United States and Paraguay are 
parties, provides that nationals of one country, if arrested in another country, 
have a right to be informed that they may consult with their consul if they 
wish.30 Virginia violated its duty to notify Breard of this right,31 and Paraguay 
argued that, because this treaty violation materially contributed to the subse-
quent imposition of Breard's death sentence, the sentence should be vacated.32 
Breard himself sought to raise the treaty-based claim in his federal habeas 
corpus petition, but the district court held that he had forfeited this basis for 
relief by failing to raise the issue at trial or on his direct appeals.33 Paraguay's 
separate lawsuit was dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds.34 The court 
came to the startling and counterintuitive conclusion that the Eleventh Amend-
ment bars a suit seeking to halt an execution because such relief is retroactive, 
not prospective?5 The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of both Breard's 
and Paraguay's claims.36 It concluded that Paraguay was seeking retrospective 
26. See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2046. 
27. See, e.g., Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 628-29 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 
1352 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, Coeur d'Alene, Federal Couns and the Supremacy of Federal Law: The 
Competing Paradigms of Chief Justices Marshall and Rehnquist, 15 CONST. COMMENTARY 301, 312 
(1998). See also infra text accompanying note 295-96. 
28. 134 F.3d 622, 628-29 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998). 
29. See id. at 625 n.2. 
30. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, Art. 36(1), 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261. 
31. The federal government conceded this point in its submission to the International Court of 
Justice. See infra note 371. 
32. See Paraguay, 134 F.3d at 624. 
33. See Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1263 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 134 F.3d 615 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998). 
34. See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1272-73 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 134 F.3d 
622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998) (per curiam). 
35. See id. at 1273. 
36. See Breard, 134 F.3d at 615; Paraguay, 134 F.3d at 622. 
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relief because Virginia's violation of the treaty took place in the past.37 Since 
Virginia was no longer hindering Breard's right to consult with his consul, there 
was no ongoing violation of the treaty; hence, Paraguay was not seeking 
prospective relief from an ongoing violation of federal law.38 In a similar case, 
United Mexican States v. Woods, 39 the Ninth Circuit reached the same conclu-
sion.40 
Paraguay and Breard both sought relief in the United States Supreme Court, 
as did Mexico. While Paraguay's petition for certiorari was pending, and less 
than a week before Breard's scheduled execution, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in The Hague ordered the United States to postpone the execution 
to give it time to consider Paraguay's claim that the execution violated the 
United States' treaty obligations.41 Notwithstanding this order, the Supreme 
Court denied the relief sought by both Breard and Paraguay. Breard was 
executed less than two-and-a-half hours later. 42 The per curiam opinion in 
Breard v. Greene43 devotes only five sentences to the Eleventh Amendment 
issue. In those sentences the Court expressed agreement with the Fourth Cir-
cuit's conclusion that Paraguay's suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.44 
When two courts of appeals conclude that a court order halting an execution 
scheduled to take place in the future is retrospective relief barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment, and the Supreme Court finds nothing wrong with that 
conclusion, something is awry. The error becomes evident when one compares 
the form of relief sought in these cases to the forms of relief sought in a typical 
habeas corpus petition. Indeed, in both the Fourth Circuit and Ninth Circuit 
cases, the prisoner himself sought the very same relief in a habeas proceeding, 
and in neither habeas proceeding was an Eleventh Amendment problem even 
suggested.45 As Justice Souter observed in Seminole Tribe, the reason federal 
habeas relief for state prisoners does not raise Eleventh Amendment problems is 
37. See Paraguay, 134 F.3d at 629. 
38. See id. The court regarded the "prospectivity" requirement as separate from the requirement that 
there be an ongoing violation of federal law, but it found both that the violation of federal law was not 
ongoing and that the relief sought was not prospective. 
39. 126 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998). 
40. See id. at 1223-24. 
41. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.) (Apr. 9, 
1998) <www.icj-cij.org/idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.htm>. 
42. The Supreme Court announced its decision at 8:22p.m. on April 14, and Breard was pronounced 
dead at !0:39p.m. Brooke A. Masters & Joan Biskupic, Killer Executed Despite Pleas; World Tribunal, 
State Department Had Urged Delay, WASH. PosT, Apr. 15, 1998, at BL 
43. 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998) (per curiam). Although the Eleventh Amendment was relevant to 
Paraguay's petitions to the Supreme Court, not Breard's, the Supreme Court addressed Breard's 
petitions and Paraguay's in a single opinion. That is why this article's title refers to the "Breard" case 
even though Breard's case, as distinguished from Paraguay's, did not itself raise Eleventh Amendment 
issues. The lower courts, by contrast, wrote separate opinions. 
44. See id. at 1356. 
45. See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 
1305-06 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart, 117 S. Ct. 588 ( 1996). 
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that such petitions fall within the Ex parte Young exception.46 If the applicabil-
ity of the Ex parte Young exception turns on whether the relief sought is 
prospective or retrospective, and if a habeas petition seeking to halt the execu-
tion of a state prisoner because of a violation of federal law falls within that 
exception, then the lawsuits brought by Paraguay and Mexico seeking the· very 
same relief must fall within it too. 
Paraguay v. Allen and United Mexican States v. Woods are the reductio ad 
absurdum of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area. Though the 
decisions almost certainly were wrong, what is remarkable about these cases is 
the plausibility of their startling holdings as applications of the Supreme Court's 
decisions elaborating the prospective-retrospective distinction. Like the Fourth 
and Ninth Circuits, the Supreme Court itself has largely ignored the relevance 
of the habeas cases to the Ex parte Young doctrine. When one takes them into 
account, it becomes clear that the doctrinal problems in this area run very deep. 
Justice O'Connor's refusal to go along with Justice Kennedy's radical recast-
ing of Ex parte Young doctrine was apparently based in part on her mistaken 
belief that distinguishing prospective from retrospective relief involved a 
"straightforward inquiry."47 If the inquiry were indeed straightforward, the 
effort of the concurring and dissenting Justices in Coeur d'Alene to preserve it 
as the exclusive--or virtually exclusive48-test of the permissibility of suits 
against state officials would be praiseworthy. Before Edelman, the Court used a 
variety of formulations to describe when a suit against a state official was barred 
by the Eleventh Amendment. One of the virtues of the Edelman line of cases is 
that it purports to replace these disparate formulations with a single, straight-
forward rule. If, as I attempt to show in this article, a comprehensive prospective-
retrospective test is neither straightforward nor consistent with the decided 
cases, the challenge is to find a straightforward test that is. I suggest that the 
results in the Supreme Court's decisions are consistent with a relatively straight-
forward test in which the concept of "prospectivity" plays only a limited role. 
The test is essentially the one first articulated in Edelman: the Eleventh Amend-
ment bars suits against state officials seeking retroactive monetary relief.49 Suits 
seeking retroactive nonmonetary relief are not barred. 
Part I of this article places the prospective-retrospective distinction in context 
by explaining how the rule of the Edelman case operates to limit the federal 
courts' ability to enforce the federal obligations of the states. Part II then 
46. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 178 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Justices in the majority did not 
dispute Justice Souter on this point. See id. at 75 n.l7 (distinguishing statute involved in Seminole Tribe 
from the "statutes cited by the dissent as examples where lower courts have found that Congress 
implicitly authorized suit under Ex parte Young," among them statute authorizing federal habeas relief 
for state prisoners). 
47. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2047 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
48. As discussed in Part III, the concurring opinion is best read as recognizing a narrow exception to 
the general rule that prospective relief against state officials who violate federal law is not barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. 
49. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665. 
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explains how the Supreme Court gradually and apparently inadvertently trans-
formed the test adopted in Edelman from rule barring only retrospective mon-
etary relief into a rule barring all retrospective relief. Part III discusses the 
decision in Coeur d'Alene and shows that the controlling opinion in that case 
did not narrow the Ex parte Young exception by adopting an expansive defini-
tion of "retrospective" relief, but instead recognized a narrow exception to the 
rule that prospective relief against state officials who violate federal law is not 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Part IV suggests that the analyses of the 
lower courts in Breard and Woods were plausible as applications of the Supreme 
Court's highly indeterminate "prospectivity" test, but must be regarded as 
erroneous in the light of the long and unchallenged history of affording federal 
habeas relief to state prisoners. This Part also explains why the Supreme Court's 
opinion explaining its denial of relief to Paraguay should not be read as an 
endorsement of those decisions. 
Part V examines the concepts of prospectivity and retrospectivity more 
closely to see whether there is a test turning on those concepts that can explain 
the Supreme Court's decisions in this area. I conclude that there is a version of a 
prospective-retrospective test that can explain the benefits cases and the habeas 
cases, albeit uneasily, but there is none that will also explain the results in the 
desegregation cases. In Part VI, I consider how best to address this doctrinal 
problem. I consider four options: jettisoning the current analytical framework in 
favor of an entirely new approach; adopting an otherwise comprehensive prospec-
tive-retrospective test while recognizing an exception for desegregation cases; 
adopting a comprehensive prospective-retrospective test and overruling the 
desegregation cases; or reverting to Edelman's original holding, under which 
only retrospective monetary relief would be barred. Although none is a panacea, 
I conclude that the fourth option is far superior to the others. 
I. THE PLACE OF THE PROSPECTIVE-RETROSPECTIVE DISTINCTION IN ELEVENTH 
AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
The rule associated with the Ex parte Young case is today often described as 
an "exception" to the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.50 That the Elev-. 
enth Amendment is itself is an exception to a broader rule is less often noted. 5 1 
The Amendment, of course, confers an immunity, and immunities are by 
definition exemptions from more-broadly-applicable rules. The Eleventh Amend-
ment is in tension with, and thus might be regarded as an exception to, two 
fundamental maxims of political science, both closely linked to the ideal of the 
rule of law.52 The first was well expressed by Alexander Hamilton in The 
Federalist: "If there are such things as political maxims, the propriety of the 
50. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984). 
51. But cf Henry P. Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception", 110 HARV. L. REv. 102 
(1996). 
52. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 11, at 1466-92; Jackson, supra note 11, at 3-13. 
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judicial power of a government being coextensive with the legislative may be 
ranked among the number." 53 The second was famously put by Chief Justice 
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison: "The government of the United States has 
been emphatically termed a government of laws and not of men. It will certainly 
cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the 
violation of a vested legal right." 54 To understand the Edelman exception to the 
Ex parte Young exception, it is necessary first to understand the nature of the 
Eleventh Amendment exception. To understand the Eleventh Amendment, it is 
necessary to understand the principles of the rule of law to which it is, or may 
be, an exception. 
In a federal system in which the federal government has the power to impose 
legal obligations directly on individuals, the need in theory for federal judicial 
tribunals with jurisdiction to enforce those obligations is not difficult to grasp. 
For structural reasons, the alternative of relying on the courts of the states to 
enforce these obligations is unsatisfying. Federal laws are needed primarily, if 
not solely, when the state legislatures have failed to take measures the federal 
legislature regards as necessary. In such circumstances, it is at least a significant 
possibility that the relevant measures will not be to the liking of at least some 
state legislatures. State judges are likely to be ineffective enforcers of these 
potentially unpopular measures because they are in theory answerable to the 
state legislatures that, for whatever reason, failed to adopt the measures. 
At the time of the Founding, this problem was far from theoretical. Under the 
Articles of Confederation, the state courts had proved to be ineffective enforcers 
of federal obligations. 55 It was for this reason that the Founders decided to 
establish a federal judiciary staffed by judges having life tenure and salary 
protection,56 and to give it jurisdiction over cases and controversies "arising 
under" federallaw.57 The Constitution does not presume conclusively that state 
courts will be hostile to federal rights. It establishes a Supreme Court and 
confers on it appellate jurisdiction over cases "arising under" federal law, but it 
does not establish lower federal courts. Thus, the default mechanism set up by 
the Constitution for enforcing federal obligations entrusts such enforcement as 
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See also 
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818-19 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[T]he 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers of every well-constructed government [must be] potentially 
coextensive .... All governments which are not extremely defective in their organization, must possess, 
within themselves, the means of expounding, as well as enforcing, their own laws."). 
54. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (5 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
55. See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 
COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1097-1102 (1992). 
56. Under the federal Constitution, federal judges are entitled to life tenure and an undiminishable 
salary. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1. By contrast, most state judges are elected and must stand for 
re-election, and are subject to term limits. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective 
Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 689, 725-26 (1995); Edward Harnett, Why is the 
Supreme Court of the United States Protecting State Judges from Popular Democracy?, 15 TEx. L. REv. 
907,974-75 (1997). 
57. See Vazquez, supra note 55, at 1097-1102. 
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an initial matter to state judges, who are instructed in the Supremacy Clause to 
give effect to federal law "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding." 58 But the Constitution gives the Supreme Court 
the power to review the state courts' judgments to ensure that they comply with 
this instruction. Moreover, the Founders recognized the possibility that Supreme 
Court review of state court decisions might be insufficient to protect the federal 
interests implicated in suits arising under federal law, and so they gave Con-
gress the power to establish lower federal courts with original jurisdiction over 
cases "arising under" federal law. 59 These were the provisions of the Constitu-
tion the Founders adopted to implement the political axiom to which Hamilton 
referred. 60 
The mechanism just described was established to give efficacy to federal 
legal obligations generally, but the Ex parte Young doctrine is relevant to one 
particular subcategory of federal laws: those imposing obligations directly on 
the states. The Constitution itself, as originally adopted, imposed significant 
obligations on the states, primarily of a negative character, such as the obliga-
tion not to enforce ex post facto laws61 or bills of attainder, 62 and the Civil War 
Amendments imposed substantial additional obligations.63 The Constitution 
also gives Congress the power to impose obligations on the states through 
legislation. Under the Court's current doctrine, Congress may impose substan-
tive obligations on states as part of a larger class of regulated parties.64 Thus, 
Congress can require the state as an employer to pay a minimum wage, and it 
can prohibit the state from infringing patents and copyrights. Even if the Court 
were to begin construing Congress's powers in this regard more narrowly, it is 
unlikely to withdraw the power entirely.65 Additionally, federal obligations may 
be.imposed on the states by treaty.66 
For reasons that require little elaboration, the need for a federal forum in 
which to enforce federal law is at its zenith when the federal law is one that 
imposes obligations directly on the state.67 A norm whose "enforcement" is 
58. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
59. This has become known as the Madisonian Compromise. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, 
DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 7-9 (1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. 
60. See Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 819. 
61. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10, cl. 1. 
62. /d. 
63. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV. 
64. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383 ( 1997). 
65. See Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1750-51. 
66. See, e.g., Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924). Whether the limitations elaborated in New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997), are 
applicable in the context of treaties is unclear. If applied fully in this context, the consular notification 
provision at issue in the Breard case may well have been inapplicable to state officials for reasons of 
domestic constitutional law. If so, then Congress was, and is, required to establish some mechanism to 
ensure that federal officials provide the necessary notification. 
67. See also Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1701. 
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controlled by an agent of the supposedly obligated party hardly warrants the 
appellation "law" at all, let alone ."supreme law." Yet it is precisely in this 
situation that the Eleventh Amendment, as interpreted in Hans v. Louisiana, 
denies the federal courts jurisdiction. This is the reason the Hans decision has 
been so controversial. 
The offensiveness of Hans to rule-of-law values depends on what exactly the 
Amendment immunizes the states from, and this is currently a matter of 
uncertainty.68 By its terms, the Amendment places certain cases outside the 
federal judicial power.69 This seems to mean that no federal court has jurisdic-
tion over the types of cases the Amendment reaches. If so, then, to the extent 
the Amendment denies the federal courts jurisdiction over remedies for the 
violation of federal rights, litigants seeking such remedies would be wholly at 
the mercy of potentially hostile state courts. Under such circumstances, the 
Amendment effectively immunizes the states from the types of remedies it bars 
the federal courts from awarding. A number of the Court's decisions support this 
"immunity-from-remedy"70 interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.71 
Other cases, however, suggest that the Amendment does considerably less 
than this.72 Under the "forum-allocation" interpretation, the Amendment does 
68. I examine the competing views the cases reflect concerning the nature of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity more fully in Vazquez, supra note 5. 
69. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "the judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend" to certain categories of cases. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
70. See generally Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1714-44. In an earlier article, I referred to this 
interpretation as the "immunity-from-liability" interpretation, id. at 1700, but in choosing that term I 
was assuming that Edelman and its progeny barred only monetary relief. Since that is the issue now on 
the table, I have adopted the less conclusory, though more awkward, term used above. 
71. See generally id. at 1702. There are in theory two versions of this view. Under the first version, 
the Amendment protects the state from an appeal to the Supreme Court without its consent. On this 
view, state courts may be theoretically required to entertain suits against the state itself, but the 
Supreme Court will be unavailable to reverse their judgments if they violate this duty. Under the second 
version, the Eleventh Amendment does not shield the states from the appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, but there is nothing in the Constitution that denies the states the privilege of asserting 
sovereign immunity in their own courts, even from claims based on federal law. (This is not so much an 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as an interpretation of the Supremacy Clause. It interprets 
the Supremacy Clause as not imposing an obligation on the states to entertain suits against themselves 
in their own courts if the Eleventh Amendment would protect the states from such suits in the federal 
courts.) I regard the two positions as effectively the same, for without Supreme Court review, the states' 
"duty" to award relief in their own courts can be violated with impunity. See id. 
There is currently a split among state supreme courts about whether they are required by the 
Supremacy Clause to entertain suits against S\lltes based on federal law that would be barred from the 
federal courts by the Eleventh Amendment. Compare Alden v. Maine, 1998 Me. 200 (sovereign 
immunity may be invoked to dismiss private suit against state under Fair Labor Standards Act), with 
Jacoby v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 962 S.W.2d 773 (Ark. 1998) (sovereign immunity not a defense in 
such a lawsuit). Thus, the Supreme Court may soon have occasion to decide (a) whether it has 
jurisdiction to review a state court decision dismissing on sovereign immunity grounds a federal-law 
action against a state, and, if so, (b) whether the states are barred by the Supremacy Clause from 
invoking sovereign immunity as a defense to such an action in circumstances in which the suit would 
be barred from federal court by the Eleventh Amendment. 
72. The cases supporting this narrower interpretation are discussed in Vazquez, supra note 5, at 
1708-14. 
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not limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and has no bearing on 
the obligation of state courts to entertain suits against the states based on federal 
law. The state courts, on this view, remain obligated by the Supremacy Clause 
to entertain suits brought against states that would be barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment if brought in the federal courts, and the Supreme Court retains the 
power to make sure that they do. If this is the sort of immunity the Amendment 
confers, then its function is merely to channel certain suits against the states into 
the state courts as an initial matter, postponing federal court involvement until 
the appellate stage. 
The Amendment is less offensive to rule-of-law values under the forum-
allocation view than under the immunity-from-remedy view. Nevertheless, the 
Founders understood that the vindication of federal rights might in certain 
circumstances require the creation of lower federal courts with original jurisdic-
tion over suits arising under federal law. Their decision to authorize Congress to 
give the lower federal courts jurisdiction over cases "arising under" federal law 
means that they recognized that state court hostility to federal rights, or even 
the state courts' possible lack of expertise on federal matters, might undermine 
the interests underlying federal laws in ways that could be difficult for the 
Supreme Court to correct on appeae3 The Eleventh Amendment inhibits the 
vindication of federal norms to the extent it disables Congress from giving the 
federal courts original jurisdiction even when federal rights are likely to be 
undermined in these ways. 
Commentators have argued that Hans is not only offensive to the rule of law 
but also rests on shaky constitutional ground. Proponents of the "diversity" 
theory of the Eleventh Amendment maintain that the Amendment should not 
have been read to apply to cases "arising under" federal law in the first place.74 
Relying on the Amendment's text, the intent of its Framers, and constitutional 
structure, they have made a strong case for interpreting the Eleventh Amend-
ment as merely removing a diversity basis of federal jurisdiction over cases 
against states, leaving intact the "arising under" basis of jurisdiction. This 
interpretation would, of course, eliminate the rule-of-law problems that make 
Hans so controversial. As the states' immunity would not extend to suits based 
on federal law, there would no longer be a gap between the legislative and 
judicial powers of the federal government. 
The Court was recently evenly divided on whether to overrule Hans and 
adopt the diversity interpretation. Justice Scalia reserved judgment on the 
question in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transporta-
73. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 486 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (statement of James 
Madison). 
74. The relevant commentators are cited, and their arguments discussed more fully, in Vazquez, 
supra note 5, at 1694-99. For a more recent defense of the diversity theory, see James E. Pfander, 
History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. 
REv. 1269 (1998). 
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tion,75 but in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 76 he came out against doing so. 
Although Justice Scalia was in dissent in that case, his views later prevailed in 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, in which the Court narrowly but emphati-
cally reaffirmed Hans.71 As discussed more fully in Part VI, the Justices who 
decline to overrule Hans granted that the evidence of the decision's consistency 
with the Framers' intent was ambiguous, but they decided to adhere to it 
anyway, largely for reasons of stare decisis.78 
Justice Scalia was in dissent in Union Gas because a majority of the Court in 
that case adopted a somewhat different strategy to alleviate the rule-of-law 
problems posed by Hans. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,79 the Court had held that the 
immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment could be abrogated by Con-
gress under its power to enforce the Civil War Amendments. In Union Gas, a 
majority of the Court held that this immunity could be abrogated as well under 
the Commerce Clause,80 and this holding was widely understood as recognizing 
a plenary congressional power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.81 
Though this holding did not eliminate the rule-of-law problem, it greatly 
reduced its significance, at least so far as the statutory obligations of the states 
were concemed.82 In Seminole Tribe, however, the Court reversed Union Gas 
and held that Congress has no power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity under Article I. 83 
In deciding to uphold Hans in the face of the challenge posed by the diversity 
theory, the Court emphasized that the Amendment was not as pernicious as its 
detractors made it out to be.84 A number of features of the increasingly rococo 
structure of rules and exceptions that make up Eleventh Amendment doctrine do 
indeed alleviate the rule-of-law problems posed by Hans. The Ex parte Young 
exception is perhaps the most important, but there are others. 
First, the Court has interpreted the Amendment not to apply to suits brought 
by the United States85 or by sister states.86 This means the Amendment bars 
only suits brought by private parties, Indian Tribes,87 and foreign states.88 The 
fact that federal laws remain enforceable in federal court at the behest of the 
federal executive branch alleviates but does not cure the problem posed by the 
75. 483 U.S. 468 (1987). 
76. 491 U.S. 1, 35 (1989) 
77. 116S.Ct.lll4(1996). 
78. See infra text accompanying notes 485-98. 
79. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
80. 491 U.S. at 15. 
81. This is how all of the Justices in Seminole Tribe interpreted Union Gas. See 116 S. Ct. at 
1126-27; id. at 1133-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1184 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
82. See Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1687 & n.20. 
83. 517 U.S. at 66. The Court did not disturb Fitzpatrick, however. See id. at 65-66. 
84. See infra text accompanying notes 488-489, 494, 498. 
85. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643-46 (1892). 
86. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 83 (1907). 
87. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatack, 501 U.S. 775, 779-82 (1991). 
88. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934). 
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Eleventh Amendment. Relying on the executive branch to initiate litigation to 
enforce the countermajoritarian rights conferred by the Constitution, and other 
legal rights that might at certain times or in certain contexts be unpopular, is 
problematic. Additionally, the requirement that the executive branch litigate 
these obligations raises the cost of enforcing these rights. In a world of limited 
governmental resources, this means that some significant portion of such viola-
tions will go uncorrected. The possibility of enforcement by the executive 
branch, however, does mean that the Amendment provides, at most, an immu-
nity from certain sorts of remedies, not an immunity from substantive federal 
regulation. The Amendment limits the enforcement mechanisms Congress can 
establish to give efficacy to the obligations it imposes on the states, but it does 
not limit Congress power to impose obligations on the states in the first 
instance. 89 
Congress's options are limited in this way, moreover, only when it exercises 
certain of its legislative powers. As already noted, the Court in Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer held that Congress may abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity when it legislates pursuant to its power to enforce the Civil War Amend-
ments,90 and presumably this power extends to legislation pursuant to later 
Amendments that include similar "enforcement" clauses.91 This means that the 
Amendment inhibits Congress only when it exercises a power to regulate the 
states having its source in the unamended Constitution. Even in this context, 
moreover, there is an exception of a sort. Under the Spending Clause, it may 
condition the states' receipt of federal funds on the states' waiver of its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.92 In this situation, Congress does not, strictly speaking, 
abrogate the states' immunity; the states voluntarily agree to provide certain 
remedies and submit to federal jurisdiction. The Amendment limits Congress's 
enforcement options only when it exercises Article I legislative powers to 
impose obligations on the states rather than encourage them to assume obliga-
tions in exchange for federal funds.93 
Congress's abrogation power and its ability to secure waivers under the 
Spending Clause further alleviate the rule-of-law problems, but, again, they do 
not cure them. Under Seminole Tribe, Congress may not abrogate pursuant to its 
Article I powers, so the Eleventh Amendment continues to be an obstacle to the 
enforcement in federal court of such state obligations as the obligation not to 
89. There are limits on Congress's power to impose obligations on the states, but these limits do not 
have their source in the Eleventh Amendment. 
90. U.S. CaNST. amend. Xlll, § 2; amend. XIV, § 5; amend. XV, § 2. 
91. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIX,§ 2; amend. XXlll, § 2; amend. XXIV,§ 2; amend. XXVI,§ 2. But cf 
Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Public Utility Comm'n, 141 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[A]fter 
Seminole, the only remaining source of congressional power to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity is the Fourteenth Amendment."). 
92. See Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1707 & n.112. 
93. See generally Kits Kinsports, Implied Waiver After Seminole Tribe, 82 MINN. L. REv. 793 
(1998). 
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infringe copyrights and patents, or not to engage in unfair competition.94 To 
overcome this problem, the option of attempting to secure a waiver in exchange 
for federal funds is not wholly satisfying as it is costly and in many circum-
stances may be infeasible or invalid.95 Finally, even where abrogation is pos-
sible, it requires the concurrence of the majoritarian branches of the federal 
government and so is unlikely to be an effective strategy for enforcing the 
federal obligations of the states that are countermajoritarian or unpopular. 
The Ex parte Young exception reduces the severity of the rule-of-law prob-
lems that remain. It does this by distinguishing suits against state officials from 
suits against the states themselves. The plaintiffs in Ex parte Young maintained 
that certain state statutes were unconstitutional and requested a federal district 
court to enjoin the state's Attorney General from enforcing them.96 The Court's 
reasons for rejecting the Attorney General's argument that the suit was one 
against the state and thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment were already well 
established at the time,97 but the Court's articulation of them in Ex parte Young 
has become the best known: 
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be. so, the use 
of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of 
complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not 
affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an 
illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting to use the name of the 
State to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because unconstitu-
tional. If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a 
violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such 
enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, 
and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is 
subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The 
State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the 
supreme authority of the United States. 98 
The distinction between suits against states and suits against state officials is 
problematic in some respects.99 Since states can only act through their officials, 
94. Some courts have upheld Congress's power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity with 
respect to patent and copyright claims on the theory that these laws create property rights that Congress 
may properly· "enforce" under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by abrogating the 
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) ll61 (Fed. Cir. 1998). I call this line of analysis the 
"abrogation reductio," and I discuss it in Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1744-66. See also John T. Cross, 
Intellectual Property and the Eleventh Amendment after Seminole Tribe, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 519 
(1998) 
95. See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1911 ( 1995). 
96. 209 U.S. at 129-31. 
97. The Court had earlier used the same analysis to reject an Eleventh Amendment challenge in 
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 285-89 (1885). 
98. 209 U.S. at 159-60. 
99. One oft-noted problem concerns the apparent conflict between Ex parte Young and the principle 
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a flat rule that suits naming state officials as defendants do not implicate the 
Eleventh Amendment would effectively read that Amendment out of the Consti-
tution. 100 It was for this reason that the Court in Edelman drew the line it 
drew. 101 As the next Part explains, the Court in Edelman held that the Ex parte 
Young exception does not reach suits against state officials seeking retrospective 
monetary relief from the state treasury, but this holding gradually evolved into a 
rule barring all retrospective relief. 
In the Pennhurst case, 102 the Court recognized another exception: Ex parte 
Young does not reach suits seeking prospective relief against state officials on 
the basis of state law. For our purposes, however, what is most important about 
the Pennhurst decision was the reasoning that led the Court to that conclusion, 
and the matters it clarified along the way. The authority-stripping rationale 
embraced by the Court in Ex parte Young would appear to have required the 
conclusion that a state official's conduct that violates state law cannot be 
attributed to the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. 103 The Court in 
Pennhurst, however, recognized the obvious: Ex parte Young rests on a fic-
tion. 104 Suits against state officials are for all practical purposes suits against the 
states themselves. When the suit alleges a violation of federal law, the Eleventh 
Amendment challenge is overcome, not because such suits are unimportant to 
the states, but because of the overriding interest in the supremacy of federal 
law. 105 This rationale, the Court held, does not apply to suits challenging state 
conduct as a violation of state law, and so the Eleventh Amendment barrier 
remains in place for such suits. 106 
The Pennhurst Court's willingness to look through the Ex parte Young fiction 
that the substantive provisions of the Constitution apply only to "state action." If the acts of state 
officials that violate federal law were for that very reason deemed to be the act of a private individual 
rather than that of the state, then how can such acts constitute "state action" such as to implicate the 
Constitution in the first place? See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 89 (calling this a " 'well-recognized irony' " 
(quoting Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc. 458 U.S. 670, 685 (1982)). 
100. Chief Justice Marshall appeared to embrace such a rule in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857-58 (1824), but he backed away from it in Governor of Georgia v. 
Madrazo, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 110 (1828). 
101. 415 U.S. at 665. 
102. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 461 U.S. 89 (1984), was the Supreme Court's 
second decision in the Pennhurst litigation. Since I do not cite the first Pennhurst decision, 451 U.S. 1 
( 1981 ), elsewhere in this article, I refer to the second Pennhurst decision as "Pennhurst" rather than as 
"Pennhurst II." 
103. This was the view of the dissenters. See 465 U.S. at 144-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
104. 465 U.S. at 105. 
105. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105: 
[T]he Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate 
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to 'the supreme authority of the United 
States.' As Justice Brennan has observed 'Ex parte Young was the culmination of efforts by 
this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective 
supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution.' Our decisions 
repeatedly have emphasized that the Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the 
vidication of federal rights. 
106. See id. at 106. 
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was an important breakthrough. 107 For one thing, it permitted the Court to 
clarify some previously confusing aspects of Eleventh Amendment doctrine. 
Before Pennhurst, Supreme Court decisions used a variety of formulations to 
describe when a suit against state officials is "really" a suit against the state. 
Many of these formulations were difficult to square with Ex parte Young, which 
was itself a decision that purported to explain when a suit against state officials 
should be regarded as a suit against the state. The Court in Ford Motor Co. v. 
Department of Treasury, for example, said that a suit is really against the state if 
"the state is the real, substantial party in interest." 108 In Hawaii v. Gordon, it 
said that a suit is against the state if it would "affect the public administration of 
government agencies." 109 In Dugan v. Rank, it said that a suit is against the 
state if the effect of the judgment would be "to restrain the government from 
acting or to compel it to act." 110 Taken literally, these standards would bar the 
typical Ex parte Young suit. By recognizing that Ex parte Young rests on a 
fiction, Pennhurst obviated the question of when a suit against a state official is 
"really" against the state. The Court made it clear that the Ford, Hawaii, and 
Dugan formulations set forth a general rule111 to which Ex parte Young is an 
exception. 112 Thus, after Pennhurst, if the suit challenges action taken by state 
officials in their official capacities, we may assume that such actions are actions 
of the state under these other tests, but that conclusion serves merely to raise the 
question whether the suit falls within the Ex parte Young exception. 113 Under 
107. See Amar, supra note ll, at 1480 n.224; Jackson, supra note ll, at 62 (Pennhurst "a real 
advance"). See also David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 
98 HARv. L. REv. 61, 83 (1984) (praising "the Court's emphasis on the subordination of immunity 
doctrine to federal interests" and its "frank recognition that state sovereign immunity must consistently 
yield to the effective enforcement of federal law."). 
108. 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). The Court in Edelman relied on this formulation in deciding that a 
suit seeking money from the state treasury is a suit against the state. 415 U.S. at 663. 
109. 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963). 
llO. 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963). In Dugan, the Court recognized that, even if the suit is "against the 
state" under this test, it is not barred if it challenges a violation of the Constitution. 372 U.S. at 621-22. 
Other cases, however, set forth this test without mentioning the exception. See, e.g., Brown v. GSA, 425 
U.S. 820, 826-27 (1976). 
Ill. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101-02 & n.ll (quoting Ford Motor, Hawaii v. Gordon, Dugan v. 
Rank and other cases as setting forth the general rule about when a suit against a state official is a suit 
against the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes). 
112. See id. at 102 (describing Ex parte Young as an "important exception" to the general rule, as set 
forth in cases such as Ford Motor, Dugan v. Rank, and Hawaii v. Gordon). 
113. Accordingly, there should be little need after Pennhurst to quote or rely on the standard 
expressed in Dugan v. Rank and similar cases. The court in Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 
784 F. Supp. 1549, 1552 (S.D. Ala. 1992), thus erred when it held that a suit seeking prospective relief 
against the Governor of Alabama was barred by. the Eleventh Amendment because the court was being 
asked to " 'restrain the government from acting or to compel it to act.' "!d. at 1552 (quoting Dugan v. 
Rank, 372 U.S. at 101 n.ll). Instead of treating Ex parte Young as an exception to Dugan and like 
cases, the Court treated Dugan as an exception to Ex parte Young. Mter Pennhurst, the Dugan, Hawaii, 
and Ford Motor formulations would appear to have no analytical significance whatsoever, except 
perhaps insofar as they tell us that suits seeking damages from state officials personally are not suits 
against the state. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974) (explaining that while "Ex 
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Pennhurst, a suit falls within the Ex parte Young exception if it alleges that the 
official's conduct violates federal law and seeks relief not barred by the Edel-
man decision. 114 Pennhurst thus also established the Edelman test as the sole 
determinant of whether suits against state officials alleging a violation of federal 
law are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Finally, Pennhurst recognized 
more generally that the Ex parte Young exception does not rest on the relative 
unimportance of certain categories of cases to the states, but on their importance 
to the federal government. This last lesson appears to have been lost on the 
Justices in the majority in Coeur d'Alene. 115 
The only reason given in either Edelman or Pennhurst for excluding suits 
seeking retrospective relief from the Ex parte Young exception was that to hold 
otherwise would "effectively eliminate the Constitutional immunity of the 
States." 116 If true, this would of course be a reason to exclude some category of 
cases from the scope of the Ex parte Young exception, 117 but it is not a reason 
for excluding any particular category. It was not until the decision in Green v. 
Mansour that the Court offered a reason for excluding suits for retrospective 
relief: 
Both prospective and retrospective relief implicate Eleventh Amendment 
concerns, but the availability of prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex 
parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end a 
continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal 
interest in assuring the supremacy of that law. But compensatory or deterrence 
interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amend-
ment.118 
The Court thus suggested that the line drawn in Edelman reflects the idea that 
stopping here-and-now violations of federal law is more important than redress-
ing past violations or deterring future violations by punishing past violations. 
The former interest outweighs the "dictates of the Eleventh Amendment," but 
the latter interests do not. The Court did not identify the interests underlying the 
parte Young is of no aid to a plaintiff seeking damages from the public treasury ... damages against 
individual defendants are a permissible remedy in some circumstances"). 
114. 465 U.S. at 105-06. See also id. at 102-03 ("Edelman held that when a plaintiff sues a state 
official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court may award an injunction that governs the 
official's future conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief."). 
115. See infra text accompanying note 310. 
116. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105. The Court in both Edelman and Pennhurst quoted Judge Mc-
Gowan's statement that monetary relief would have to be prohibited "if [the Eleventh Amendment] is 
to be conceived of as having any present force." Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106 (quoting Edelman, 415 
U.S. at 665, which in tum quoted from Rothstein v. "Yman, 467 F.2d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 1972)). 
117. If the diversity theory were correct, however, the Amendment, properly read, would not reach 
suits arising under federal law in the first place. Since Pennhurst's holding that the Amendment bars 
suits based on state law would thus give the Amendment its full scope, the rule barring retrospective 
relief from federal-law violations would not be justified by the interest in not "effectively eliminating" 
the states' immunity. 
118. 474 U.S. at 68. 
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Eleventh Amendment, but other cases do. "[O]ne of the most important goals of 
[Eleventh Amendment] immunity," the Court has said, is to protect state 
treasuries. 119 Additionally, the Amendment protects the states' dignity by "avoid-
[ing] 'the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial 
tribunals at the instance of private parties.' " 120 It is for the latter reason that the 
Amendment protects states from being sued eo nomine even for only prospec-
tive relief. 121 
Identifying the interests underlying the Eleventh Amendment and the Ex 
parte Young exception, however, tells us little about where the line between 
Edelman and Ex parte Young should be drawn. The proponents of the diversity 
theory, for example, recognized that the point of the Eleventh Amendment was 
to protect state treasuries, 122 but they argued that, for the Amendment's Fram-
ers, this interest may well have been outweighed in all cases arising under 
federal law by the need to ensure the efficacy of the states' federal obliga-
tions.123 The Court in Seminole Tribe rejected the diversity interpretation, but it 
did so principally for reasons of stare decisis. This suggests that doctrinal 
stability and continuity are the most important interests underlying the retention 
of the Hans interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. If so, then the important 
question is how existing doctrine balances the competing interests. 
The Court in Green suggested that Eleventh Amendment doctrine reflects the 
subordination of compensatory. and deterrence interests to the interests underly-
ing the Eleventh Amendment, 124 but the Court's analysis was flawed in funda-
mental ways. The Court relied on a false dichotomy between supremacy and 
deterrence, and it overlooked an important piece of the sovereign immunity 
119. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 49 (1994) (quoting Jacintoport Corp. v. 
Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm'n, 762 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir. 1985). See generally Vazquez, supra 
note 5, at 1722-32. But cf infra text accompanying note 510 (protecting state treasuries is not an 
interest advanced by the Eleventh Amendment under the forum-allocation view). 
120. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58 (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & 
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)). 
121. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58. Justice Kennedy in Coeur d'Alene intimated that the Amend-
ment serves the interests of judicial federalism as well-allowing state courts to get a first crack at 
adjudicating the liabilities of the states. See 117 S. Ct. at 2038. This seems to be just a narrower version 
of the dignitary interest mentioned in Seminole Tribe: giving the states' own courts first crack at 
lawsuits against them is desirable because subjecting them to suits in a "foreign" forum would 
antagonize them. See id. at 2038 (Kennedy, J.). Kennedy's version is narrower because it is concerned 
about the indignity of being hauled into federal court, whereas in Seminole Tribe the Court was 
concerned about the indignity of being hauled into any court. 
122. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 117, 
135-36 (1990); William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical 
Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1386 (1989). 
123. Fletcher, supra note 122, at 135-36. 
124. The Court actually said that "compensation and deterrence interests are insufficient to over-
come the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment." Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (emphasis 
added). This statement is true in a trivial sense; if they could be overcome, they would not be 
"dictates." Because the Court suggested that these "dictates" can be overcome by the interests that 
undergird prospective relief, I understand the Court to have been saying that compensatory and 
deterrence interests cannot overcome the interests underlying the Eleventh Amendment. 
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puzzle. If by "supremacy" of federal law we mean its efficacy, then it is clear 
that this interest cannot be separated from the need to deter violations. The point 
of law is to guide human conduct. 125 A law can be said to be efficacious to the 
extent it succeeds in its purpose of guiding conduct, and obviously a law that 
guides conduct without recourse to judicial proceedings is more efficacious than 
one that does not. An important way the law induces compliance without 
recourse to judicial proceedings is by threatening potential violators with a 
sanction, or, in other words, by deterring violations. As Justice Brennan pointed 
out in Green, if the only remedy available against a state official who has 
violated federal law were an order requiring the violator to stop, state officials 
would have no incentive to pay any regard whatsoever to federal statutes or 
regulations. 126 Until they are told by a court what to do, they can ignore federal 
law safe in the knowledge that they will suffer no consequences. Far from 
ensuring the supremacy of federal statutes and regulations, this regime ensures 
their irrelevance except as the source of the truly binding category of federal 
law: the court order. 127 · 
The Court in Green was also wrong to suggest that the law does not rely on 
the deterrence provided by retrospective sanctions to give efficacy to the federal 
obligations of the states. Most tellingly, the Court accepts the appropriateness of 
such sanctions to deter violations of judicial orders. For example, although 
Edelman held that a court is initially only permitted to order the payment of 
benefits due in the future, if the defendant violates that order, he is subject to a 
number of retrospective sanctions, including civil and criminal contempt sanc-
tions, and indeed the court may order the use of state funds to pay the benefits 
withheld in violation of the court's order, as well as the plaintiff's costs and 
attorney's fees. 128 More important, even when the litigant complains initially 
only of a past violation of law, the court's arsenal of remedies includes the 
quintessentially retrospective remedy of damages. The Court in Edelman held 
that the Eleventh Amendment barred certain suits seeking money from the state 
treasury, but it did not purport to disturb the long line of cases holding that the 
Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages payable from the state official's 
personal resources, 129 and the Court has continued to adhere to these cases after 
Edelman. 130 State officials are protected from such suits by a qualified immu-
125. This is, at least, one of its principal purposes. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, 
On Extra-Judicial Constitutional interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1359, 1375 (1997). 
126. Green, 474 U.S. at 77-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
127. A rule permitting only prospective relief thus has an unexpected connection to the theory of law 
propounded earlier in this century by John Chipman Gray, who famously defined the law as "[r]ules of 
conduct laid down and applied by the courts of a country," THE NATURE AND SouRCES OF LAw 102 
(1909), and contended that statutes were not really law but only "sources" used by the courts to lay 
down true legal norms. !d. at 152. Whatever the merit of this view, it is surprising, to say the least, to 
see it endorsed (implicitly) by judges who are typically thought to disdain judicial lawmaking. 
128. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689-93 (1978). 
129. The Court in Edelman noted that the plaintiffs did not seek money payable from the defendants' 
personal resources. 415 U.S. at 664-65. 
130. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 n.ll (1986). 
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nity, and thus plaintiffs can recover damages only for the most egregious 
violations. 131 But limiting liability in this way does not (or at least is not 
intended to) compromise the interest in deterring violations of federal law. 
Underlying the officials' immunity seems to be the fear that, without it, state 
officers will be overdeterred. 132 
The Court in Green thus got the relationship between Ex parte Young and the 
interest in deterrence all wrong. 133 The case law permitting individual-capacity 
damage actions against state officials is a key aspect of sovereign immunity 
doctrine, as Justice Scalia recognized when he cited these cases along with Ex 
parte Young as alleviating the rule-of-law problems posed by Hans. 134 Eleventh 
Amendment doctrine does not suggest that deterring violations of federal law by 
state officials is unimportant. The doctrine merely seeks to advance the interest 
in deterrence through the regime of officer liability as opposed to entity 
liability. 135 
The line of cases affirming the availability of individual-capacity damage 
actions places the original holding of Edelman in an entirely different light. If 
Edelman merely protects states from suits seeking money from the state trea-
sury, then Ex parte Young is not a narrow exception to a broad rule of immunity 
for state actors; rather, it establishes a bright line between federal-law suits 
against states and federal-law suits against state officials. The former are barred 
by the Eleventh Amendment regardless of the relief sought, but the latter are 
permitted by the Eleventh Amendment regardless of the relief sought. On this 
view, Edelman merely establishes that whether the plaintiff is suing the state or 
the official does not tum entirely on whom the plaintiff has named as the 
defendant. In a suit for monetary relief, the suit is against the official only if the 
plaintiff seeks money from the official. But if the plaintiff seeks specific relief, 
the suit is regarded as one against the official as long as the official is the named 
defendant. If Edelman were read merely to bar suits seeking money from the 
state treasury, the Eleventh Amendment would not categorically bar any type of 
relief. It would merely specify who is the proper defendant in a suit seeking 
money damages, and a wholly separate (and subconstitutional) immunity doc-
trine would bar monetary remedies not deemed necessary to ensure the su-
premacy of federal law. On the other hand, reading Edelman more broadly to 
bar some forms of nonmonetary relief, as the Supreme Court's recent cases do, 
131. The privilege protects officials from damage liability if the federal law they violated was not 
"clearly established." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
132. See id. at 807; Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1643-44 (1997). 
133. The Court in Green was also mistaken about the connection between the Eleventh Amendment 
and the interest in compensating victims of violations of federal law. See infra text accompanying note 
124. 
134. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
135. Whether it succeeds is a different question. For a discussion of whether an officer liability 
regime is, or can be made, as effective as an entity liability regime, see generally Larry Kramer & Alan 
0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under§ 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 SuP. Cr. REv. 249; 
Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1801-04. 
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creates a gaping hole in the constitutional regime for enforcing the federal legal 
obligations of the states. 
II. THE INADVERTENT EXPANSION OF THE EDELMAN EXCEPTION 
TO THE EX PARTE YOUNG EXCEPTION 
Although Edelman v. Jordan is widely regarded as the source of the prospec-
tive-retrospective distinction, the Court in Edelman did not purport to be 
breaking new ground. The Court appeared to believe that the case before it was 
governed by the already well-settled rule that "a suit by private parties seeking 
to impose a liability payable from public funds in the state treasury is foreclosed 
by the [Eleventh] Amendment." 136 The Court asserted that proposition near the 
beginning of its analysis, citing three Supreme Court decisions from the 1940s, 137 
and then proceeded to apply the rule to the facts before it. 138 The innovation in 
the Court's analysis in Edelman was its use of the terms "prospective" and 
"retrospective" to describe the limits of Ex parte Young. As explained below, 
however, the Court used these adjectives to distinguish the sort of monetary 
relief permitted by the Eleventh Amendment from the sort of monetary relief 
barred by it; the Court did not say that retroactive nonmonetary relief was 
barred. Retroactivity, in other words, was treated by the Court as necessary but 
not sufficient to take the suit out of the Ex parte Young exception. 
This Part describes the gradual transformation of a holding that suits seeking 
retroactive monetary relief from the state fall outside the Ex parte Young 
exception into a rule that can be read to bar, inter alia, suits seeking to halt an 
unlawful execution. This discussion will show that the test the Court today 
espouses came about as the result of an apparently inadvertent, and in any event 
unexamined, overreacting of the Edelman holding. It also shows that, with one 
independently vulnerable exception, the decisions adopting this broader test 
have done so only in dictum. 
A. EDELMAN 
The plaintiffs in Edelman were challenging a policy followed by Illinois 
officials administering a benefits program funded by the federal government 
pursuant to the Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled (AABD) statute. 139 
Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Illinois officials were violating a federal 
regulation requiring that eligibility for benefits for the aged and blind be 
decided within ·thirty days of the application date, 140 and providing that benefits 
136. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 651. 
137. The Court cited Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946), Ford 
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945), and Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. 
Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944). 
138. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 666-67. 
139. /d. at 653. 
140. Federal regulations required that the processing of the applications of the disabled be com-
pleted within 60 days. See id. at 654. 
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begin to accrue on the date the application is approved or on the thirtieth day 
after a successful application was submitted, whichever comes first. 141 The state 
officials challenged the validity of those regulations, but the district court 
ordered the officials to adhere to them in processing future applications. 142 In 
addition, the court ordered the state to "release AABD benefits withheld from 
those whose applications ... had not been processed within the federal time 
limits." 143 In other words, the state officials were ordered to pay successful 
applicants the benefits they would have received had their applications been 
processed on time. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, 144 and the Supreme Court affirmed the 
portion of the order requiring the officials to adhere to the time limit in 
processing future applications. 145 The Court held, however, that the Eleventh 
Amendment barred the court from ordering the state officials to use money from 
the state treasury to pay past-due benefits. 146 The Court relied on the principle 
that, "[w]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the 
state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its 
sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal 
defendants." 147 Throughout the opinion, the Court expressed its holding in such 
a way as to reach only claims for monetary relief. 148 
The Court introduced the concept of retroactivity only to distinguish permis-
sible from impermissible monetary relief. The Court did not disturb the district 
court's injunction insofar as it required the state officials to dispense funds to 
future applicants in accordance with the federal deadlines, concluding that this 
141. See id. at 654 n.3. 
142. See Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985,988 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
143. /d. at 988 (quoting the district court). 
144. See id. at 999. 
145. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664. Justice Kennedy in Coeur d'Alene, writing only for himself and 
the Chief Justice, argued that, because the parties had conceded that the "prospective" portion of the 
award fell within the Ex parte Young exception, the Court in Edelman had no occasion to decide 
whether that was in fact the case. 117 S. Ct. at 2038. However, seven Justices in Coeur d'Alene 
expressly rejected Kennedy's suggestion that Edelman left the question open. /d. at 2046 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring); id. at 2051 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting). Moreover, even Kennedy did not dispute that a 
court orders prospective relief when it orders that payments due in the future comply with federal law. 
Kennedy instead questioned whether such prospective relief should always be available in federal court. 
See id. at 2034. In this article, I rely on the Court's upholding of the "prospective" portion of the 
district court's order primarily for what it tells us about how the Court understood the concept of 
"prospectivity." 
146. See Edelman, 465 U.S. at 668-70. 
147. /d. at 663 (quoting Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 464). 
148. See id. ("liability which must be paid from public funds" barred); id. ("retroactive payments of 
statutory benefits"); id. at 664 ("accrued monetary liability"); id. at 665 (suits seeking award of "state 
funds to make reparation for the past" barred (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 236-37 (2d 
Cir. 1972)); id. ("monetary award against the state itself" barred); id. at 666 ("monetary judgment 
payable out of the state treasury" barred); id. at 668 (suits requiring "payment of state funds ... as a 
form of compensation" barred); id. (relief granted by district court impennissible because "it is in 
practical effect indistinguishable in many aspects from an award of damages against the States" and "is 
measured in terms of a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty"); id. at 677 (award 
"may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury"). 
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portion of the order fell within the Ex parte Young exception because it simply 
required the state to bring its conduct into compliance with federal law. Because 
the Court thus upheld an award of monetary relief, the proposition that suits 
seeking money from the state treasury are barred failed to explain the Court's 
judgment. That is why the Court introduced the distinction between prospective 
and retrospective relief. The Court's opinion makes it clear, however, that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars an award of past-due benefits because such relief is 
both retroactive and monetary. 149 The Court never said that all retroactive relief 
is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 
Keeping in mind that the Edelman Court's distinction applied only to mon-
etary relief, it is useful to consider briefly how the Court understood the 
concepts of prospectivity and retrospectivity. 150 In other contexts, the distinc-
tion between what is prospective and what is retrospective is straightforward. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term "prospective" as "operative 
with regard to the future" 151 and "retrospective" as "operative with regard to 
past time." 152 A statute is said to have prospective effect when it applies only to 
conduct taking place after the statute's enactment, and it is said to have 
retrospective or retroactive effect when it addresses the legal status of conduct 
that took place before its enactment. When used to describe forms of relief, 
however, the meaning of the terms is necessarily more complex. Consistent 
with the dictionary definitions, the Court has stated that Edelman permits relief 
"that governs the official's future conduct." 153 But that formulation is unhelp-
ful, as any sort of relief necessarily addresses the defendant's future conduct. A 
court order awarding damages, considered the prototypical form of retrospec-
tive relief, requires the defendant to pay the damages in the future. 
The Court in Edelman tells· us that the relief sought in that case was 
retrospective because "[i]t is measured in terms of a monetary loss resulting 
from a past breach of a legal duty." 154 The Court thus focuses on the time of the 
conduct complained of, suggesting that if the plaintiff is complaining about, and 
seeking relief from, conduct that already took place, she is seeking retrospective 
relief. On this view, the courts' role in suits against state officials is merely to 
prevent anticipated violations of federal law, or to stop ongoing violations, but 
not to redress violations that have already taken place. Past events may be 
relevant to show that the plaintiff has standing to complain of possible future 
violations or to show that the plaintiff's fear of future violations is well-
founded, but when it comes to awarding relief, the courts must simply disregard 
them. 
This seemingly straightforward formulation of the test, however, elides some 
149. See id. at 668. 
150. For a more extensive discussion, see infra Part V. 
151. 12 OXFORD ENGLISH 01Cfl0NARY 669 (2d ed. 1989) (definition 4a). 
152. 13 id. at 801 (definition 2). 
153. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 103. 
154. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668. 
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serious complexities. These difficulties will be examined in Part V. For the 
moment, it suffices to note that the Court provided no reason for concluding that 
an obligation to pay money is not a continuing or ongoing obligation as long as 
the obligation remains unfulfilled. What the Court does tell us is that an award 
of benefits is "retrospective" insofar as the plaintiff's entitlement to the benefits 
"accrued" in the past. 155 A suit seeking benefits that accrue after the court's 
order seeks prospective relief. We shall see that the Court itself has failed 
consistently to follow even this limited guidance. 
B. MILLIKEN 
The Court's 1977 decision in Milliken v. Bradlei 56 appeared to confirm that 
Edelman placed only retrospective monetary relief outside the safe harbor of Ex 
parte Young. If ever there was a case involving nonmonetary relief susceptible 
to classification as "retrospective," Milliken was it. Yet the Court held the relief 
to be permissible under Ex parte Young. 
Milliken v. Bradley came before the Supreme Court twice. The plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendants, Michigan and Detroit officials, had maintained a 
system of de jure segregation in the Detroit public schools, and the district court 
agreed. 157 As a remedy, the court ordered, inter alia, the busing of children from 
neighboring school districts into the Detroit school district, 158 concluding that 
there was no other way to integrate the Detroit schools. 159 The first time the 
case reached the Supreme Court, the issue was whether the court had acted 
properly in ordering a multidistrict remedy without first finding that there had 
been unconstitutional segregation in the other districts, or that officials from 
other districts were responsible in some way for the unconstitutional segrega-
155. This is suggested by tbe Court's statement in Edelman, repeated in later cases, that tbe relief 
sought in tbe case was retrospective because the plaintiff was seeking an "accrued monetary liability." 
Jd. at 664; see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977), discussed below. The Court did not 
elaborate on tbe meaning of "accrued," but lower courts have defined it as tbe date when the obligation 
to pay money matures or vests, which may be tbe same as tbe date by which payment was required or 
may be earlier. The Second Circuit, for example, has held tbat liability for Medicaid benefits accrue 
when medical services are rendered, even if payment is not due until later. See Perales, 50 F.3d at 130. 
Thus, a court may not order a state to pay for medical services performed before the court's order, even 
if payment for the services is not due until after tbe court's order. In Edelman, class members whose 
applications had already been processed were not entitled to any relief, as they were complaining about 
the failure to pay benefits tbat had already accrued. Class members whose applications had not yet been 
processed were entitled to an order requiring tbat the applications be processed within tbe relevant time 
period. If their applications had already been pending longer, tbey were presumably entitled to an order 
requiring that, if found eligible, tbey be paid amounts tbat accrued between tbe court's order and tbe 
approval of their applications, but not amounts tbat had accrued before the court's order. Cf Barnes v. 
Bosley, 828 F.2d 1253, 1257-58 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding an award of "backpay" for tbe period 
between the issuance of tbe court's order and the time employee reinstated). 
156. 433 u.s. 267 (1977). 
157. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 725 (1974). 
158. See id. at 754. 
159. See id. 
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tion in betroit. 160 In reversing the multidistrict remedy, the Court relied heavily 
on its earlier decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion161 to the effect that the object of the remedy must be to "correct ... 'the 
condition that offends the Constitution.' " 162 The Court stressed that the condi-
tion that offended the Constitution in Milliken was the past de jure segregation 
in the Detroit public schools, not their present racial imbalance. On the latter 
point, the Court quoted its statement in Swann that "as a matter of substantive 
constitutional right, [no] particular degree of racial balance or mixing" is 
required. 163 The Court remanded for the imposition of a proper remedy. 164 
On remand, the district court ordered the defendants to put in place, inter 
alia, "13 remedial and compensatory programs," 165 including a "remedial 
reading and communications skills program." 166 The district court found that 
this relief was "needed to remedy effects of past segregation." 167 Because state 
as well as local officials had been responsible for maintaining the system of de 
jure segregation, the court ordered that the costs of these programs be shared 
equally by the state and city defendants. 
Before the Supreme Court a second time, the defendants challenged the 
propriety of the district court's remedy, and the state officials argued that the 
portion of the order requiring them to pay half the cost of the programs violated 
the Eleventh Amendment under the standard adopted in Edelman. 168 This time, 
the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order in its entirety. On the 
question of the appropriate remedy, the Court quoted its earlier decision as 
setting forth the relevant standard: the remedy "must be designed as nearly as 
possible 'to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they 
would have occupied in the absence of such conduct.' " 169 "The ultimate 
objective," the Court said, "is to make whole the victims of unlawful con-
duct." 170 The Court said that it was appropriate to establish "a program of 
compensatory education" 171 for victims to help them "overcome the past 
inadequacies of their education," 172 and that the remedy may include "specific 
educational programs designed to compensate minority group children for 
160. See id. at 744-45. 
161. 402 U.S. I, 14 (1971). 
162. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 738 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 16). See also id. at 744 ("the scope of 
the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation"). 
163. /d. at 740. 
164. See id. at 753. 
165. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. at 272. 
166. /d. at 272 n.5. 
167. /d. at 274 (quoting the district court). 
168. See id. at 288-90. 
169. /d. at 280 (quoting Milliken, 418 U.S. at 746). 
170. /d. at 280 n.l5. 
171. /d. at 284 (quoting Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817, 831 (5th Cir. 
1969)). 
172. /d. at 285 (quoting Smith v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 106, 110 (1969), aff'd, 
448 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
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unequal educational opportunities resulting from past or present racial and 
ethnic isolation." 173 
The Court's reasons for upholding the remedy left the part of the order 
requiring the state defendants to pay for half of the cost vulnerable to an 
Eleventh Amendment challenge. The district court had ordered the payment of 
funds from the state treasury, and the funds were concededly being used to 
"compensate" and "make whole" the victims of past wrongdoing by state 
officials. The Court had made it clear that the constitutional violation at issue 
was the past de jure segregation, not any present failure to achieve "a particular 
degree of racial balance" in the schools, and the district court had expressly 
ordered the state officials to use state funds "to remedy effects of past segrega-
tion." 174 This, the state defendants argued, was clearly retroactive monetary 
relief. 175 The Court, however, affirmed the order against the state officials. 
Milliken can be read to have found Edelman inapplicable because: (a) the 
relief sought was not monetary; (b) the relief sought was not retrospective; or 
(c) the relief sought was neither. The most satisfying interpretation construes the 
decision as holding that the case fell within the Ex parte Young exception 
because the relief sought (and awarded) was not monetary. The Court character-
ized the Edelman case as "a suit for money damages," and described the 
holding in Edelman as barring "the award of an accrued monetary liability" 
representing "retroactive payments." 176 It distinguished Milliken from Edelman 
on the ground that, in Milliken, "there was no money award ... in favor of 
respondent Bradley or any members of his class." 177 "This case," the Court 
said, "simply does not involve individual citizens conducting a raid on the state 
treasury for an accrued monetary liability." 178 The Court's language suggests 
that Edelman bars the court from ordering that defendants pay state money· to 
the plaintiffs for the purpose of compensating them for past wrongs. On this 
theory, the Edelman rule was inapplicable because the defendants were not 
ordered to pay money to the plaintiffs, but were instead required to bear the cost 
of a form of nonmonetary relief. 
There is language in Milliken, however, suggesting that the Court found the 
Edelman rule inapplicable because it regarded the relief awarded by the district 
court to be prospective.179 But the Court's attempt to distinguish Edelman on 
this ground was almost embarrassingly weak. Every reason given by the Court 
for regarding the relief in Milliken as prospective applied equally to the relief 
found retrospective in Edelman. For example, the Court stressed that in Milliken 
the court had ordered that remedial programs be put into effect "prospectively," 
173. /d. at285 (quoting United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d441, 448 (5thCir. 1971)). 
174. /d. at 274 (emphasis added). 
175. See id. at 288-89. 
176. /d. at 289 (quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663-64) (emphasis added in Milliken). 
177. /d. at 290 n.22. 
178. /d. 
179. See infra text accompanying notes 180, 182-83. 
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and that the order thus operated "prospectively to bring about the delayed 
benefits of a unitary school system." 180 The profusion of italics, however, 
cannot obscure the fact that the "retrospective" portion of the district court's 
order in Edelman operated prospectively in just the same way-to bring about 
delayed benefits (literally). As David Currie has observed, "no one is ever 
ordered to have paid yesterday." 181 
The Court also stressed that the order at issue in Milliken did "no more than" 
"enjoin state officials to conform their conduct to the requirements of federal 
law, notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury," 182 
and that they were merely ordered to "eliminate from the public schools all 
vestiges of state-imposed segregation." 183 That is true, but we are left to 
wonder why eliminating "vestiges" of past unconstitutional conduct is not 
retrospective relief. The plaintiffs in Edelman were denied funds that federal 
law required the state to pay them; the Court might just as plausibly have said 
that the district court had merely ordered the defendants to eliminate the 
"vestiges" of that unlawful omission. 
In short, the Court's attempt to classify the relief in Milliken as prospective 
completely fails to distinguish it from the relief the Court in Edelman found to 
be retrospective. 184 For this reason, the Milliken decision is best understood as 
reaffirming that Edelman bars only retroactive monetary relief. 185 So under-
stood, the decision merely clarifies that "monetary relief" means relief requir-
ing the defendant to pay money directly to the plaintiff. 
C. FROM QUERN TO PAPASAN 
Although the Edelman holding applied only to suits for monetary relief, and 
Milliken is best read to confirm that limitation, the Court in subsequent cases 
180. /d. (emphases in original). 
181. David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government Officers, 1984 SuP. CT. 
REv. 149, 162. 
182. Milliken, 433 U.S. at 289. 
183. /d. at 290 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 15). 
184. The Court in Milliken also distinguished the relief involved in Edelman from that upheld in 
Milliken on the ground that, "[u]nlike the award in Edelman, the injunction entered here could not 
instantaneously restore the victims of unlawful conduct to their rightful position." Milliken, 433 U.S. at 
290 n.21. See also id. at 290 ("These programs were not, and as a practical matter could not be, 
intended to wipe the slate clean by one bold stroke, as could a retroactive award of money in 
Edelman."). It is not clear why the comparative ineffectiveness of the remedy at correcting the 
violation should make it less objectionable under the Eleventh Amendment. At any rate, if the 
permissibility of a remedy turns on its failure to "wipe the slate clean in one bold stroke," then it would 
follow that the district court in Edelman could have avoided Eleventh Amendment problems by 
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff Jordan the past-due amounts in installments, but no one reads 
either Edelman or Milliken that way. The Court here seems to be grasping at straws to distinguish the 
case before it from Edelman. This particular straw, however, has nothing to do with "prospectivity" or 
"retrospectivity." To the extent the lack-of-instantaneity point is relevant, it may provide a further gloss 
on the type of monetary relief permitted by the Eleventh Amendment and the type it prohibits, but it 
does not shed any light on the concept of prospectivity. 
185. But cf Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2047 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court [in 
Milliken] upheld the relief ... because the remedy was prospective rather than retrospective."). 
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has taken a number of small, almost imperceptible, steps towards reading 
Edelman to tum on the retroactivity vel non of the relief sought. 186 Until Coeur 
d'Alene, the holdings of all of these cases, with one shaky exception, were 
consistent with the view that Edelman bars only retroactive monetary relief. 187 
Nevertheless, these cases laid the groundwork for the problematic decisions in 
Coeur d'Alene and Breard. 
1. Quem 
The first step came in Quem v. Jordan, 188 a sequel to Edelman. After the 
remand in Edelman, the lower court ordered the defendants to send class 
members a notice informing them that "a state administrative procedure [was] 
available" by which they might pursue their claims for past benefits. 189 The 
Supreme Court held that such relief was permissible as "ancillary" to the 
prospective relief the Court had upheld in Edelman, stressing that the district 
court did not purport to decide whether the class members were in fact entitled 
to any relief from the state, 190 and that the state officials had not raised an 
objection to the expense of preparing or sending the notice. 191 The significance 
of Quem for present purposes lies in the Court's description of what it had 
decided in Edelman. Consistent with the reading of Edelman offered above, the 
Court in Quem explained that Edelman merely "reaffirmed the rule that had 
evolved in our earlier cases that a suit in federal court by private parties seeking 
to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury 
is barred by the Eleventh Amendment." 192 
Two statements in Quem, however, read out of context, could be understood 
to treat "retrospectivity" as a sufficient condition for Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. One of those statements-a reference to "the distinction set forth in 
Edelman between prospective relief, which is permitted by the Eleventh Amend-
186. Doctrinal evolution by "almost imperceptible steps" is characteristic of the law in this area. See 
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 524 (1954). 
187. With-the exception of Papasan v. Allain, discussed infra text accompanying notes 228-56, all of 
the cases in which the Eleventh Amendment was found applicable on the ground that the relief sought 
was retrospective involved solely monetary relief. 
188. 440 U.S. 332 (1979). 
· 189. The notice ordered by the district court actually went further; it would have informed the class 
members that their rights were violated and it would have included a "notice of appeal" for the class 
members to file with the state administrative agency. The Court of Appeals held that such a notice was 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment but said that notice relief of the type described in the text was 
permissible. The Supreme Court was reviewing the latter decision. 
190. See Quem, 440 U.S. at 348 ("[W]hether or not the class member will receive retroactive 
benefits rests entirely with the State, its agencies, courts, and legislatures, not with the federal court."). 
191. See id. at 349. The circumstances in which notice relief is permitted by the Eleventh Amend-
ment were clarified in Green v. Mansour, discussed infra text accompanying notes 216-27. 
192. /d. at 337 (citing Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663; Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 
U.S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Great N. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944)). 
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ment, and retrospective relief, which is not" 193 -is merely a description of the 
Court of Appeals' holding. The other is a statement that "[t]he distinction 
between that relief permissible under the doctrine of Ex parte Young and that 
found barred in Edelman was the difference between prospective relief on the 
one hand and retrospective relief on the other." 194 This statement came at the 
end of the paragraph that began with the description of Edelman's holding as 
"reaffirming" the principle quoted above about liabilities that must be paid 
from public funds, and immediately followed the Court's observation that Ex 
parte Young permits prospective injunctive relief "even though such an injunc-
tion may have an ancillary effect on the state treasury." 195 In context, therefore, 
it seems clear that the Court was merely saying that the distinction between the 
relief found permissible in Ex parte Young and that found impermissible in 
Edelman was that between prospective and retrospective monetary relief. Unfor-
tunately, the Court in Quem was less careful than in Edelman to make it clear 
that its holding extended only to monetary relief. 196 
2. Cory v. White 
Cory v. White 197 is easily misread to hold that Edelman bars all suits against 
state officials seeking retrospective relief. Although some lower courts appear to 
have read the case that way, 198 the case stands for no such thing, and subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions properly read the case more narrowly. 199 
The plaintiff in Cory was the administrator of the estate of Howard Hughes, 
who complained that officials in both California and Texas were imposing 
inheritance taxes on the Hughes estate based on the claim that Hughes was 
domiciled in their state at the time of his death. The administrator brought an 
interpleader action in federal district court naming as defendants the California 
and Texas officials and seeking a determination of Hughes' domicile. To prevail, 
however, the plaintiff had to overcome the Supreme Court's unanimous decision 
in Worcester County Trust Co. v. Rilel00 that the Eleventh Amendment barred 
such interpleader actions. The administrator relied on Edelman, which he 
interpreted as silently overruling Worcester County Trust by holding that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars only "suits 'by private parties seeking to impose a 
liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury.' " 201 The 
193. Quem, 440 U.S. at 336. 
194. /d. at 337. 
195. /d. 
196. The controlling opinion in Coeur d'Alene read Quem to permit the relief to stand "because it 
was ... prospective." Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2046 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
197. 457 U.S. 85 (1982). 
198. See, e.g., Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 737 n.2 (6th Cir. 1994); Ulaleo v. Paty, 902 F.2d 1395, 
1399 (9th Cir. 1990); Banas v. Dempsey, 742 F.2d 277, 288 (6th Cir. 1983); Steffens v. Steffens, 955 F. 
Supp. 101, 105 n.5 (D. Colo. 1997). 
199. See infra note 206 and accompanying text. 
200. 302 U.S. 292 (1937). 
201. Cory, 457 U.S. at 90 (quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663). 
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majority rejected that reading of Edelman and accused the dissent of "mischarac-
teriz[ing] Edelman as asserting that the Eleventh Amendment bars 'only' suits 
seeking money damages. " 202 
The majority's criticism of the dissent was well-founded, but it is a mistake to 
read Cory as holding that all suits seeking retrospective relief fall outside· the Ex 
parte Young exception. As the majority noted in Cory, Worcester County Trust 
held that the plaintiff's interpleader action fell outside the Ex parte Young 
exception because it did not allege that "the action sought to be restrained [was] 
without the authority of state law or contravene[d] the statutes or Constitution 
of the United States." 203 It was for these reasons that the Court in Worcester 
County Trust found tl!e Ex parte Young exception to be inapplicable, and the 
majority in Cory was correct to conclude that Edelman did not disturb this 
holding.204 But neither Edelman nor Cory stands for the proposition that a suit 
seeking retroactive nonmonetary relief is barred if the plaintiff is alleging a 
violation of state or federal law. To the contrary, Cory supports the reading of 
Edelman offered above. While the Cory majority found that suits against state 
officials seeking retroactive monetary relief are not the only suits barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment, it recognized that the holding in Edelman was limited to 
such suits. 205 Significantly, Cory is usually cited today for the proposition that 
suits against the state itself, as distinguished from state officials, are barred 
regardless of the relief sought.Z06 The cases that read it for the proposition that 
suits challenging a state official's violation of federal law are barred even if they 
seek nonmonetary relierz07 are reading it too broadly.Z08 
202. !d. at 90 n.2. 
203. /d. at 89 (quoting Worcester County Trust, 302 U.S. at 297). According to the Court in Cory it 
was "clear ... that inconsistent determinations by the courts of two States as to the domicile of a 
taxpayer did not raise a substantial federal constitutional question," and that the state officials were 
acting within the scope of their authority under state law. /d. 
204. Today the outcome would be even clearer, as the Court held in Pennhurst that a claim that state 
officials are acting in violation of state law is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, even if the plaintiff 
seeks prospective relief. 465 U.S. at 100. 
205. The Cory majority stated: 
The dissent mischaracterizes Edelman as asserting that the Eleventh Amendment bars "only" 
suits seeking money damages. Edelman recognized the rule 'that a suit by private parties 
seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment' ... but never asserted that such suits were the only ones 
so barred. 
457 U.S. at 90 n.2. 
206. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58. It is also sometimes cited for the proposition that a 
suit against a state official does not fall within the Ex parte Young exception if the plaintiff does not 
allege that the official's conduct is illegal. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986). 
207. See supra note 198. 
208. In the light of the Pennhurst Court's explanation of Ex parte Young as an exception to the 
principle that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officials that are really suits against the 
state, it is interesting to note the Court's treatment of Cory v. White. The Court in Pennhurst reads Cory 
as establishing that "a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless 
of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief." Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102. In the very next sentence, 
however, the Court states that Ex parte Young "recognized an important exception to this general rule," 
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3. Pennhurst 
As we saw in Part I, Pennhurst was a watershed Eleventh Amendment 
decision because it recognized that Ex parte Young rests on a fiction made 
necessary by the need to ensure the supremacy of federal law rather than a 
judgment that certain suits are not "really" against the state. Pennhurst is also 
important because it takes another step towards treating retroactivity as a 
sufficient condition for denying relief on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The 
Court in Pennhurst raised the profile of the Edelman test by making it the 
exclusive determinant of when a suit against state officials alleging a violation 
of federal law is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 209 At the same time, dicta 
in the opinion appeared to narrow the Ex parte Young exception by reading 
Edelman to adopt a test turning on the prospectivity vel non of the relief sought. 
The Court in Pennhurst initially described the Edelman holding as barring 
"an injunction ... that awards retroactive monetary relief." 210 Later in the 
opinion, however, the Court phrased the holding more broadly. After explaining 
that the Ex parte Young exception rests on the need to ensure the supremacy of 
federal law, the Court asserted that this need "must be accommodated to the 
constitutional immunity of the States." 2 u Then it stated that "the significance 
of Edelman v. Jordan" was that the decision "declined to extend the fiction of 
Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so would effectively eliminate 
the immunity of the States." 212 "[A]n award of retroactive relief," the Court 
said, "necessarily 'fall[s] afoul of the Eleventh Amendment if that basic consti-
tutional provision is to be conceived of as having any present force.' " 213 Given 
the Court's earlier, narrower description of Edelman's holding, it is likely the 
Court was using the term "retroactive relief" here to mean "retroactive mon-
etary relief," a construction that is supported by the fact that the language 
quoted from Rothstein v. WYman was explicitly limited to suits seeking mon-
etary relief?14 Later cases, however, cite these statements in Pennhurst as 
id., and this exception is one that, the Court later explains, extends only to suits against state officials 
seeking prospective relief. Thus, the rule is that a suit against state officials that is really a suit against 
the state is barred, whether it seeks prospective relief or damages, except that a suit against state 
officials is not against the state and thus not barred if it seeks prospective relief from a violation of 
federal law. The upshot is that a suit against a state official seeking prospective relief is barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment when the plaintiff does not claim a violation of federal law. 
209. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
210. 465 U.S. at 102-03. 
211. /d. at 105. 
212. Id. 
213. /d. at 105-06 (quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665, which in tum quoted from Rothstein v. 
"Yman, 467 F.2d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 1972)). 
214. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665, quoted the following sentences from Rothstein, 467 F.2d at 237, in 
full: 
It is one thing to tell the Commissioner of Social Services that he must comply with the 
federal standards for the future if the state is to have the benefit of federal funds in the 
programs he administers. It is quite another thing to order the Commissioner to use state 
funds to make reparation for the past. The latter would appear to us to fall afoul of the 
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support for a rule barring all retroactive reliet.z 15 
4. Green v. Mansour 
Green v. Mansour 16 took perhaps the biggest step toward placing all retroac-
tive relief outside the Ex parte Young exception. Green involved a claim that 
Michigan officials were violating federal law in dispensing benefits under the 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. While the case was pending 
in the district court, Congress amended the statute, and the plaintiffs conceded 
that thereafter the Michigan officials were complying with federal law.217 The 
sole remaining dispute concerned whether state officials had violated federal 
law in disbursing benefits that had accrued in the past. Plaintiffs sought a 
declaration that the Michigan officials had violated federal law in the past and 
notice relief similar to what had been upheld in Quem . . 
The district court denied the relief, concluding that "the changes in federal 
law rendered moot the claims for prospective relief, and that the remaining 
claims for declaratory and notice relief related solely to past violations of 
federal law" and thus were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.218 The Court of 
Appeals affirmed,219 as did the Supreme Court. The Court clarified that it had 
approved the notice relief in Quem not because it was prospective, but because 
it was a "mere case-management device" that was "narrow" and "ancillary to a 
valid injunction previously granted." 220 Notice relief was impermissible in 
Green, however, because the claim for injunctive relief was moot, as there was 
no ongoing violation of federal law. 221 Declaratory relief was similarly impermis-
sible because, as there was no continuing violation of federal law, the declara-
tion would be useful to the plaintiffs only if it would have res judicata effect in 
the state courts, and such a "result would be a partial 'end run' around [the] 
decision in Edelman v. Jordan." 222 
To this extent, the Green case does not break much new ground. The 
plaintiffs' ultimate objective was monetary relief of the type found retroactive in 
Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any 
present force. 
The Court in Pennhurst substituted "retroactive relief" for "[an order that] the Commissioner ... use 
state funds to make reparation for the past," Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105-06, which suggests that the 
Court was using the former term as a shorthand for the latter. 
· 215. See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). 
216. /d. 
2I7. See id. at 65-66. 
218. /d. at 64. 
219. See Banas v. Dempsey, 742 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Green v. Mansour, 474 
U.S. 64 (1985). 
220. Green, 474 U.S. at 71. But cf Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2046 (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
(reading Quem as permitting relief "because it was ... prospective"). 
221. Again, the Court failed to explain why the failure to pay past-due benefits was not a 
"continuing" violation; apparently, the Court was applying the "accrual" test applied in Edelman. See 
supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
222. Green, 474 U.S. at 73 & n.2. 
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Edelman, and the Court merely closed what it saw as a loophole created by 
Quern. The Court need not have said anything about suits seeking nonmonetary 
relief, but, alas, it did. It repeatedly described the Edelman holding as setting 
forth a distinction between prospective and retrospective relief, and, in what 
soon became the standard formulation, the Court defined "prospective" relief as 
relief seeking to stop an "ongoing" or "continuing" violation of federallaw.Z23 
No fewer than ten times, the Court described the type of relief permitted by Ex 
parte Young as relief seeking to halt an "ongoing" or "continuing" or "current" 
or "present" violation of federal law.Z24 Perhaps more important, the Court 
stated that it had "refused to extend the reasoning of Young ... to claims for 
retrospective relief." 225 Under this formulation, it is irrelevant that the relief 
sought is monetary. The applicability of the Ex parte Young exception turns 
entirely on when the violation of federal law is deemed to have occurred. 
Additionally, the policy rationale the Court in Green provided for the line 
drawn in Edelman confirms that it believed the Eleventh Amendment barred 
more than just monetary relief. As discussed in Part I, the Court suggested that 
Edelman bars remedies that serve "deterrence or compensatory" interests as 
distinguished from remedies that ensure "supremacy" of federal law.Z26 We 
have already seen that the Court erred in drawing such a sharp distinction 
between supremacy and deterrence and in overlooking the fact that the law 
gives effect to deterrence interests (and, to some extent, compensatory interests 
as well) by permitting suits seeking damages from state officials personally.Z27 
Our discussion of Milliken exposes another error in the Green Court's analysis: 
even in a suit seeking relief that requires the ·expenditure of state funds, 
compensatory interests can, in certain circumstances, overcome the states' 
Eleventh Amendment interests. Since compensatory interests can clearly be 
advanced by nonmonetary forms of relief, as Milliken shows, the Court's 
rationale for the Edelman distinction indicates that more than just monetary 
relief is barred. But the fact that the relief in Milliken was available, even 
though its purpose was to compensate victims of past wrongs, also demonstrates 
that the Court in Green was wrong not only about the Eleventh Amendment's 
223. /d. at 67-68. 
224. ld. at 67 (describing question presented as "whether federal courts may order the giving of 
notice of the sort approved in Quem v. Jordan or issue a declaratory judgment that state officials 
violated federal law in the past when there is no ongoing violation of federal law"); id. at 68 
("injunctive relief stopping ongoing violations of federal law" permitted); id. (describing relief 
available under Ex parte Young as "prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of 
federal law"); id. ("[r]emedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law" permitted); id. at 
69 ("injunction against [a] current violation of federal law" permitted); id. at 71 ("remedy designed to 
prevent ongoing violations of federal law" permitted); id. (relief barred if "there is no continuing 
violation of federal law"); id. at 73 (relief barred if "[t]here is no claimed continuing violation of 
federal law"); id. at 74 ("injunction and declaratory judgment against continuing and future violations 
of federal law" permitted); id. (relief impermissible because "no present violations" of federal law). 
225. /d. at 68. 
226. See supra text accompanying note 118. 
227. See supra text accompanying notes 125-33. 
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relationship to the deterrence interest, but also about its relationship to the 
compensation interest. 
5. Papasan 
Papasan v. Allain228 was the first Supreme Court decision after Milliken to 
give sustained attention to the distinction between prospective and retrospective 
relief, and it has been the last to do so as well. The Court's analysis in Papasan 
is consistent with the test articulated in Green, which asks whether the defen-
dant's violation of federal law is ongoing or not. Papasan is also the only one of 
the Supreme Court's post-Edelman, pre-Coeur d'Alene decisions in which the 
Court's embrace of a comprehensive prospective-retrospective test may be said 
to have been more than dictum. Nevertheless, Papasan is not a serious obstacle 
to a return to Edelman's original holding, for depending on how one interprets 
it, Papasan is in conflict with either Edelman or Milliken and would have to be 
reconsidered anyway. In this section, I explain Papasan's conflict with Edel-
man. In Part VI, I suggest an interpretation of Papasan that would square it with 
Edelman, but this interpretation places it in conflict with Milliken. The conflict 
with Milliken can be overcome only by rejecting the Papasan holding insofar as 
it purports to apply to nonmonetary forms of relief. 
The plaintiffs in Papasan were public school officials and public school 
students from the twenty-three northern counties of Mississippi who claimed 
they were "being unlawfully denied the economic benefits of public school 
lands granted by the United States to the State of Mississippi well over 100 
years ago." 229 The facts underlying their claims are complex: In a series of 
federal statutes enacted between 1798 and 1817 in connection with its admis-
sion to the Union, Mississippi was required to reserve a certain portion of its 
land for the support of the public schools. These statutes, however, did not 
apply to lands in northern Mississippi comprising what later became the north-
em twenty-three counties of the state. The Chickasaw Nation ceded these lands 
to the United States in 1832, and an 1836 federal statute vested title to a portion 
of them in the State of Mississippi "for the use of schools within [the Chick-
asaw Cession] in said State.'mo The purpose of this arrangement was to make 
the same provision for public education in the northern twenty-three counties 
that had previously been made for the rest of the state.Z31 However, in 1856, the 
state legislature, with Congress's permission, sold the land and loaned the 
. proceeds to the state's railroads.232 The railroads were destroyed during the 
Civil War and the state's investment vanished.233 The state legislature made 
alternative provision for public education in the northern twenty-three counties, 
228. 478 u.s. 265 (1986). 
229. /d. at 268. 
230. /d. at 272 (quoting 5 Stat. 116) (1836). 
231. See id. at 271. 
232. See id. at 272. 
233. See id. 
HeinOnline  -- 87 Geo. L.J. 36 1998-1999
36 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:1 
but the upshot was that, at the time of the lawsuit, the average per-pupil amount 
spent on education in the northern twenty-three counties was $0.63, while in the 
rest of the state it was $75.34_234 
The plaintiffs raised two claims. First, they argued that federal law created a 
"trust obligation" to use the land, or income from the land, "for the benefit of 
Chickasaw Cession schoolchildren in perpetuity," 235 and that the defendants 
were violating that obligation. As relief, the plaintiffs requested, inter alia, "the 
establishment by legislative appropriation or otherwise of a fund in suitable 
amount to be held in perpetual trust for the benefit of plaintiffs; or in the 
alternative making available to plaintiffs [lands] of the same value as the 
original Chickasaw Cession ... lands. " 236 Second, the plaintiffs argued that the 
disparity between the amount of resources devoted to education in the northern 
twenty-three counties and that devoted to education elsewhere in the state 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 237 The Court found that the first claim was 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it sought retrospective relief, but 
that the second claim sought prospective relief and thus was not barred. 
The Court's discussion of the prospective-retrospective distinction drew heavily 
from Green. The Court quoted the statement in Green that remedies designed to 
end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the su-
premacy of federal law, whereas the need to compensate for or deter future 
violations does not outweigh "the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment," 238 and 
it added that 
[Ex parte] Young has been focused on cases in which a violation of federal 
law by a state official is ongoing as opposed to cases in which federal law has 
been violated at one time or over a period of time in the past, as well as on 
cases in which the relief against the state official directly ends the violation of 
federal law as opposed to cases in which that relief is intended indirectly to 
encourage compliance with federal law through deterrence or directly to meet 
third-party interests such as compensation.Z39 
In a different formulation, the Court indicated that the time when the injury is 
234. See id. at 273. 
235. ld. at 274. The federal law that was violated was apparently the 1836 federal statute. Since the 
state officials' actions that resulted in the sale of the land and ultimately the loss of the proceeds were 
taken with the express authority of a federal statute, it is unclear why the later federal statute was not 
deemed to repeal the earlier statute. The Supreme Court's opinion indicates that the plaintiffs also 
pressed a Contract Clause claim that was "in all essential respects the same as" the trust claim. /d. at 
274 n.8. This suggests that the plaintiffs were arguing that the 1836 law created a vested property right 
that the state could not constitutionally breach even with federal permission. But cf Pension Benefit 
Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 732-33 & n.9 (1984) (holding that limits imposed on 
states by Contract Clause not applicable to federal government through reverse incorporation). 
236. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 275. 
237. See id. at 274. 
238. ld. at 278 (quoting Green, 474 U.S. at 68). 
239. /d. at 277-78. 
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suffered determines whether relief is prospective or retrospective.240 The Court's 
observation that "the line between permitted and prohibited suits will often be 
indistinct" 241 was well borne out by its application of the test to the two claims 
before it. 
The Court concluded that the trust claim was retrospective and thus barred. 
After expressing some skepticism about the merits of the claim, the Court said 
that it would accept the plaintiffs' characterization of the claim for purposes of 
analysis. 242 It thus assumed that the federal statute created an obligation to use 
the land, or income from the land, for the benefit of schoolchildren in the 
northern twenty-three counties "in perpetuity." But the Court concluded that 
this claim, which it characterized as "a continuing obligation to comply with 
trust obligations," was indistinguishable from "an ongoing liability for past 
breach of trust," which the Court apparently thought was clearly retrospective 
in nature.243 "In both cases, the trustee is required, because of the past loss of 
the corpus, to use its own resources to take the place of the corpus or the lost 
income from the corpus." 244 The Court concluded that the relief sought would 
be retrospective even to the extent the petitioners were seeking only the income 
from the corpus that would have accrued after the court's order had the trust 
corpus not been lost.245 "Such payment," the Court held, 
would be merely a substitute for the return of the trust corpus itself. That is, 
continuing payment of the income from the lost corpus is essentially equiva-
lent in economic terms to a one-time restoration of the lost corpus itself: It is 
in substance the award, as continuing income rather than as a lump sum, of 
'an accrued monetary liability.' 246 
On the other hand, the Court found the plaintiffs' equal protection claim to be 
permissible because it sought prospective relief. The claim was prospective 
because "the essence of the equal protection allegation" was not "the past 
actions of the state," but "the present disparity in the distribution of the benefits 
of state-held assets. " 247 This, the Court said, "is precisely the type of continu-
ing violation for which a remedy may permissibly be fashioned under [Ex 
parte] Young." 248 
The Court's heavy reliance on, and indeed elaboration of, the analysis it had 
240. See id. at 278 ("[r]elief that in essence serves to compensate a party injured in the past" 
barred). 
241. ld. 
242. See id. at 279-80. 
243. ld. at 280-81. 
244. ld. at 281. 
245. See id. 
246. ld. (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. at 289, which in tum quoted from Edelman, 415 U.S. 
at 664) (emphasis added in Milliken). 
247. ld. at 282. 
248. ld. 
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introduced in Green indicates that it did not regard Edelman to be limited to 
monetary relief. But, unlike the discussion in Green, the Court's apparent 
embrace of a comprehensive prospective-retrospective distinction in Papasan 
appears to have been part of its holding. It is difficult to characterize the 
plaintiffs' alternative request for an order requiring the defendants to make state 
land available to them as a request for monetary relief_249 The Court's denial of 
this relief on Eleventh Amendment grounds thus makes it difficult to regard the 
Court's apparent extension of the prospective-retrospective test to nonmonetary 
relief as mere dictum. 
Nevertheless, the Papasan opinion is not a serious obstacle to a return to the 
original holding of Edelman because, to the extent the Court based its decision 
on the conclusion that the requested relief was retrospective, even the portion of 
Papasan denying monetary relief is in conflict with Edelman. The plaintiffs 
claimed that the federal statute imposed a trust obligation to use the income 
from the trust corpus for the benefit of the plaintiff schoolchildren in perpetuity, 
and the Court assumed that this obligation continued even after the loss of the 
trust corpus. The accrual test adopted in Edelman would have barred the Court 
from awarding the payment of the income that would have accrued from the 
time the state lost its investment to the date of the district court's order, but not 
the income that would have accrued after the court's order. 
The Court's reasons for concluding otherwise are unpersuasive and seem to 
have little to do with "retrospectivity." The Court relied heavily on its convic-
tion that the continuing payment of the income "is essentially equivalent in 
economic terms to a one-time restoration of the corpus itself[.]" 250 While it is 
true that one way for the state to have fulfilled its obligation would have been to 
replace the corpus, that would not have been the only way: the state might 
instead have appropriated an amount equal to the prospective income from the 
corpus, to be disbursed periodically for the benefit of the plaintiffs. It is not true, 
moreover, that an award of prospective income would "in substance" have been 
the same as a "lump sum" award of "an accrued monetary liability." The 
state's accrued monetary liability consisted of the income that accrued from 
time it lost its investment to the time of the court's order. But the Court 
dismissed as "retrospective" the plaintiffs' request for income that had not yet 
accrued at the time of the court's order. The Court was apparently moved by the 
fact that, because the trust corpus no longer existed, the state would be required 
"to use its own resources to take the place of ... the lost income." But, in 
Edelman, the state was similarly required to "use its own resources" to pay 
249. But cf infra note 528 (suggesting that a rule barring only monetary relief may in the end have 
to be expanded to include certain suits seeking land or goods in lieu of money and expressing 
uncertainty about whether the Papasan plaintiffs' request for land would have fallen within the rule as 
so expanded). 
250. /d. at 281. 
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class members future benefits,251 yet the Court found that portion of the order 
prospective. The fact that the trust corpus was lost meant that the "lost income" 
would have to be calculated as if the trust corpus had not been lost, but 
affording the plaintiffs the requested relief would not have required the state 
actually to replace the trust corpus. 
In any event none of this seems relevant to the question of the relief's 
prospectivity. As discussed more fully in Part VI, these portions of the Court's 
analysis support a reading of the Papasan opinion as resting on the "second-
ary" nature of the relief sought. In other words, the Court appears to have 
concluded that ihe suit was barred because the plaintiffs were seeking an order 
requiring the defendants to provide a substitute for the primary obligation 
imposed by federal law, as opposed to ordering the performance of the primary 
obligation itself_252 If so, then Papasan was not a case about the prospective-
retrospective distinction at all; like Milliken, it purported to tum on prospectiv-
ity, but in fact turned on something else. This reading of Papasan squares it 
with Edelman but, as explained in Part VI, places it in conflict with Milliken?53 
To the extent the reasons given by the Court for denying relief do bear on 
prospectivity, they demonstrate the slipperiness of the relevant concepts and the 
indeterminateness of the Court's test. The Court emphasized that the distinction 
between a trustee's "continuing obligation" to pay the plaintiffs the trust 
income and a trustee's "ongoing liability for past breach of trust" was "essen-
tially a formal distinction of the sort ... rejected in Edelman." 254 The Court's 
apparent assumption that the latter relief is retrospective suggests that the Court 
focused on the time of the defendants' acts that gave rise to the plaintiffs' 
injury-here, the unwise and assertedly illegal investment in railroad bonds. In 
the Court's view, these actions constituted the "breach of trust" of which 
plaintiffs were complaining, and the suit was retrospective because they oc-
curred in the past. This analysis, when considered alongside the Court's earlier 
statement that the Edelman test seeks to identify cases in which federal law was 
violated "at one time or over a period of time in the past," suggests that the 
Court was equating the time at which the "violation" of federal law occurred 
with the time at which the acts causing plaintiffs' injury occurred. Federal law 
was violated when the defendants lost the trust corpus, and the remedy being 
sought was retrospective because those acts took place in the past. 
But that is not the only, or even the most sensible, way to characterize the 
relevant legal violation. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants violated an 
obligation to use income of the trust corpus in perpetuity for the benefit of 
251. Admittedly, the funds were given to the state by the federal government, but that hardly seems 
relevant to the question of whether these payments were prospective or retrospective. 
252. The distinction between primary and secondary obligations is discussed infra text accompany-
ing notes 420-22. 
253. See infra text accompanying notes 522-27. 
254. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 280. 
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public schoolchildren in the twenty-three northern counties of Mississippi. If 
that is the legal obligation, then it was violated over time and the plaintiffs were 
entitled to an order "stopping" the violations that had not yet occurred.255 This 
conclusion is supported by the portion of the Court's opinion suggesting that 
whether or not the relief is prospective turns on the time when the injury is 
suffered, as opposed to the time when the acts causing the injury took place.256 
To the extent the plaintiffs were complaining about the violation of an obliga-
tion to devote a certain amount to education in the northern counties in the 
future, they were complaining about a future injury. The Papasan opinion 
offered no reason for rejecting this characterization of the relevant legal viola-
tion in favor of the one it chose. 
D. THE PROSPECTIVE-RETROSPECTIVE DISTINCTION ON THE 
EVE OF COEUR D'ALENE 
By the end of the Court's 1985 Term, the transformation of retrospectivity 
from necessary to sufficient reason for finding relief barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment was essentially complete. The Green formulation, under which Ex 
parte Young permits "prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing 
violation of federal law," became the standard one in Supreme Court opin-
ions?57 By the time Coeur d'Alene was decided, the idea that Ex parte Young 
permits only prospective relief had become so ingrained that it was the dissent-
ers who stated the requirement most clearly: 
[T]he plaintiff must allege that the officers are acting in violation of federal 
law [citing Pennhurst], and must seek prospective relief to address an ongoing 
violation, not compensation or other retrospective relief for violations past. 
[citing Green, Quem, and Edelman.f58 
The concurring Justices similarly wrote that " [a] federal court cannot award 
retrospective relief, designed to remedy past violations of federallaw," 259 and 
repeatedly referred to the type of relief theretofore permitted by Ex parte Young 
as "prospective relief to end an ongoing violation of federal rights," 260 or 
words to that effect.261 The idea that the Amendment bars only monetary relief 
255. Since the trust corpus was lost, complying with the obligation required the defendants to use 
their own money to replace the income the land would have produced, but, as noted above, this has no 
bearing on the prospectivity of the relief. 
256. See id. at 281. 
257. In Seminole Tribe, for example, the Court said that "federal jurisdiction over a suit against a 
state official" is permissible under Ex parte Young "when that suit seeks only prospective injunctive 
relief in order to 'end a continuing violation of federal law.' " 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (quoting Green, 
474 U.S. at 68). 
258. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2048 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
259. /d. at 2043 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
260. /d. at 2045. 
261. See id. See also id. at 2043 ("prospective relief to end a state officer's ongoing violation of 
federal law"); id. at 2046 (the cases establish that "a Young suit is available where a plaintiff alleges an 
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was not expressed. The debate among the Justices concerned the extent to 
which the prospectivity of the relief sought should suffice to avoid the Eleventh 
Amendment bar. The dissenters maintained that it should always suffice, the 
"principal" opinion by Justice Kennedy maintained that it should not,262 and 
the controlling opinion by Justice O'Connor came out somewhere in the middle. 
As discussed in the next Part, the precise status of the prospective-retrospective 
distinction after Coeur d'Alene is a matter of some uncertainty. The Coeur 
d'Alene opinions do confirm, however, that all of the Justices believed that the 
case law as it had developed to that point barred a federal court from awarding 
retrospective relief in suits against state officials, regardless of whether or not 
that relief was monetary. 
It is nevertheless the case that, until Coeur d'Alene, this transformation had 
taken place almost entirely in dicta. With the independently vulnerable excep-
tion of Papasan, all of the cases in which the Court found relief to be 
retrospective involved monetary relief and thus fit squarely within the more 
limited rule set forth in Edelman. None of these cases, therefore, gave the Court 
any occasion to wrestle with the difficult doctrinal problems raised by a 
comprehensive prospective-retrospective test. 
In the lower courts, too, the cases finding relief to be retrospective and thus 
barred were virtually all suits seeking monetary relief.263 Indeed, even after 
Green, the lower courts continued to describe the line between Ex parte Young 
and Edelman in language more closely resembling the limited Edelman formula-
tion than the broader Green formulation. For example, the Fifth Circuit in 
Brennan v. Stewart described the distinction as "a relatively simple rule" that is 
"usually quite easy to apply." The court explained: 
Basically, prospective injunctive or declaratory relief is permitted-
whatever its financial side effects-but retrospective relief in the form of a 
ongoing violation of federal law, and where the relief sought is prospective rather than retrospective"); 
id. (describing Green as holding that "Eleventh Amendment bars notice relief where plaintiffs alleged 
no ongoing violation of federal law); id. (describing Edelman as holding that "Eleventh Amendment 
bars relief for past violation of federal law"); id. ("Edelman is consistently cited for the proposition 
that prospective injunctive relief is available in a Young suit."); id. ("[T]he question in Quem was 
whether the notice relief was more like the prospective relief allowed in typical Young suits, or more 
like the retrospective relief disallowed in Edelman .... The Quem Court permitted the relief to stand 
not because it was inconsequential, but because it was adjudged prospective."); id. at 2047 ("[T]he 
Court [in Milliken] upheld the relief ... because the remedy was prospective rather than retrospec-
tive."). 
262. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion and Justice Souter's dissenting opinion both refer to 
Justice Kennedy's opinion as the "principal opinion." See Coeur d'Alene, II 7 S. Ct. at 2045 
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2048 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
263. Decisions finding nonmonetary relief to be barred were few and far between. See Ulaleo v. 
Paty, 902 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1990) (seeking "return of land"); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. 
Alabama, 784 F. Supp. 1549 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (seeking order requiring Governor to negotiate with 
Tribe). In the latter case, moreover, the relief was found to be barred not because it was retrospective, 
but on other, clearly erroneous, grounds; see supra note 113. 
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money judgment in compensation for past wrongs-no matter how small-is 
barred?64 
In the light of Papa'san, the Court's statement that the prospective-retrospective 
distinction is usually "relatively simple" and "easy to apply" in the context of 
monetary relief was an exaggeration. But if the test were extended to nonmon-
etary relief, the adjectives "simple" and "easy" would be the last to come to 
mind. The lower courts appear to have regarded the prospective-retrospective 
distinction as relatively straightforward only because they assimilated it as a 
rule barring damage-like monetary relief. Commentators, too, regarded the 
Edelman line of cases as simply barring suits for money damages and their 
equivalent.265 As a description of Edelman's practical impact in the lower courts 
and in the Supreme Court on the eve of the Court's decision in Coeur d'Alene, 
this understanding of Edelman was largely accurate. · 
By the time Coeur d'Alene reached the Court, it had also been established 
that Ex parte Young represented an "exception" to the various previous formula-
tions of when a suit against a state official is "really" a suit against the state. 
The Court in Pennhurst had clarified that Ex parte Young, when it applies, 
trumps those other formulations, and the lower courts had, by and large, 
correctly assimilated that teaching.266 Pennhurst had also established the Edel-
man test as the sole determinant of whether a suit against a state official alleging 
a violation of federal law is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Coeur d'Alene 
clearly changed that. 
III. COEUR D'ALENE AND THE AVERTED REFORMULATION 
OF Ex PARTE YOUNG DOCTRINE 
In Coeur d'Alene, the Supreme Court came very close to radically revising its 
Ex parte Young doctrine. Exactly what the Court held, and thus how radically it 
changed the doctrine, is a matter of some dispute. In this Part, I defend an 
interpretation of the controlling opinion as establishing a narrow exception to 
the general rule that suits against state officials seeking prospective relief from 
ongoing violations of federal law are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 
The Coeur d'Alene Tribe and some of its members maintained that federal 
law entitled the Tribe to the beneficial ownership, subject to the trusteeship of 
the United States, of certain submerged lands in and around Lake Coeur 
d'Alene. They sought an injunction invalidating state laws that interfered with . 
the Tribe's ownership and prohibiting state officials from so interfering.267 The 
264. 834 F.2d 1248, 1253 (5th Cir. 1988). 
265. See supra note 15. 
266. See, e.g., United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. 
Ct. 1517 (1998) (describing Ex pane Young as "exception" to rule that Eleventh Amendment bars suits 
against state officials "if the decree would operate against the [state]"). 
267. See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2032. 
HeinOnline  -- 87 Geo. L.J. 43 1998-1999
1998] PROSPECTIVE-RETROSPECTIVE DISTINCTION 43 
district court found that their claim was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, 
but rejected the claim on the merits. 268 The Court of Appeals agreed that the 
claim fell within the Ex parte Young exception, but reversed and remanded on 
the merits.269 The dissenting Justices would have affirmed,270 but a majority of 
the Supreme Court found that the claim was barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment.27I 
The structure of Justice Kennedy's "principal" opinion in the case suggests 
that he was initially writing for a five-Justice majority but ultimately lost the 
votes of Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas?72 The portions of Justice 
Kennedy's opinion that the three Justices ultimately refused to join would have 
drastically revised Ex parte Young doctrine?73 Strikingly, however, the final 
section of his opinion, which the concurring Justices did join, advances more 
limited bases for dismissing the Tribe's suit.274 In the end, the decision does not 
revise Ex parte Young doctrine quite so thoroughly as Kennedy would have 
liked, 275 but, beyond that, the courts and commentators do not agree about what 
exactly the Court held. The answer turns on the concurring Justices' reasons for 
concluding that the Tribe's claim did not fall within the Ex parte Young 
exception. 
As I read it, the concurring opinion reaffirms the prospective-retrospective 
test articulated in such cases as Green, but at the same time carves out a narrow 
exception to the rule that suits seeking prospective relief are not barred. Before 
examining Justice O'Connor's views, however, I shall discuss the "minority" 
views expressed in Justice Kennedy's opinion. After discussing Justice 
O'Connor's reasons for refusing to concur in these portions of the opinion, I 
shall tum to the analysis in the parts of Justice Kennedy's opinion that O'Connor, 
Scalia, and Thomas did join, and the additional reasons given by O'Connor for 
joining these portions. 
268. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. State of Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443, 1449-52 (D. Idaho 
1992). 
269. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe ofldaho v. State ofldaho, 42 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994). 
270. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2047-59 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
271. See id. at 2043. 
272. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined in Sections I, II.A, and III; only Chief Justice 
Rehnquistjoined in Sections II.B. II.C, and II.D. See id. at 2031. 
273. See id. at 2035-36. 
274. Justice Kennedy obviously borrowed from Justice O'Connor's opinion the statement that "[a]n 
allegation of an on-going violation of federal law is ordinarily sufficient to invoke the Young fiction." 
/d. at 2040. Cf id. at 2043 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Where a plaintiff seeks prospective relief to 
end a state officer's ongoing violation of federal law, such a claim can ordinarily proceed in federal 
court."); id. at 2045 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("When a plaintiff seeks prospective relief to end an 
ongoing violation of federal rights, ordinarily the Eleventh Amendment poses no bar."). This statement 
seems inconsistent with his proposed "case-by-case approach," id. at 2039, requiring a "careful 
balancing and accommodation of state interests when determining whether the Young exception applies 
in a given case," id. at 2038 . 
. 275. Several lower courts, however, have applied Justice Kennedy's ad hoc balancing analysis even 
though a majority of the Court clearly rejected such .an approach. See Herbst v. Voinovich, Case No. 
1:96-CV-1002, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9430 (N.D. Ohio June 22, 1998); Hou Hawaiians v. Cayetano, 
996 F. Supp. 989, 997 n.9 (D. Haw. 1998). See also cases cited infra note 293. 
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Part II.B of Justice Kennedy's opinion, which only the Chief Justice joined, 
appears to defend a bright-line rule that suits against state officials for prospec-
tive relief are barred by the Eleventh Amendment if state courts are open to 
adjudicate the claim and confer the requested relief?76 Justice Kennedy argues 
that the Court applied this rule in Ex parte Young and other early cases, but that 
later cases "somewhat obscured" "this mode of analysis. " 277 Since "[t]oday 
... it is acknowledged that States have real and vital interests in preferring their 
own forum in suits brought against them," and since Idaho's courts were open 
to the plaintiffs in this case, Kennedy concludes that "there is neither warrant 
. nor necessity to adopt the Young device to provide an adequate judicial fo-
rum. 'm8 He buttresses this conclusion in Part II.C, again writing just for 
himself and the Chief Justice, by belittling "[what] is described as the interest 
in having federal rights vindicated in federal courts. " 279 He repeatedly ex-
presses confidence in the state courts as forums for enforcing federal rights, 
denying that "state courts are a less adequate forum for resolving federal 
questions" than are the federal courts,280 and stressing the state courts' "right 
and duty . . . to interpret and follow the Constitution and the laws enacted 
pursuant to it, subject to a litigant's right of review in [the Supreme] Court in a 
proper case. " 281 
The bright line is blurred in Part II.D, however, in which Kennedy explains 
that Ex parte Young in fact requires a "case-by-case approach" 282 entailing a 
"careful balancing" 283 of a "broad" "range of concerns." 284 With some justifi-
cation, Justice Kennedy has difficulty squaring the Court's past results with a 
comprehensive test turning on prospectivity, and so he proffers alternative 
276. See id. at 2035. 
277. !d. at 2036. As Justices Souter and O'Connor pointed out, Justice Kennedy misread Ex parte 
Young and the other early cases. He relied on the portion of the Young opinion which concluded that 
because the state law being challenged imposed large penalties on anyone who violated it, it effectively 
"preclude[ d) a resort to the courts (either state or Federal) for the purpose of testing its validity." /d. at 
2035 (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 146). The Court in Ex parte Young relied on these penalties, 
however, only in concluding that it was unreasonable to require the plaintiffs to test the legality of the 
law by violating it and then raising the issue of its validity as a defense to prosecution. As Justices 
Souter and O'Connor correctly observed, the penalties merely established that testing these laws by 
violating them was not an adequate remedy at law. See id. at 2045 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 
2057 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Ex parte Young Court gave no consideration to whether the state 
courts were available to award an injunction of the sort the plaintiffs were seeking from the federal 
court. Justice Kennedy's reliance on other early opinions was similarly misplaced. For example, he 
cited Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U.S. 270, 299 (1885), as supporting his proposed rule that a federal 
action against a state official is available only if no state court remedy is available. Coeur d'Alene, 117 
S. Ct. at 2035. But Poindexter was a case from the state courts, and although the state courts denied 
relief, the Supreme Court reversed on appeal. See generally Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1735-36. 
278. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2036. 
279. /d. 
280. /d. at 2037. 
281. /d. 
282. /d. at 2039. 
283. /d. at 2038. 
284. /d. at 2039. 
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explanations. He suggests, for example, that the result in Milliken actually 
rested on the strong federal interest in providing a federal forum for the 
vindication of Fourteenth Amendment claims.Z85 Citing the Court's holding in 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer86 that the Civil War Amendments give Congress the power 
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, Kennedy concludes that "it fol-
lows that the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment themselves 
offer a powerful reason to provide a federal forum." 287 But, again, Kennedy 
does not advocate a flat rule that the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable to 
Fourteenth Amendment claims (a rule that would have opened the door to 
damage actions against states for violation of antidiscrimination principles, for 
example). Instead, he treats Milliken as an example of how the Court had 
decided Eleventh Amendment cases in the past based on an ad hoc weighing of 
the federal rights at issue against the state interests involved.288 
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion criticizes Justice Kennedy for "replac-
[ing] a straightforward inquiry into whether a complaint alleges an ongoing 
violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective 
with a vague balancing test that purports to account for a 'broad' range of 
unspecified factors. " 289 Her opinion characterizes the prospective-retrospective 
test as not just well-established, but a "basic principle of federallaw." 290 She 
also criticizes Justice Kennedy for denigrating the federal interest in having 
federal issues decided in federal courts.Z91 Her opinion has accordingly been 
praised for averting an evisceration of Ex parte Young doctrine that would have 
been disastrous for the enforcement of federal rights against the states.292 
Whether the concurring opinion is indeed more protective of federal rights 
than Justice Kennedy's is not so clear. Justice O'Connor did, after all, agree 
with Justice Kennedy's conclusion that the Tribe's lawsuit did not fall within the 
Ex parte Young exception. This means either that she interpreted the concept of 
retroactivity very broadly, thus contracting the reach of Ex parte Young in a 
potentially significant way, or that she agreed with Justice Kennedy's conclu-
sion that prospectivity alone is not sufficient to place a suit within the Ex parte 
Young exception. For the reasons discussed below, I conclude that the concur-
ring Justices found the Tribe's suit to be barred not because the Tribe was 
seeking retrospective relief, but because the Justices carved out a narrow 
exception to the general rule that suits seeking prospective relief are permitted. 
Additionally, I understand Justice Kennedy to have advocated a case-specific 
balancing approach not for all cases but only for cases seeking prospective 
285. See id. 
286. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
287. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2039. 
288. See id. 
289. !d. at 2047. 
290. /d. at 2045. 
291. See id. at 2046. 
292. See, e.g., id. at 2048 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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relief?93 Because suits seeking retrospective relief would continue to be categori-
cally barred under his test, Justice Kennedy's balancing approach would have 
operated only to deny jurisdiction. If so, then Ex parte Young does retain a 
broader scope under Justice O'Connor's approach than under Justice Kennedy's. 
Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor's approach is still something of a mixed bag 
from the perspective of protecting federal rights against infringement by the 
states. As I explain below, although remedies will be more readily available in 
federal court under Justice O'Connor's approach than under Justice Kennedy's, 
there will apparently be more cases under Justice O'Connor's approach in 
which there will be no remedy at all for a state's violation of federal rights.Z94 
The significance of this problem depends on the breadth of the exception 
recognized by the concurring Justices. 
It is difficult to imagine how anyone could disagree with the conclusion of 
the lower court judges and the dissenting Justices that the Tribe was seeking 
prospective relief. The dissenting opinion, however, reads Justice Kennedy's 
opinion as concluding that the relief the Tribe sought was an "impermissibly 
retrospective remedy." 295 Although Justice Souter said that he understood this 
conclusion to be confined to Justice Kennedy's opinion,296 the language from 
Justice Kennedy's opinion that he cited in support of this reading appears in a 
portion of the opinion that Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined. If 
Justice Souter's reading is correct, then a majority of the Court found the relief 
sought by the Tribe to be "impermissibly retrospective." Lower courts also 
appear to have read Coeur d'Alene to hold that the relief sought was barred 
because it was retrospective.297 
Those readings of the opinion are, in my view, mistaken. Justice Souter relied 
on Justice Kennedy's statement near the end of his opinion that, "[i]f the Tribe 
were to prevail, Idaho's sovereign interest in its lands and waters would be 
affected in a degree fully as intrusive as almost any conceivable retroactive levy 
upon funds in its Treasury. " 298 But this does not say that the relief sought was 
293. This is suggested by the statements in the opinion to the effect that not all suits for prospective 
relief should automatically be permitted to proceed. See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2034 ("to permit a 
federal court action to proceed in every case where prospective and injunctive relief is sought ... would 
be to adhere to an empty formalism"); id. at 2038 ("where prospective relief is sought ... the Eleventh 
Amendment, in most cases, is not a bar") (emphasis added). Some lower courts, however, have applied 
Justice Kennedy's balancing approach to permit suits that in their view otherwise would have been 
barred. See Ashmus v. Calderon, 123 F.3d 1199, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 1997) (permitting action to proceed 
"despite California's Eleventh Amendment immunity defense" citing efficiency and fairness concerns, 
and noting that the suit would have little impact on the state's sovereign interests), rev'd on other 
grounds, 118 S. Ct. 1694 (1998); United States W. Communications, Inc. v. Reinbold, No. A1-97-25, 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22606, at *11-12 (D.N.D. July 28, 1997) (permitting action to proceed based on 
finding that federal interests at issue outweighed state interests). 
294. See infra text accompanying notes 317-19. 
295. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2055. 
296. See id. at 2054 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
297. See, e.g., Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d at 628. 
298. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2043 (quoted by Justice Souter, id. at 2055). 
HeinOnline  -- 87 Geo. L.J. 47 1998-1999
1998] PROSPECTIVE-RETROSPECTIVE DISTINCTION 47 
retrospective. Moreover, an earlier part of Justice Kennedy's optmon, also 
joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas, clearly states that the relief 
sought by the Tribe was prospective.Z99 All five of the Justices in the majority 
thus hold that at least some lawsuits against state officials alleged to be violating 
federal law are barred by the Eleventh Amendment even though only prospec-
tive relief is being sought. Coeur d'Alene does not contract Ex parte Young by 
broadening the concept of retroactivity. 
This is scant comfort, however, if the Court held that relief against state 
officials is barred if it is as "intrusive" as retrospective relief?00 Already, one 
federal appellate court has read Coeur d'Alene to establish such a test.301 
Although other portions of Justice Kennedy's opinion that Justices O'Connor, 
Scalia, and Thomas joined include broad language that might be interpreted as 
vague support for something like an "intrusiveness" test,302 Justice Souter was 
right to conclude that this test could not be attributed to the concurring Justices. 
The concurring Justices criticized Justice Kennedy's balancing test because it 
was vague and unfait~ful to precedent.303 An "intrusiveness" test would bejust 
as vague and just as unfaithful to precedent. Justice O'Connor repeatedly stated 
that the cases established that "a Young suit is available where a plaintiff alleges 
an ongoing violation of federal law, and where the relief sought is prospective 
rather than retrospective. " 304 But, as she also recognized, prospective relief of 
the sort allowed by Ex parte Young and Edelman is very often as intrusive as 
retrospective relief, if not more so.305 Justice O'Connor also emphasized that 
she "would not narrow our Young doctrine." 306 An intrusiveness test would 
~learly represent a substantial narrowing of that doctrine. 
Justice O'Connor's opinion is best read as recognizing a narrow exception to 
·the rule that prospective relief against state officials violating federal law is not 
barred. This reading is supported by her repeated references to the prospective-
299. See id. at 2044 ("The Tribe has alleged an on-going violation of its property rights in 
contravention offederalla.w and seeks prospective injunctive relief."). 
300. See Jackson, supra note 27, at 312. 
301. See ANR Pipeline Co. v. Lafaver, ISO F.3d 1178, 1190 (lOth Cir. 1998). 
302. For example, Justice Kennedy wrote that interpreting Ex parte Young to permit lawsuits 
against state officials "in every case where prospective declaratory and injunctive relief is sought" 
would be "to adhere to an empty formalism and to undermine the principle . . . that Eleventh 
Amendment immunity represents a real limitation on a court's federal question jurisdiction. The real 
interests served by the Eleventh Amendment are not to be sacrificed to elementary mechanics of 
captions and pleading." Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2034. 
303. For example, while Justice Kennedy would have the courts dismiss suits against state officials 
if they unduly interfere with state interests, Justice O'Connor correctly noted that "we have never 
doubted the importance of state interests in cases falling squarely within the our part interpretations of 
the Young doctrine." /d. at 2047 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
304. /d. at 2046 (emphases in original); see also id. at 2045 ("Where a plaintiff seeks prospective 
relief to end a continuing violation of federal rights, ordinarily the Eleventh Amendment poses no 
bar."). 
305. See id. at 2055. 
306. /d. at 2047. 
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retrospective test as the "ordinary" rule.307 Additionally, her statement that she 
"[does] not subscribe to the principal opinion's reformulation of the appropriate 
jurisdictional inquiry for all cases in which a plaintiff invokes the Young 
doctrine," 308 suggests that she was accepting a reformulation for some cases.309 
The breadth of this exception is a matter of some uncertainty. Justice O'Connor's 
analysis supports the conclusion that the exception is quite narrow. 
Justice O'Connor gave two reasons for finding the Tribe's suit to be barred. 
First, she treated it as settled that "a federal court cannot summon a State before 
it in a private action seeking to divest the State of a property interest," and she 
noted that the Tribe conceded that this suit was "the functional equivalent" of 
such a suit. Her reliance on this principle suggests a broad exception for suits 
challenging on federal grounds a state's claim to property. In seminal cases such 
as United States v. Lee,310 a precursor to Ex parte Young, the Couit had walked 
a fine and uneasy line: it allowed the plaintiffs to obtain a court order prohibit-
ing state officials from interfering with their property rights, but at the same 
time it maintained that such an order would not bind the state itself, as only the 
officials were parties to the lawsuit. Of course, if a state's officials are required 
by court order to respect the plaintiffs' property rights, then a state's claim to the 
property is effectively adjudicated. This seemed just another example of the 
fictitious nature of Ex parte Young suits, and one would have thought that the 
Court's willingness to see through this fiction in Pennhurst would have led it in 
Coeur d'Alene to dismiss as quaint the idea that an award of prospective relief 
against state officials does not bind the state itself. Pennhurst seemed to be 
saying: "Everybody knows that a suit against a state official awarding prospec-
tive relief is really a suit against the state. We nevertheless indulge the fiction 
that it is just a suit against the official because this is necessary to preserve the 
supremacy of federal laws." Had it taken this approach in Coeur d'Alene, the 
Court would have erased the uneasy line drawn in Lee by admitting that suits 
ordering state officials not to interfere with federal property rights are really 
suits against the states, but accepting them nevertheless as necessary to ensure 
the supremacy of federal law. The Court's apparent inclination to resolve the 
tension by holding instead that such suits are barred because they are really suits 
against the states represents an analytical retrenchment. 
Dicta in a more recent Supreme Court decision suggests that Justice O'Connor 
may well be ready to adopt an exception to Ex parte Young for all property 
claims,311 but Coeur d'Alene does not adopt such an exception. Her concur-
307. See supra notes 274 & 304, and accompanying text. 
308. !d. at 2047 (emphasis added). 
309. Admittedly, this is in tension with her statement that she would not narrow Ex parte Young 
doctrine. Perhaps she did not regard the reformulation as a narrowing because of her reading of such 
old cases as Lee, discussed below. The reformulation was a narrowing, however, if one reads Pennhurst 
as replacing those old formulations with a comprehensive prospective-retrospective distinction. See 
supra text accompanying notes 108-15. 
310. 106 u.s. 196 (1882). 
311. See California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1464, 1471-73 (1998). 
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renee rested in addition on the fact that the Tribe was asserting a right to 
sovereignty over the lands at issue? 12 Since it is only the latter factor that 
distinguished this case from Lee, and since Justice O'Connor asserted that she 
was not "narrowing" Ex parte Young doctrine, the exception she recognized 
must include only cases in which the plaintiff raises a claim to exclusive 
sovereignty over land. The exception recognized in Coeur d'Alene would thus 
appear to embrace only disputes over sovereignty between states and Indian 
Tribes, and possibly also . between states and foreign states. After all, only 
sovereigns may have disputes over sovereignty, and the Eleventh Amendment 
does not apply to suits brought by sister states or the United States?13 
The exception may be narrower still. Justice Kennedy, for five Justices, wrote 
at length about the special importance to the states of submerged lands, stating 
that such lands have a "unique status in the law. " 314 Justice O'Connor added 
that the Court has "repeatedly emphasized the importance of submerged lands 
to state sovereignty" and that "[c]ontrol of such lands is critical to a State's 
ability to regulate use of its navigable waters. " 315 It is not clear why any of this 
should bear on whether a court may adjudicate a Tribe's claim that federal law 
denies the state sovereignty over such lands. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor 
seem to prejudge the merits here, holding in effect that the suit may not be 
maintained because the state, not the Tribe, has sovereignty over the land. Be 
that as it may, the Court's disquisition on the special nature of submerged lands 
suggests that the exception extends only to disputes over sovereignty over such 
lands, a reading that is confirmed by Justice O'Connor's statement that her 
holding extends only to suits in which "a plaintiff seeks to divest the State of all 
regulatory power over submerged lands." 316 The Coeur d'Alene exception to 
the Ex parte Young exception is thus narrow indeed. 
Recognizing the limited scope of this exception helps alleviate concerns over 
an aspect of the concurring opinion that might otherwise be troublesome. One 
of the key disagreements between Justices Kennedy and O'Connor concerned 
the relevance of the availability of a state forum. In denying relief, Justice 
Kennedy regarded it as important that the courts of Idaho were open to hear this 
case. Though he minimized the importance of federal courts, he affirmed the 
need for some court to be available to enforce federal law.317 He appeared to 
regard Ex parte Young as a stop-gap measure, allowing federal courts to fill in 
when the state courts decline to enforce the federal obligations of state offi-
312. "[T]he Tribe seeks to eliminate all together the State's regulatory power over the submerged 
lands at issue-to establish not only that the State has no right to possess the property, but also that the 
property is not within Idaho's sovereign jurisdiction at alL" Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2044. 
313. See supra notes 85-86. 
314. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at2041. 
315. Jd. at 2044. 
316. /d. at 2047. 
317. See id. at 2305 (noting that "the plan of the convention contemplates a regime in which federal 
guarantees are enforceable so long as there is a justiciable controversy"). 
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cials?18 Although Justice O'Connor criticized Justice Kennedy for understating 
the importance of the federal courts' role in protecting federal rights, she 
recognized that certain suits against state officials seeking prospective relief are 
barred even if they claim a violation of federal law. For the concurring Justices 
(or some of them), therefore, the unavailability of a federal forum may mean 
that in these cases there is potentially no forum at all in which to vindicate the 
federal rights at issue. In this respect, Justice O'Connor's position appears to be 
less protective of federal rights than Justice Kennedy's.319 
Limiting the exception to disputes about sovereignty over submerged lands 
significantly alleviates this concern. Disputes between states and Indian tribes 
concerning sovereignty over submerged lands can be resolved in the federal 
courts if the federal government brings suit. The Coeur d'Alene dispute is 
currently being resolved in just this way, albeit with respect to only a portion of 
the land the Tribe claims. 320 Disputes about sovereignty over submerged lands 
between a state and a foreign state can be submitted by the federal government 
to an arbitral forum, with or without the state's consent.321 That these mecha-
nisms depend on the executive branch's initiative makes them less than com-
pletely satisfying to disputants, but the incentive of the executive branch to 
intervene in these cases is likely to be quite high. 
Coeur d'Alene might be a worrisome precedent if it portended a proliferation 
of "exceptions" to the Ex parte Young exception. The case would be cause for 
considerable concern if the Court were contemplating an exception for every 
case in which "it simply cannot be said that the suit is not a suit against the 
State," 322 for, as the Court recognized in Pennhurst, all suits against state 
officials falling within the Ex parte Young exception are for all practical 
purposes suits against the states. Although the concurring Justices' reaffirmation 
of the prospective-retrospective test as the "ordinary" rule is preferable to 
Justice Kennedy's unmoored case-by-case approach, their decision to craft an 
exception barring a narrow class of suits seeking prospective relief represents a 
marked retrenchment from the analytical advance made in Pennhurst. This 
retrenchment, and the fact that even the dissenting Justices appear to have 
318. "Where there is no available state forum the Young rule has special significance. In that 
instance providing a federal forum for a justiciable controversy is a specific application of the principle 
that the plan of the convention contemplates a regime in which federal guarantees are enforceable so 
long as there is a justifiable controversy. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, p. 475 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 
1961) ('[T]here ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitutional 
provisions.')" /d. at 2035. 
319. Strictly speaking, O'Connor's position is not inconsistent with the proposition that state courts 
are required under General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908), to entertain suits against state 
officials seeking prospective relief from violations of federal law. It is at least curious, however, that the 
concurring Justices, unlike the dissenters, do not criticize Kennedy's implicit repudiation of Crain. On 
this repudiation, see infra notes 472-79 and accompanying text. 
320. See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2032; United States v. Idaho, No. CV 94-328-N-EJL (p. 
Idaho July 28, 1998). 
321. See Lattimer v. Poteet, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 4, 13-14 (1840). 
322. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2047 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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embraced a comprehensive prospective-retrospective test, appear to bode ill for 
a return to Edelman's original holding. On the other hand, the concurring 
Justices' decision to resolve the case as they did, ironically, may hasten the 
demise of the test they purported to reaffirm. By deciding the case on the basis 
of a narrow exception crafted for the occasion, the concurring Justices demon-
strated that, if the prospective-retrospective test is the "ordinary" rule, it is a 
rule that does little work. Edelman's original holding explains the unavailability 
of damages and damage-like monetary remedies. Seemingly retrospective non-
monetary relief, on the other hand, is permitted (Milliken), while seemingly 
prospective relief is barred if it is secondary rather than primary (Papasan) or if 
the dispute concerns sovereignty over submerged lands (Coeur d'Alene). By 
adopting an exception to govern the case, rather than relying on the "ordinary" 
rule, the concurring Justices have provided yet another example of the poverty 
of the rule they say they regard as a "basic principle of federal law." 
IV. BREARD V. GREENE AND THE OVERLOOKED LINK BETWEEN HABEAS CORPUS 
AND Ex PARTE YOUNG DOCTRINE 
In Breard v. Greene, the Supreme Court said little about the Eleventh 
Amendment, but what it said-and, more importantly, what it did not say-tells 
us volumes about the sorry state of Ex parte Young doctrine. The lower courts 
dismissed a lawsuit based on a reading of Edelman that would require the 
dismissal of virtually all petitions for federal habeas relief filed by state prison-
ers. Instead of reversing this problematic holding, the Court expressed its 
agreement with the lower courts' reasoning and denied the requested relief?23 
In Part IV A, I give a brief history of the Breard litigation, summarizing the 
reasons given in that case and in the similar Woods case for finding an order 
halting an allegedly unlawful execution to be retrospective. In Part IVB, I 
evaluate the lower court decisions in these cases as applications of the prospec-
tive-retrospective test, as the Supreme Court has elaborated it so far, and 
conclude that, judged by that standard, the decisions were plausible, if unsatisfy-
ing. In Part IV c, I explain the conflict between these holdings and the long 
history of granting federal habeas relief to state prisoners. Finally, in Part IVD, I 
explain why the Supreme Court's decision in Breard should not be regarded as 
an Eleventh Amendment decision at all. 
A. THE BREARD LITIGATION 
Angel Breard was a Paraguayan national who was convicted by a trial court 
in Virginia of a brutal rape and murder and was sentenced to death. 324 The 
controversy that concerns us grows out of Virginia's violation of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, a multilateral treaty to which the United 
323. See Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. at 1356. 
324. See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 617 (4th Cir.), cen. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998). 
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States and Paraguay are parties?25 The treaty provides that a national of one 
country "arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or ... 
detained in any other manner" by the authorities of another country has the 
right to confer with the consul of his country, if he so requests?26 It provides 
further that "said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of 
his rights under this [provision]." 327 No one seriously disputed that Breard had 
a right under this treaty to be informed that he was entitled to consult with 
Paraguay's consul to the United States, and that this right was violated by 
Virginia. 328 According to the courts entertaining his federal habeas petition, 
though, by the time Breard became aware of this right, it was too late. The 
district court held that he had forfeited his claim by failing to raise it at his trial 
or on his direct appeals,329 and the Fourth Circuit affirmed?30 
In a parallel case, the Republic of Paraguay and its consue31 sued the 
Governor of Virginia, George Allen, raising the treaty violation issue and 
seeking a vacatur of the death sentence.332 The failure to notify Breard of his 
rights under the treaty, Paraguay argued, had materially contributed to the 
ultimate imposition of the death sentence?33 Because of his lack of familiarity 
with the American justice system, Breard had turned down a plea bargain that 
would have averted the death penalty and, instead, after pleading not guilty, he 
confessed to the crime on the stand, claiming that he had been "under a curse 
placed upon him by his ex-wife's father." 334 Although his court-appointed 
counsel advised against this course of action, Paraguay argued that the Para-
guayan consul, being familiar with both Paraguayan and American judicial 
practice and culture, would have been more effective at explaining the risks and 
persuading Breard to accept a plea bargain.335 
Governor Allen moved to dismiss Paraguay's action on a number of grounds. 
In addition to raising the Eleventh Amendment argument, he argued, inter alia, 
that the treaty-based claim was nonjusticiable, that the plaintiffs lacked standing 
to demand the relief they sought, that the suit violated the Rooker-Feldman · 
325. See Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d at 625. 
326. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, Art. 36(1), 21 U.S.T. 77, 59 U.N.T.S. 
261. 
327. /d. 
328. The United States conceded these points in the ICJ proceeding initiated by Paraguay. See infra 
note 371. 
329. See Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1263 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 134 F.3d 615 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998). The court also said that "a violation of rights under the 
Convention is insufficient to permit [habeas] relief," citing the unpublished decision in Murphy v. 
Netherland, No. 3:95cv856, slip op. at 6-8 (E.D. Va. July 26, 1996), aff'd on other grounds, 116 F.3d 97 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 26 (1997). The basis of the dismissal in Breard v. Netherland, 
however, was forfeiture. 
330. See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d at 617. 
331. Although the consul was also a plaintiff, I shall hereinafter refer only to Paraguay. 
332. See Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1272. 
333. See Appellants' Brief at 5-6, Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 1998) (No. 96-2770). 
334. Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 73,445 S.E.2d 670,674 (1994). 
335. See Appellant's Brief at 5-6, Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F. 3d 144 (4th Cir. 1998) (No. 96-2770). 
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doctrine, 336 and that the exclusive basis on which to seek to vacate a criminal 
sentence is habeas corpus?37 The district court rejected the Governor's justicia-
bility and standing arguments, 338 but dismissed Paraguay's suit on Eleventh 
Amendment grounds. 339 
The court's analysis was brief. After noting that the Eleventh Amendment 
bars suits against state officials that are in fact suits against a state, the court 
correctly noted that the Ex parte Young case is an "exception" to this rule?40 
But to fall within the exception, according to the court, "the plaintiffs must 
satisfy two criteria: ( 1) they must show that they seek a remedy for a continuing 
violation of federal law and (2) they must show that the relief is prospec-
tive."341 The court devoted most of its analysis to determining whether there 
was a "continuing violation of federal law," concluding that there was not.342 It 
quoted Papasan for the proposition that the question is whether federal law is 
being violated now as opposed to "at one time or over a period of time in the 
past," 343 and it cited Milliken as a case in which the state officials were 
violating federal law "at the precise moment when the case was filed." 344 In 
this case, the court held, Virginia violated the treaty in the past, and the 
violation was not "continuing," since Virginia was no longer hindering Breard's 
efforts to consult with his consul.345 The court assumed the validity of plaintiff's 
factual claim that, but for the violation, Breard would not be on death row 
today?46 It characterized this result as "a tragic consequence of Virginia's 
failure to abide by the law," but stressed that "it is still a consequence of the 
violation and not a continuing wrong." 347 The court concluded its analysis by 
characterizing the relief sought by the plaintiffs as "retroactive" and thus barred 
by the Eleventh Amendment. 348 It accordingly denied the plaintiffs the opportu-
nity to present evidence that Virginia's violation of the treaty materially contrib-
uted to the imposition of Breard's death sentence. 
336. Under this doctrine, which takes its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 
(1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 ( 1983), "federal courts do 
not have jurisdiction pursuant to § 1983 to review the judgments and decisions of state courts." ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISD!Cf!ON 423 (2d ed. 1994). 
337. See Appellee's Brief at 14-26, Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 1998) (No. 96-2770). 
338. See Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1274-75. 
339. See id. at 1273. 
340. !d. at 1272. 
341. /d. (citing Green, 474 U.S. at 68). 
342. !d. at 1273. 
343. /d. (quoting Papasan, 478 U.S. at 278). 
344. /d. 
345. !d. 
346. See id. 
347. !d. (emphasis in original). 
348. /d. Although the court indicated that there were two requirements-that the relief sought be 
prospective and that the violation of federal law be ongoing-the fact that the court characterized the 
relief as retrospective immediately after concluding that the violation of federal law was not ongoing, 
and without any additional analysis, suggests that the court regarded the two requirements as related. 
The Courts of Appeals criticized the district court for not treating the requirements as distinct. See 134 
F.3d at 627 n.5. 
HeinOnline  -- 87 Geo. L.J. 54 1998-1999
54 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:1 
While Paraguay's appeal was .pending in the Fourth Circuit, the United States 
submitted a brief as amicus curiae volunteering its views. The Justice Depart-
ment questioned the district court's Eleventh Amendment analysis,349 but ar-
gued that the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims should be affirmed on other 
grounds. The Department argued broadly that "treaty disputes between govern-
ments are not justiciable in domestic courts," 350 and, more narrowly, that this 
particular treaty did not give the plaintiffs a cause of action?51 The Court of 
Appeals, however, declined the invitation to affirm on other grounds and instead 
affirmed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. 
Like the district court, the Court of Appeals asserted that suits against state 
officials must meet two requirements to escape the Eleventh Amendment bar: 
the violation of federal law must be ongoing, and the relief sought must be 
prospective?52 The Court found that neither was satisfied here. The court found 
it "obvious ... that the actual violation alleged is a past event that is not itself 
continuing." 353 It distinguished Milliken and Papas an on the ground that they 
"involve[ d) classic examples of presently experienced harmful consequences of 
past conduct, hence of ongoing violations of federally protected constitutional 
rights." 354 That would have seemed an apt description of Paraguay's case, 
too,355 but, in a classic non sequitur, the court concluded that Paraguay's claim 
was distinguishable because Virginia officials "were [not] continuing to prevent 
349. See Brief for Amicus Curiae United States at 30-32, Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F. 3d 622 (4th Cir. 
1998) (No. 96-2770). The United States suggested that the Eleventh Amendment should not apply when 
the federal government, "by statute or through a duly ratified treaty adopted under the foreign affairs 
power, authorize[s] a foreign government to sue a state in order to enforce" its treaty-based rights. /d. at 
31. In other cases, the Justice Department has advanced the somewhat more limited argument that the 
Eleventh Amendment does not limit Congress's exercise of the war power. See Brief of the United 
States as Intervenor, at 5-15, Velasquez v. Frapwell, 994 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (No. IP 
96-0557-C HIG); Brief of the United States as Intervenor-Appellant at 6-17, Velasquez v. Frapwell, 
Nos. 98-1547, 98-203N (filed June 5, 1998); Brief of the United States Intervenor at 6-17, Palmatier v. 
Michigan Dep't of State Police, No. 97-1982 (filed Dec. 15, 1998); Reply Brieffor the United States as 
Intervenor at 2-5, Palmatier v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, No. 97-1982 (filed Feb. 18, 1998). One 
court adopted that position shortly after the Court decided in Seminole Tribe that Congress does not 
have the authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under its Article I powers, see Diaz-
Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 616 (1st Cir. 1996), but the district courts in Velasquez and 
Palmatier rejected the argument. Velasquez v. Frapwell, 994 F. Supp. 993, 1001-03 (S.D. Ind. 1998); 
Palmatier v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 981 F. Supp. 529, 532 (W.O. Mich. 1997). Appeals are 
pending. 
350. Brief for Amicus Curiae United States at II, Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(No. 96-2770). This argument provoked a reply from a group of law professors. See Brief for Amici 
Curiae Group of Law Professors, Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (No. 96-2770). 
351. See Brief for Amicus Curiae United States at 23-26, Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 
1998) (No. 96-2770). 
352. See Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d at 627. 
353. /d. at 628. 
354. /d. 
355. The district court, after all, had stated that the death sentence was a "consequence" of 
Virginia's violation of the treaty-a "tragic" one, at that. For the district court, however, consequences 
were not enough. See Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1273 (emphasis in original). 
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Paraguay ... from providing aid and counseling to Breard." 356 The court gave 
similar reasons for distinguishing Fourth Circuit precedent permitting an em-
ployee who had been fired in violation of federal law to obtain an award of 
reinstatement,357 as well as a precedent permitting former patients of a mental 
institution who had been subjected to unconstitutional treatment while at the 
institution to obtain "a federal injunctive decree for their care. " 358 In those 
cases, too, the court said, "responsible state officials were presently violating 
the claimants' ongoing rights." 359 
The court also concluded that the relief being sought was not "in any true 
sense prospective," but rather was "quintessentially retrospective: the voiding 
of a final state conviction and sentence." 360 "[T]he inescapable fact," the court 
said, is that the effect of this relief "would be to undo accomplished state action 
and not to provide prospective relief against the continuation of a past viola-
tion."361 Finally, the court faulted the plaintiffs for arguing, "as if [it] were 
dispositive of the question," that the suit fell within the Ex parte Young 
exception because they were not seeking money damages.362 Citing Coeur 
d'Alene, the court wrote that "(m]oney damages are probably the purest and 
most recognizable form of retrospective relief, but surely not the only form. " 363 
In its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit cited the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
United Mexican States v. Woods364 as being in accord with its holding. Woods 
involved a very similar claim by the Mexican government seeking to vacate the 
death sentence of Ramon Martinez Villareal on the ground that a violation of 
the Vienna Convention by Arizona officials had materially contributed to the 
ultimate imposition of his sentence. 365 The Ninth Circuit dismissed the suit on 
Eleventh Amendment grounds, providing an even breezier analysis than the 
Fourth Circuit: 
A criminal proceeding can be roughly analogized to a series of videotaped 
scenes: the arrest, the interrogation, the trial, the sentencing, and the appeal. 
Each of these scenes is examined post hoc in state postconviction proceedings 
and federal habeas. In no event, however, can the conviction or sentence be 
considered as a dynamic event, to be examined in a prospective fashion. The 
facts relating to the analysis of whether the proceedings met constitutional 
requirements are fixed and must be viewed through a retrospective lens?66 
356. Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d at. 628. 
357. See Coakley v. Welch, 877 F.2d 304, 307 (4th Cir. 1989). 
358. Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d at 628 (discussing Thomas S. by Brooks v. Flaherty, 902 F.2d 250 
(4th Cir. 1990)). 
359. /d. 
360. !d. 
361. /d. 
362. /d. 
363. /d. 
364. 126 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998). 
365. /d. at 1222-23. 
366. !d. at 1223. 
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Like the Fourth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit held that there was no continuing 
violation of the treaty because the prisoner was currently being allowed to 
consult with his consul. 367 
Both Paraguay and Mexico filed petitions for certiorari, as did Breard. With 
Breard's execution date set for April 14, 1998, and the Supreme Court yet to 
rule on its petition, Paraguay on April 3 filed an application with the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague arguing that the execution of Breard 
would violate the Vienna Convention and seeking an order prohibiting the 
execution.368 Paraguay further asked for provisional measures-the equivalent 
of a preliminary injunction-for the purpose of maintaining the status quo 
pendente lite.369 The ICJ heard argument on April 7. The United States admitted 
the treaty had been violated, but it argued that vacating the death sentence was 
not the appropriate remedy because (a) it is not a remedy authorized by the 
treaty, and (b), in any event, the failure to notify Breard of his rights did not 
have an appreciable effect on the ultimate outcome of the case. In support of the 
latter point, the United States noted, among other things, that Breard had been 
in the United States for six years, was familiar with American culture and had a 
good command of English; that he had been counseled against the strategy he 
ultimately pursued not just by his court-appointed counsel, but also by his 
mother, uncle and cousin, each of whom was familiar with Paraguayan culture; 
and that Virginia officials had not in fact offered Breard a plea agreement, and 
under the circumstances never would· have?70 The United States also ques-
tioned the ICJ's jurisdiction over the case.371 The United States did not, of 
course, rely on the Eleventh Amendment, as this provision of domestic law, 
even if it had been correctly applied by the Fourth Circuit, would not have 
excused a violation of the treaty as a matter of international law. 
On April 9, the ICJ issued an opinion reserving judgment on the arguments 
367. See id. 
368. See Application of the Republic of Paraguay (April 3, 1998) <www.icj-cij.org/idocketlipaus/ 
ipausframe.htm>. 
369. Under appropriate circumstances, the ICJ has "the power to indicate ... any provisional 
measure which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party." STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CouRT OF JUSTICE, Art. 41(1). The ICJ may indicate provisional measures only if the 
plaintiff's claim prima facie falls within the ICJ's jurisdiction and the measures are needed to prevent 
irreparable prejudice to the moving party. See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99, 103-05 
(Interim Protection Order of June 22); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 135, 136-43 (Interim 
Protection Order of June 22). 
370. See Verbatim record of oral argument in case concerning the Application of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), CR 9817, at 35-37 [hereinafter Verbatim Record]. 
371. An Optional Protocol to which both the United States and Paraguay are parties gives the ICJ 
"compulsory jurisdiction" over any dispute about the interpretation or application of the treaty. 
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning the Compulsory 
Settlement of Disputes, 21 U.S.T. 325, T.I.A.S. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 (Apr. 24, 1963). The United 
States argued that there was no "dispute" within the meaning of the Protocol, as the United States 
agreed that the treaty had been violated. Verbatim Record CR 9817, at 42-43. Paraguay responded that 
there was a dispute about whether the treaty required the vacatur of Breard's sentence. See id. CR 98/8, 
at 8. 
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advanced by the United States but finding Paraguay's claims sufficiently merito-
rious to warrant an order granting the requested provisional measures?72 The 
unanimous order provided that the United States "should take all measures at 
its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the 
final decision in these proceedings." 373 Upon the issuance of this order, Para-
guay supplemented its certiorari petition to the Supreme Court with a motion 
for permission to file an original action in the Court against the Governor of 
Virginia (who was now James Gilmore).374 
In the meantime, on April 8, the Supreme Court had invited the Solicitor 
General to submit the views of the United States on or before 5:00p.m. on April 
13, the day before the scheduled execution. At around that time, the Solicitor 
General filed the Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae. Although the 
federal government urged the Supreme Court to deny the requested relief, it 
pointedly declined to endorse the Fourth Circuit's Eleventh Amendment analy-
sis.375 Instead, it argued that the Fourth Circuit had rightly dismissed Paraguay's 
suit because the Vienna Convention does not authorize the setting aside of a 
criminal conviction as a remedy for breach of the duty Virginia had violated. 376 
It argued further that Breard's petition was correctly dismissed because h_e had 
forfeited his claim by failing to raise it earlier?77 Finally, it argued that the ICJ 
order did not require, or even justify, a grant of certiorari. It took the position 
that, under our constitutional system, the only mechanism "at [the federal 
government's] disposal" for securing compliance with the ICJ order was to 
request the Governor of Virginia to postpone the execution.378 Accordingly, 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright sent Governor Gilmore a letter pointing 
out the importance to the United States of complying with the ICJ order and 
requesting that he postpone the execution. 379 
The Supreme Court issued its decision the following day, less than an hour 
before the scheduled execution,380 denying the petitions of both Breard and 
Paraguay.381 Governor Gilmore then took the United States' foreign policy 
372. See Order of April 9, 1998, in case concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
(Para. v. U.S.), at 7. 
373. !d. 
374. See Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, Complaint and Memorandum in Support, No. 
125 Orig. (filed April 13, 1998). 
375. See Brief for Amicus Curiae United States at 15, Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998) 
(Nos. 97-1390 (A-738), 97-8214 (A-732)) ("[W]e do not necessarily endorse the court of appeals' 
distinction between "past" and "ongoing" violations of the Convention for Eleventh Amendment 
purposes."). 
376. See id. at 25-26. 
377. See id. at 18-19. 
378. For a critique of this position, see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard and the Federal Power to 
Require Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 683 (1998). 
379. See Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State, to James S. Gilmore III, Governor of 
Virginia, 1-2 (Apr. 13, 1998). 
380. See Brooke A. Masters & Joan Biskupic, Killer Executed Despite Pleas: World Tribunal, State 
Had Urged Delay, WASH. PosT, Apr. 15, 1998, at 81. 
381. See Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. at !356. 
HeinOnline  -- 87 Geo. L.J. 58 1998-1999
58 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:1 
interests into account and, finding them wanting, denied Albright's request for a 
postponement.382 Breard was executed that evening. The Supreme Court's 
decision received a great deal of press coverage in the succeeding days, as the 
Court had permitted an execution to go forward in defiance of an order of the 
International Court of Justice.383 For present purposes, however, the importance 
of the decision lies in its apparent endorsement of the lower courts' conclusion 
that Paraguay's lawsuit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment because the 
relief Paraguay sought was retrospective. 
The Court wrote only five sentences on the Eleventh Amendment: 
The Eleventh Amendment provides a separate reason why Paraguay's suit 
might not succeed. That Amendment's "fundamental principle" that "the 
States, in the absence of consent, are immune from suits brought against them 
... by a foreign State" was enunciated in Principality of Monaco v. Missis-
sippi .... Though Paraguay claims that its suit is within an exemption dealing 
with continuing consequences of past violations of federal rights, see Milliken 
v. Bradley ... we do not agree. The failure to notify the Paraguayan Consul 
occurred long ago and has no continuing effect. The causal link present in 
Milliken is absent in this case?84 
In the alternative, the Court denied Paraguay's petitions because "neither the 
text nor the history of the Vienna Convention clearly provides a foreign nation. 
with a private right of action in United States court to set aside a criminal 
conviction and sentence for violation of consular notification provisions." 385 
Justice Souter wrote separately to explain that he was concurring in the denial 
of Paraguay's petitions only on the ground that the treaty did not authorize the 
remedy being sought.386 Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented and 
would have set the case for briefing and argument.387 
I explain below why the lower courts' Eleventh Amendment holdings in Allen 
and Woods cannot be right, and why the Supreme Court's rushed judgment in 
Breard should not be treated as a binding endorsement of these holdings. The 
Court's opinion in.Breard is nevertheless troubling, primarily for what it did not 
382. See Commonwealth of Virginia, Office of the Governor Press Office, Statement of Governor 
James S. Gilmore Ill, Concerning the Execution of Angel Breard (April 14, 1998). After the Supreme 
Court issued its decision, Paraguay filed an original action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia, seeking relief based on the ICJ order. The district court denied relief, and the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed. Republic of Paraguay v. Gilmore, CA-98-227-3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 14, 1998), aff'd, No. 
98-1547 (4th Cir. Apr. 14, 1998). 
383. See e.g., Masters & Biskupic, supra note 380; Frank J. Murray, U.S. Law Outweighs Older 
Pact: Foreign Countries Can't Sue States, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 1998, at AI; Peter J. Spiro, States that 
Flout World Opinion May Incur Loss, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1998, at A23. 
384. Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. at 1356 (citations omitted). 
385. /d. 
386. See id. (Souter, J., concurring). 
387. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). It is not clear from Justice Ginsburg's opinion whether she 
was dissenting from the denial of Paraguay's petitions as well as Breard's. See id. at 1357 (referring 
only to Breard's petitions). 
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say. One might have expected the Court quickly to disavow the lower court's 
problematic Eleventh Amendment analysis, particularly since the majority appar-
ently agreed with the Solicitor General that there were independent grounds for 
affirming the judgment. Yet the Court declined the opportunity to disavow, or 
even reserve judgment on, the lower court's analysis, and instead expressed the 
view that the suit was correctly dismissed because it sought retrospective 
relief_388 This suggests that the Supreme Court is as confused by its doctrine in 
this area as are the lower courts. 
B. THE ALLEN AND WOODS OPINIONS AS APPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S 
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
The reasoning that led the Fourth and Ninth Circuits to conclude that the suits 
by Paraguay and Mexico were barred by the Eleventh Amendment was unsatis-
fying, but then, as we have seen, so is the reasoning of many of the Supreme 
Court's decisions in this area. What is more remarkable about these cases is the 
plausibility of their holdings as applications of the Supreme Court's test for 
determining whether a suit falls within the Ex parte Young exception. One 
begins to suspect that something is wrong with the Supreme Court's test when it 
supports the conclusion that as intuitively prospective a remedy as the halting of 
a future execution is in fact "retrospective" relief. The suspicion is confirmed 
when one considers that this analysis would require the rejection of over a 
century of cases recognizing the constitutionality of federal habeas relief for 
state prisoners. 
1. Distinguishing "Ongoing" from "Past" Violations 
The test the Supreme Court articulated in Green for distinguishing prospec-
tive from retrospective relief turns on whether the relevant violation of federal 
law occurred in the past or is instead occurring in the present (or is expected to 
occur in the future). This analysis focuses the court's attention on the legal 
violation that is the basis of the plaintiff's complaint, and in the Allen and 
Woods cases, the relevant violation seemed to be the failure to provide the 
notification required by the Vienna Convention. This was certainly the most 
prominent legal violation in these cases, and, as the court said in Allen, it is 
"obvious" that it occurred in the past. By focusing the court's attention on the 
complained-of legal violation, the Court's test deflects the intuition in these 
sorts of cases that the plaintiffs are seeking prospective relief. 
Even the Green test, however, permits relief from a continuing violation. The 
plaintiffs in Allen had relied on cases that they construed to allow relief from 
continuing consequences of past violations of the law. 389 This argument was 
supported by Milliken, in which the district court had awarded relief because it 
388. The Court did not use the term "retrospective," but it said that the relief was barred because it 
related to a violation of law that happened "long ago" and had no "continuing effect." /d. at 1356. 
389. See Appellants' Brief at 10-16, Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F. 3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998)(No. 96-2770). 
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was "needed to remedy effects of past segregation." 390 The Fourth Circuit in 
Allen apparently accepted this argument,391 as did the Supreme Court, whose 
opinion in Breard described Milliken as establishing "an exemption dealing 
with continuing consequences of past violations of federal rights." 392 But this 
test fails to explain why the plaintiffs in Edelman were unable to recover their 
past-due benefits.393 It was perhaps the difficulty of squaring Edelman with a 
"continuing effects" test that led the district court to conclude that a showing of 
continuing consequences of past violations was not enough to place a suit 
within the Ex parte Young exception.394 It may also have been this difficulty that 
led the Fourth Circuit, even while interpreting Milliken to permit relief from 
continuing consequences of past violations, ultimately to deny relief because the 
violation was not ongoing.395 A "continuing consequences" or "continuing 
effects" test should have produced the opposite result on the Eleventh Amend-
ment issue in Allen,396 but such a test is untenable in light of Edelman. 
The district court was thus justified in rejecting the "continuing effects" test 
and insisting instead that the violation of law itself be "ongoing" rather than 
"in the past." Under this test, the outcome depends on the specification of the 
relevant legal violation. The district court and the Court of Appeals regarded the 
relevant legal violation as either the violation of the duty to notify Breard of his 
right to consult with his consul or the violation of his right to consult with his 
consul. Either way, the violation itself was not continuing. The time for notifica-
tion had passed, and Breard and his consul were now being allowed to consult. 
As discussed below, the habeas cases require the conclusion that these were not 
the relevant legal violations. The Supreme Court's decisions on the scope of the 
Ex parte Young exception, however, overlook the relevance of the habeas cases 
to the prospective-retrospective test, and the district court offered little basis for 
resisting the intuition that these were the relevant legal violations. 
2. Distinguishing Prospective from Retrospective Relief 
If defining prospective relief by reference to the complained-of legal viola-
tion of law risks deflecting the intuition in certain cases that the relief being 
sought is prospective, the Fourth Circuit should not have fallen into that trap, as 
it understood the requirement of prospectivity to be separate from the require-
390. 418 U.S. at 274. 
391. 134 F.3d at 628. 
392. 118 S. Ct. at 1356. 
393. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84 (asking why plaintiffs in Edelman were not 
permitted to obtain a remedy eliminating the vestiges of the defendant's unlawful failure to pay them 
past-due benefits). See also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 59, at 1074 ("Might not indigent beneficia-
ries in Edelman have been suffering continuing effects of previous denials of benefits?"). 
394. See supra text accompanying note 347. 
395. See supra notes 354-56 and accompanying text. 
396. As distinguished from the merits. See infra text accompanying notes 416-17 (explaining why 
Supreme Court decision should be understood as a merits decision). 
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ment that the violation of law be ongoing. Even without this deflection, how-
ever, the court concluded that the relief sought by Paraguay was retrospective. 
This section considers whether the Fourth Circuit correctly concluded that these 
two requirements are separate and whether, ultimately, it matters whether they 
are separate or not. I also examine the reasoning that led the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits to conclude that the relief sought by Paraguay and Mexico was 
retrospective. 
The Supreme Court originally introduced the idea of an "ongoing" violation 
as a way to define prospective relief. Green v. Mansour, which the Fourth 
Circuit regarded as the relevant authority, defined "prospective relief" as 
"remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law," 397 and 
"retroactive" relief as remedies that relate to "past violations of federal law." 398 
The Court thus envisioned a single requirement, not two separate ones. Later 
cases, however, such as Seminole Tribe and Coeur d'Alene, phrase the test in 
language amenable to the Fourth Circuit's construction?99 If the Court in these 
cases established the requirement of an "ongoing" violation of federal law as 
separate and distinct from the prospectivity requirement, it has done so, once 
again, inadvertently and without analysis. 
Does it matter whether the requirements are treated as separate and indepen-
dent? Under the test as the Fourth Circuit understood it, a suit falls within the 
Ex parte Young exception only if both requirements are met. I suggested above 
that defining prospectivity by reference to the underlying violation of law risks 
deflecting the intuition that certain forms of relief are prospective. If so, then 
delinking the requirements may help produce correct decisions on the prospectiv-
ity issue. But this is of little relevance if the plaintiff must additionally, and 
independently, show that the violation of law is ongoing. On the other hand, if 
the requirements are indeed just two sides of the same coin, then de linking them 
poses a danger that, in determining whether the violation of law is ongoing, the 
court will be uninfluenced by whatever insight it would otherwise have gotten 
from the intuition that the relief sought was prospective. 
In any event, no such insights would have illuminated the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits' analyses of whether there was an "ongoing" violation, for neither 
court regarded the relief sought by the plaintiffs to be prospective. Rather than 
view the case as an attempt to stop a future execution, the Fourth Circuit 
!d. 
397. See Green, 474 U.S. at 68: 
Both prospective relief and retrospective relief implicate Eleventh Amendment concerns, but 
the availability of prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex pane Young gives life to the 
Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are 
necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law. 
398. See id. at 69. The Court explained that: "[Edelman held that] the Eleventh Amendment barred 
the injunction ordering retroactive benefits because it was effectively an award of money damages for 
past violations of federal law." /d. 
399. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73; Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2040. 
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described it as an attempt to "void[] a final state conviction and sentence. " 400 
"That this could be effectuated in an injunctive or declaratory decree directed at 
state officials," the court wrote, "does not alter the inescapable fact that its 
effect would be to undo accomplished state action. " 401 The conviction and the 
judge's imposition of the sentence had, of course, been "accomplished" by the 
time the court wrote, but Paraguay was seeking to stop the carrying out of the 
sentence. Had that been "accomplished," Breard would have been dead and 
Paraguay's lawsuit moot. Of course, the lawsuit was both an attempt to "undo" 
a conviction and sentence imposed in the past and an attempt to stop an 
execution scheduled to take place in the future. The Court's Eleventh Amend-
ment cases do not offer a basis for choosing between these two possible 
characterizations. 402 
The Ninth Circuit's judgment in Woods that the plaintiff sought retrospective 
relief was similarly driven by its focus on the events the plaintiff was seeking to 
undo. For the court, it was significant that "[t]he facts relating to the analysis of 
whether proceedings met constitutional requirements are fixed and must be 
viewed through a retrospective Iens."403 The Supreme Court's Eleventh Amend-
ment cases offer little basis for rejecting that characterization in favor of the one 
Mexico advocated. But the Ninth Circuit unwittingly brushed up against a line 
of cases that does provide very relevant guidance. The court recognized that 
these events may be "examined post hoc in state postconviction proceedings 
and federal habeas." 404 Its characterization of state habeas proceedings as "post 
hoc" no doubt contributed to its conclusion that the relief sought by Mexico 
was retrospective. As the next section shows, however, the many cases affording 
federal habeas relief to state prisoners establish beyond cavil that the suits 
brought by Paraguay and Mexico fell within the Ex parte Young exception. 
C. HABEAS CORPUS AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
The relationship between habeas corpus jurisprudence and Eleventh Amend-
ment doctrine has been largely overlooked by the courts and commentators. It is 
difficult to think of cases better situated to correct this oversight than Allen and 
Woods. In both cases, the prisoner himself pursued the same forms of relief as 
the plaintiffs, yet in neither case did the court notice that, if it were right in its 
conclusion that the governments' suits were barred by the Eleventh Amendment 
because the relief sought was retrospective, the same conclusion would follow 
400. Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d at 628. 
401. !d. 
402. Compare the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bennett v. Yoshino, 140 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1998), 
involving a challenge to an election that had already taken place. The court rejected the defendants' 
characterization of the requested relief as retrospective, emphasizing that "[w]hat [plaintiff] objects to 
is not the mere occurrence of the vote, but the state's decision to give effect to that vote." !d. at 1224 
(emphasis in original). 
403. Woods, 126 F.3d at 1223. 
404. !d. 
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for the prisoners, and indeed for virtually every state prisoner seeking federal 
habeas relief. 
It is especially surprising that the Fourth Circuit failed to see this connection, 
as its opinion recognized that Breard's federal habeas petition was "itself an 
action against a state official, the prison warden, that itself is maintainable in 
federal court only by virtue of the Ex parte Young exception, as specifically 
implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 2254. " 405 The court cited for this proposition 
Justice Souter's dissent in Seminole Tribe, which states that "[i]t is well 
established that when a habeas corpus petitioner sues a state official alleging 
detention in violation of federal law and seeking the prospective remedy of 
release from custody, it is the doctrine identified in Ex parte Young that allows 
the petitioner to evade the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh Amendment. " 406 It 
is a bit of an anachronism to describe the habeas cases as an application of the 
Ex parte Young exception, as these cases predated and indeed were relied upon 
in Ex parte Young itself.407 But it is true that the habeas cases do not violate the 
Eleventh Amendment because of the principle, later identified with Ex parte 
Young, that a suit against a state official alleging a violation of federal law is not 
a suit against the state because "[t]he state cannot ... impart to the official 
immunity from responsibility to the supreme ~uthority of the United States. " 408 
As the Court went on to say in Ex parte Young: 
This supreme authority ... is nowhere more fully illustrated than in the series 
of decisions under the Federal habeas corpus statute . . . in some of which 
cases persons in custody of state officers for alleged crimes against the state· 
405. Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d at 627 n.6. The Fourth Circuit's opinion alludes to Virginia's 
argument that, while Breard was concededly complaining of an ongoing violation of his rights, 
Paraguay was not. See id. at 627. If the court meant to endorse this argument, it failed to explain how 
the identity of the plaintiff bears on the "ongoing" nature of Virginia's violation of the treaty or the 
"retrospective" nature of the relief being sought. If the violation led to the imposition of a death 
sentence on its national, then it would seem that the violation of Paraguay's rights under the treaty were 
just as ongoing as the violation of Breard's rights. (This, of course, assumes that Paraguay had the right 
under the treaty that its nationals not be executed if his conviction or sentence was materially 
influenced by a violation of the consular notification provision, but one must make this assumption in 
engaging in the Eleventh Amendment analysis. A dismissal that depended on the conclusion that 
Paraguay did not have such a right would have been a dismissal on the merits.) There certainly were 
defensible grounds in Allen for concluding that Breard's petition was proper but Paraguay's lawsuit was 
not. The United States made some of these arguments to the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court, and 
Virginia made others. See supra notes 336-37 & 350-51 and accompanying text. For example, drawing 
on such cases as Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 
(1994), the court might defensibly have held that habeas corpus is the exclusive avenue for obtaining 
relief from a death sentence. A dismissal on such grounds, however, would not have been an Eleventh 
Amendment dismissal. 
406. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 178. (Souter, J., dissenting). The Justices in the majority did not 
dispute Souter on this point. See supra note 46. See also Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce 
Corp., 337 U.S. 682,689-90 (1949); Booth v. Maryland, 112 F.3d 139, 144 (4th Cir. 1997); Brennan v. 
Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1252 n.6 (5th Cir. 1988); United States ex rei. Elliott v. Hendricks, 213 F.2d · 
922, 926-28 (3d Cir. 1954). 
407. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 167-68. 
408. !d. 
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have been taken from that custody and discharged by a Federal court or judge, 
because the imprisonment was adjudged to be in violation of the Federal 
Constitution. The right to so discharge has not been doubted by this court, and 
it has never been supposed there was any suit against the state by reason of 
serving the writ upon one of the officers of the state in whose custody the 
person was found.409 
The Court cited ten Supreme Court cases dating back to 1886 as "fully 
recognizing" the power of federal courts to grant such relief notwithstanding 
the Eleventh Amendment.410 
All of these decisions, and many, many others rendered after 1908, would be 
called into question by a rule barring as retrospective the sort of relief Paraguay 
and Mexico were seeking. Since the Fourth and Ninth Circuits obviously did 
not mean to question these decisions, and in any event an Eleventh Amendment 
challenge to the federal power to grant habeas relief to state prisoners is 
inconceivable, we can conclude with confidence that these courts erred when 
they held that the relief sought by Paraguay and Mexico was barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. If the Ex parte Young exception is subject to an excep-
tion for suits seeking retrospective relief, then "retrospective" must be defined 
so as to accommodate the well-established principle that federal courts are not 
constitutionally barred from granting habeas relief to state prisoners who chal-
lenge the legality of their convictions or sentences. 
The reasons given by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits for regarding the relief 
sought by Paraguay and Mexico as retrospective would require the same 
characterization of the relief sought in virtually every habeas case. The Ninth 
Circuit said that the relief was prospective because "the facts relating to the 
analysis of whether the proceedings met constitutional requirements are fixed." 
But the facts are fixed in the same way whenever a state prisoner seeks release 
based on an allegation that, say, constitutional errors in his trial materially 
contributed to his conviction. The Fourth Circuit said that the relief was 
retrospective because the plaintiff was seeking to "void[] a final state convic-
tion" and thus to "undo accomplished state action." But every habeas petitioner 
is similarly seeking to "void" an otherwise final state conviction or sentence. 
Nor can Allen and Woods be distinguished from a typical habeas action on the 
ground that the violation of federal law was in the past. In virtually every 
habeas action, the petitioner is seeking relief because .of some past act that 
violated federal law, whether the basis of the claim is the unconstitutionality of 
the statute under which he was convicted, or the failure of the police to give him 
Miranda warnings, or some procedural violation in his trial, or some error in the 
409. ld. 
410. Id. (citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886); Thomas v. Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890); 
Cunningham v. Neagle, I35 U.S. I (I890); Baker v. Grice, I69 U.S. 284 (I898); Ohio v. Thomas, 173 
U.S. 276 (1899); Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U.S. 499 (I90I); Reid v. Jones, I87 U.S. I53 (I902); 
United States v. Lewis, 200 U.S. I (I906); In re Lincoln, 202 U.S. I78 (1906)). 
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imposition of his sentence.411 If the petitioner claims that the state law under 
which he was convicted was unconstitutional, he may be said to be complaining 
that the legislature acted unconstitutionally in enacting the statute, that the 
prosecutor acted unconstitutionally in bringing the prosecution, that the state 
trial court acted unconstitutionally in failing to dismiss the indictment, and that 
various appellate courts acted unconstitutionally in failing to reverse the trial 
court. By the time the habeas petition reaches federal court, there have been 
numerous past "unconstitutional" acts, and the petitioner is asking the court to 
focus on one or more of them. 
If the applicability of the Ex parte Young exception turns on whether the 
plaintiff or petitioner is seeking to remedy a continuing violation of federal 
law--either because this is what it means to be seeking prospective relief or 
because this is an additional, separate requirement-then the analysis must be 
such as to permit the sort of relief sought in the typical habeas petition. This 
means that, in the case of a state prisoner claiming her conviction was invalid, 
the relevant legal violation must be regarded as the present incarceration, not 
the past unlawful conviction. In the case of a state prisoner seeking the vacatur 
of her death sentence, the relevant legal violation must be regarded as the 
carrying out of the sentence, not the judge's imposition of the sentence, or the 
prior violations of law that rendered invalid the imposition of the sentence. 
Unlike the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment cases, the habeas cases give 
us strong ground for concluding that the Fourth Circuit erred when it character-
ized the suit for Eleventh Amendment purposes as a suit to "undo" accom-
plished state action or to "void" a conviction and sentence. In short, if the 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits were right, then over a century of habeas corpus 
jurisprudence is wrong.412 
411. Among the few situations in which the relief sought does not relate to a past violation is the 
case where the petitioner argues that the imposition of a death sentence is unconstitutional because he is 
presently insane. See, e.g., Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 118 S. Ct. 1618, 1619 (1998). Ironically, 
Justices Scalia and Thomas have expressed the view that habeas relief is unavailable in this context. See 
id. at 1625 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
412. It might be argued that § 2254, the statute authorizing federal habeas relief for state prisoners, 
raises no Eleventh Amendment problems because Congress, in enacting it, validly abrogated Eleventh 
Amendment immunity pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. There are several problems with 
such an argument. First, § 2254 was enacted in 1867, one year before the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified. There is no evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to ratify an 
otherwise unconstitutional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity, or indeed that the framers of 
§ 2254 intended to abrogate any such immunity. Moreover, § 2254 authorizes federal habeas relief for 
state prisoners in custody in violation not just of the Fourteenth Amendment, but of other types of 
federal law, including constitutional provisions found in the unamended Constitution, as well as federal 
statutes and treaties. The Court has found no Eleventh Amendment problem with habeas petitions by 
state prisoners claiming they are in custody in violation of such constitutional provisions as the Ex Post 
Facto Clause, see Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), or the 
Bill of Attainder Clause, see Gusman v. Marrero, 180 U.S. 81 (1901); McMullen v. United States, 989 
F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1993), or federal statutes enacted pursuant to Article I, see Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 
1277 (1994), or treaties, see United States ex ref. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13 (1925); Wildenhus' 
Case, 120 U.S. I (1886). In these contexts,§ 2254 can only with difficulty be said to be enforcing the 
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D. THE BASIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN BREARD 
The Supreme Court in Breard appeared to agree with the Fourth Circuit that 
Paraguay's lawsuit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it sought 
retrospective relief. The elliptical opinion does not use the term "retrospective," 
but it does say that the failure to notify "occurred long ago" and that the claim 
does not fall within the Milliken exception to the Eleventh Amendment for 
"continuing consequences of past violations of federal rights." 413 The Court 
thus seems to be endorsing the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the claim was 
retrospective because Paraguay was complaining about the failure to notify 
Breard of his rights under the treaty, which occurred in the past. 
But Breard should not be treated as a binding Eleventh Amendment holding 
for two reasons. First, the opinion itself indicates that the Court did not reach 
firm conclusions on the Eleventh Amendment's applicability. The Court stated 
that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment provides a separate reason why Paraguay's 
suit might not succeed."414 The Court was less tentative when it indicated that 
Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, even before § 2254 was enacted, federal Jaw authorized federal 
habeas relief in specific circumstances for persons in the custody of state officials in violation of federal 
Jaw. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 187-89 (1980); Charles 
Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REv. 345, 358 (1930). Although these laws 
were controversial in some respects, no one appears to have questioned their constitutionality on 
Eleventh Amendment grounds. See Ex parte Sifford, 22 F. Cas. 105 (S.D. Ohio 1857) (No. 12,848); Ex 
parte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. 965 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1856) (No. 11,934); Ex parte Jenkins, 13 F. Cas. 445 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 7,259). Finally, the Court in Ex parte Young purported to be giving the state 
official the full scope of the protection afforded by the Eleventh Amendment on the assumption that it 
had not been cut back in any way by the Fourteenth Amendment, 209 U.S. at !50, yet the Court relied 
on the habeas cases as support for the holding that the suit was not one against the State. Thus, the 
Court itself does not appear to have regarded § 2254 as a statute enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Its analysis was based on the idea that these cases did not raise Eleventh Amendment problems because 
they were not covered by that Amendment, not because Congress had abrogated an otherwise-
inapplicable immunity. 
It has been argued that the habeas cases do not raise Eleventh Amendment problems because federal 
habeas review of state criminal convictions is appellate review. James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, 
"Some Effectual Power": The Quantity and Quality of Decisiommaking Required of Article Ill Courts, 
98 COLUM. L. REv. 696, 882-84 & n.894 (1998). This argument assumes that the Eleventh Amendment 
does not apply to federal appellate review of state courts decisions. The claim that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not apply to the Supreme Court's review of state court decisions in suits against the 
states finds support in the cases, see McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages and 
Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 26-31 (1990), although there are cases that suggest that it does. See generally 
Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1714-44. The claim that the· Eleventh Amendment does not bar appellate 
review of state court decisions by the lower federal courts, however, is highly speculative at this point. 
See id. at 1689 n.33. In any event, the appellate review theory would only explain the cases granting 
federal habeas relief to persons who had been convicted by state courts. The habeas statute, however, 
authorizes habeas relief for persons illegally in the custody of state officials without a trial. Indeed, that 
the federal courts have the power to grant habeas relief to persons in state custody without a trial is 
probably the least controversial proposition of hab~as jurisprudence. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 
317 (1995); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,478 (1991). 
413. Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. at 1356. 
414. /d. at 1356 (emphasis added). The reason is "separate" from the other reason given for denying 
Paraguay's petitions-i.e., that the treaty did not authorize the remedy being sought. Here, too, the 
Court appears to be giving only a tentative judgment. If the Eleventh Amendment is "another reason 
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Paraguay's suit failed the test of Milliken v. Bradley, but this should be read in 
the light of the Court's earlier indication of tentativeness. It is unclear why the 
Court allowed an execution to go forward, and the order of an international 
court to be flouted, on the ground that there was a mere possibility that 
Paraguay's claim would fail, but that is what the Court said. The Court did not 
purport to be rendering a considered or firm Eleventh Amendment decision.415 
Indeed, the Court appears not to have expressed even tentative views on the 
scope of the Eleventh Amendment. The Court concluded that Virginia's failure 
to notify Breard of his rights under the treaty had "no continuing effect" 
because "the causal link present in Milliken is absent in this case. " 416 The 
causal link was lacking, apparently, for the reasons the Court gave earlier in its 
opinion for denying relief to Breard: 
Even were Breard's Vienna Convention claim properly raised and proven, it is 
extremely doubtful that the violation should result in the overturning of a final 
judgment of conviction without some showing that the violation had an effect 
on the trial. In this case, no such showing could even arguably be made. 
Breard decided not to plead guilty and to testify at his own trial contrary to 
the advice of his attorneys, who were likely far better able to explain the 
United States legal system to him than any consular official would have been. 
Breard's asserted prejudice-that had the Vienna Convention been followed, 
he would have·accepted the State's offer to forgo the death penalty in return 
for a plea of guilty-is far more speculative than the claims of prejudice 
courts routinely reject in those cases where an inmate alleges that his plea of 
guilty was infected by attorney error.417 
The Court appears to be saying that Paraguay's claim was correctly dismissed 
on threshold grounds without a hearing because Paraguay failed to prove what it 
wanted to prove at the hearing. More generously, the Court might be understood 
to be establishing a requirement that claimants in Paraguay's position must 
proffer evidence that meets a higher threshold of persuasiveness than is usually 
required to defeat a motion to dismiss. To be sure, these reasons for denying 
relief are highly problematic, but the problems they raise have nothing to do 
with the Eleventh Amendment. In deciding whether a defendant enjoys an 
immunity of any sort, a court must assume that the plaintiffs' claim is otherwise 
meritorious, both on the facts and on the law. Quite apart from the Eleventh 
Amendment, Paraguay would not have been entitled to the relief it sought if it 
could not show some causal connection between the claimed violation of the 
Paraguay's suit might not succeed," then the no-remedy point is the first reason Paraguay's suit "might 
not succeed." 
415. See id. Moreover, "opinions accompanying the denial of certiorari cannot have the same effect 
as decisions on the merits." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989). 
416. ld. at 1356. 
417. ld. at I355. 
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treaty and the sentence that was ultimately imposed. The Supreme Court in 
Breard concluded that "no showing could even arguably be made" that the 
treaty violation "had an effect on the trial." That is an opinion about the merits. 
It tells us nothing about the Eleventh Amendment. 
V. EXPLAINING THE CASES AS APPLICATIONS OF A COMPREHENSIVE RULE 
TuRNING ON "PROSPECTIVITY" 
The Court's recent cases purport to adopt a comprehensive test turning on the 
concept of prospectivity.418 In this Part, I consider whether there is a coherent 
understanding of that concept that can explain the principal lines of Supreme 
Court cases (including the habeas cases). I make no attempt to defend, or even 
to provide a rationale for, a rule permitting certain forms of relief but not others. 
My effort here is solely to determine whether the Supreme Court's holdings can 
be reconciled along the dimension of prospectivity. 
I conclude that there may be a test turning on the concept of prospectivity 
that can reconcile all of the Supreme Court's holdings except Papasan and the 
desegregation cases. The rule that emerges takes the following form: the 
Eleventh Amendment does not bar a court from ordering a state official to 
comply in the future with a primary obligation imposed by federal law (as 
distinguished from a secondary or remedial obligation), or from awarding 
compensation for anticipated future violations of such an obligation, but it does 
prohibit courts from awarding redress for past violations of such an obligation. 
This rule reconciles the habeas cases with the benefits cases, but it rests on a 
distinction between primary obligations and secondary or remedial obligations 
that is unfamiliar to courts, counterintuitive in certain respects, and difficult to 
apply. For this reason, and because no conceivable rule turning on prospectivity 
can also explain the results in the desegregation cases, I conclude that a 
comprehensive rule turning on prospectivity is untenable. In Part VI, I consider 
possible substitutes. 
A. RECONCILING THE BENEFITS CASES AND THE HABEAS CASES 
In Allen and Woods, the Courts of Appeals attempted to apply the test the 
Supreme Court had articulated in such recent cases as Green and Papasan, 
under which a court is permitted to order a halt to a continuing or ongoing 
violation of federal law, but not to redress a past violation. Under this test, the 
permissibility of the relief turns on when the relevant violation of federal law is 
deemed to have occurred. The trick, as we have seen, is identifying the relevant 
violation of law. The courts in Allen and Woods concluded that dismissal was 
required because the plaintiffs were complaining about Virginia's past failure to 
provide notice under the Vienna Convention. This analysis, however, would 
require the dismissal of most federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners, as 
418. Comprehensive, that is, except for the narrow exception recognized in Coeur d'Alene. 
HeinOnline  -- 87 Geo. L.J. 69 1998-1999
1998] PROSPECTIVE-RETROSPECTIVE DISTINCTION 69 
such petitioners are typically complaining in the same way about past violations 
of federal law. 
The past failure to provide notice was not the only violation of federal law 
about which the plaintiffs in Allen and Woods were complaining. They also 
argued that the Vienna Convention prohibited states from carrying out a sen-
tence materially caused by a violation of the obligation to provide notice.419 The 
habeas cases suggest that, when a person argues that a past violation of law 
renders his sentence invalid and seeks to prevent the sentence from being 
carried out, the court should focus on the future violation that would occur if the 
sentence were carried out, not the past violation that occurred when the judge 
imposed the sentence, or the earlier violations of law that made the imposition 
of the sentence invalid. 
But, if the relevant legal violation in habeas cases is the violation that would 
occur if the remedy the petitioner seeks (for example, release or vacatur of 
sentence) were not granted, then why wasn't the remedy sought by John Jordan 
deemed prospective? The district court in Edelman ordered the state official to 
pay John Jordan his past-due benefits in the future. Indeed, all plaintiffs whose 
complaints are not vulnerable to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) are necessarily 
maintaining that the law entitles them to an order requiring the defendant to do 
(or refrain from doing) something in the future, either to avert or to redress a 
violation of law. 
A moment's reflection reveals that a court's power to award a remedy under a 
rule turning on prospectivity cannot tum on whether, absent the claimed immu-
nity, the defendant would be under a continuing obligation to afford the remedy. 
Secondary or remedial obligations are by their nature continuing ones, and all 
plaintiffs whose claims are not defective are necessarily claiming that the 
defendant is presently under such a duty. (There are, of course, defenses such as 
prescription and statutes of limitations, but we do not need the Eleventh 
Amendment to protect states from stale claims.) If the Eleventh Amendment 
draws a line between suits seeking to halt a continuing violation (or avert a 
future one) and suits seeking to redress a past violation, then it is clear that the 
violation of law to which this test refers cannot be the secondary or remedial 
obligation the plaintiff seeks to enforce. This insight suggests that, in asking 
whether the plaintiff seeks to halt a continuing violation or redress a past 
violation, we must focus instead on the primary legal obligation, the obligation 
for which the plaintiff seeks the remedy. If so, then the court may award a 
remedy only if it serves to halt an ongoing violation of a primary obligation, or 
to avert an anticipated future violation of such an obligation, but not if it serves 
to redress the past violation of a primary 'obligation. 
The crux of this test, then, is the distinction between primary and secondary 
obligations. But drawing this distinction is not always straightforward. Al-
though I conclude that a version of this test can reconcile the habeas cases with 
419. See Appellants' Bri~f at 20, Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (No. 96-2770). 
HeinOnline  -- 87 Geo. L.J. 70 1998-1999
70 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:1 
the benefits cases, this reconciliation requires plausible but counterintuitive and 
difficult-to-apply glosses on the concept of a primary obligation. 
In the habeas context, two subtly different problems arise, one more serious 
than the other. First, confusion may arise from the fact that the term "remedy," 
and thus "remedial obligation," may be understood in two different senses. The 
relief requested by Paraguay and Breard was clearly a "remedy," if that term is 
used, as it often is, to encompass any sort of relief requested of a court. Under 
the rule as stated above, the permissibility of the relief cannot tum on whether 
the remedial or secondary obligation is continuing; we must focus exclusively 
on the primary obligation. But the relief sought by the plaintiff will always be 
remedial in this sense, and the defendants' claimed obligation to act as the 
plaintiff wants the court to order it to act will typically be the only future 
obligation of the defendant at issue. If the fact that the obligation the plaintiff 
seeks to enforce is remedial in this sense were enough to prevent the court from 
ordering it, then all suits would be barred. Clearly, the obligation the plaintiff 
seeks to enforce is sometimes the relevant legal obligation for purposes of this 
test even though it is "remedial" in the sense that the plaintiff is asking the 
court to order its performance. 
To clarify this aspect of the rule, it is useful to consider the "remedy" of 
specific performance. As Professor Corbin notes, sometimes the breach of a 
primary duty results in the substitution of a secondary duty, but sometimes the 
primary duty continues to exist and a secondary or remedial obligation is added 
to it, so that the plaintiff may obtain court enforcement of the primary duty (that 
is, specific performance) plus enforcement of a secondary duty (such as a duty 
to pay damages) to compensate for the failure to perform earlier.420 Both are 
remedies in the sense that the court has awarded them, but one remedy orders 
compliance with a primary duty, while the other orders compliance with a 
secondary duty. Hart and Sacks would apparently regard a court order of 
specific performance as requiring compliance with a secondary duty, albeit a 
secondary duty that is "a simple duplicate of the primary duty." 421 Putting aside 
their apparent semantic disagreement with Corbin, we may restate the rule as 
follows: a court may order compliance in the future with the primary duty or 
with a secondary duty that duplicates the primary duty, but it may not otherwise 
redress past violations of a primary duty. In other words, the court may order 
the plaintiff to perform now a primary obligation that was due earlier, but it may 
not award a remedy for the defendant's failure to perform the primary obliga-
tion earlier. 
This formulation still leaves us with the task of distinguishing primary from 
secondary duties. The habeas cases are consistent with the posited rule only to 
the extent a court ordering habeas relief can be said to be ordering future 
420. See Arthur L. Corbin, Rights and Duties, 33 YALE L.J. 501, 516 (1924). 
421. HENRY M. HART, JR & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 137 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & PhilipP. Frickey eds., 1994). 
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compliance with a primary obligation, as opposed to a secondary obligation. 
This means that the prisoner seeking habeas relief must be said to have a 
primary right not to be incarcerated (or executed) except in certain circum-
stances, and hence that the state has a primary obligation not to incarcerate him 
or execute him except in those circumstances. But is it the case that successful 
habeas petitioners possessed a primary right not to be incarcerated all along? In 
certain circumstances at least, the habeas cases resist being characterized as 
cases seeking to require future compliance with a primary obligation. 
Professor Corbin defines a primary right as "a right resulting from some 
operative fact that was not itself a violation of some precedent right," and a 
secondary or remedial right as "a right resulting from some operative fact that 
was a violation of some precedent right. " 422 (The corollary primary and second-
ary obligations tnay be defined by substituting the word "obligation" for 
"right.") Did Breard have a "primary right" not to be executed, or did his right 
"result from" the state's prior violation of the Vienna Convention? Does 
someone whose conviction was based in part on evidence admitted in violation 
of the rule of the Miranda v. Arizona decision423 have a primary right not to be 
incarcerated, or did his right to be released "result from" the violation of 
Miranda? Obviously, there is a sense in which the obligation to release the 
prisoner "results from" the prior violation, yet this cannot render it a secondary 
obligation under the posited Eleventh Amendment rule without disturbing a 
great deal of settled habeas jurisprudence.424 Professor Corbin's definition of 
secondary obligation must be understood to include only obligations whose 
existence does not depend on the prior violation of a legal duty.425 Nor can the 
obligation be regarded as secondary for purposes of this rule because the 
lawmaker imposed it primarily, or even exclusively, to deter police misconduct 
rather than to protect the guilty defendant, for the Court permits habeas relief on 
the basis of Miranda claims even while acknowledging its predominantly 
prophylactic purpose.426 To explain the habeas cases, the posited rule must 
count a prisoner's right not to be incarcerated as "primary" even if the right 
appears in some respects to be a remedy for a prior violation of law. 
If relief for the violation of a federal law is available on habeas, then the 
posited rule must regard the federal law as placing conditions on the state's 
power to deprive people of life or liberty, while regarding the right to life or 
422. Corbin, supra note 420, at 515. 
423. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
424. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 686-95 (1993) (violation of Miranda a ground for 
habeas corpus relief). 
425. The existence of the hypothetical prisoner's right not to be incarcerated does not depend on the 
state's violation of Miranda. It is rather the state's power to incarcerate him that depends on its getting a 
valid conviction, which in tum may depend on its satisfaction of the Miranda rule. (Of course, the state 
has the power to detain people before conviction under the rules that specify the conditions of pre-trial 
detention. These rules further qualify the prisoner's primary right not to be detained.) 
426. See Withrow, 507 U.S. at 693. 
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liberty as the relevant primary right (albeit a defeasible one).427 This is not to 
say that all federal laws addressing state law enforcement activities impose 
conditions on the state's power to incarcerate people (or execute them). A given 
federal law may not make compliance a condition of incarceration, and if it 
does not, then vacatur of the conviction is not an available remedy. Such a law 
is either precatory or backed by other sanctions. What the legal consequences of 
a violation are is a matter of interpreting the law at issue. What is important for 
present purposes is that a law whose violation requires release is, for that 
reason, a condition of the state's deprivation of the prisoner's primary right to 
life and liberty for purposes of the posited rule. 
The posited rule thus explains the habeas cases, but only if we conceive these 
cases in a particular way, transforming what the Breard Court took to be the 
relevant legal violation into the failure to meet a condition for denying the 
prisoner his primary right. Though this analytical move is defensible, and in 
some respects attractive, characterizing habeas claims in this way is in tension 
with some of the Court's recent decisions in the habeas area. In the Teague line 
of cases, for example, the Court has appeared to view habeas corpus as a 
remedy for state courts' violation of established federal law, rather than as the 
enforcement of any right of a prisoner to be free unless convicted in accordance 
with the law.428 Thus, the court has ruled that a conviction that should be 
reversed on direct appeal because of a violation of federal law generally may 
not be vacated on habeas if the federal right that was violated was not clearly 
established atthe time of the conviction. The Court appears to have reasoned 
that the purpose of habeas is to deter state courts from violating federal law, but 
state courts cannot be deterred from violating rights that were not clearly 
established.429 This objection is not fatal to the posited rule; as we have seen, a 
right may be primary for purposes of our rule even if it is conferred for 
instrumental reasons and seems in some respects remedial. But the fact that the 
modes of analysis used in closely related areas discourage courts from viewing 
the case as the posited rule requires increases the likelihood of error and thus 
reduces the rule's appeal. 
Recharacterizing what may appear to be a secondary or remedial right as a 
defeasible primary right helps illuminate another line of cases that has been 
destabilized by the Court's recent decisions, but here, too, other factors discour-
age the courts from conceiving these cases as the rule requires. When Edelman 
was thought merely to bar damage-like monetary relief, the courts had little 
427. Put another way, Breard did not have an absolute right not to be executed; he had a right not to 
be executed unless and until convicted and sentenced to death in accordance with certain rules. His 
claim was that the state had not yet convicted him and sentenced him to death in accordance with those 
rules, and thus he had a right not to be executed yet. No one claimed that the state was without power to 
attempt anew to satisfy the conditions federal law imposed for executing Breard. 
428. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 59, at 
1392-1413. 
429. See generally Richard Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1731, 1773, 1793 (1991). 
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trouble concluding that the relief of reinstatement in employment cases was 
permitted under the Ex parte Young exception.430 More recently, the courts have 
begun to find the issue difficult because of the new requirement that there be an 
"ongoing" violation of federal law. In Doe v. Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory,431 for example, the district court found this remedy to be barred 
because what it regarded as the relevant violation of federal law-the firing-
occurred in the past, and no additional violations of federal law were currently 
occurring.432 The Ninth Circuit reversed, but it had considerable difficulty with 
the Court's new standard. The defendant had argued that reinstatement was not 
available because there was "no ongoing policy and hence no threat of future 
enforcement ... against [plaintiff]" of the unlawful policy that had led to his 
discharge.433 The Ninth Circuit responded not by denying the relevance of this 
contention, but by denying the factual claim. Pointing to evidence that the 
defendant continued to apply the same policy, the court concluded that the 
plaintiff "had alleged an ongoing policy (relating to employment suitability) 
and the likelihood of future enforcement" of that policy against him if he 
reapplied.434 To the extent the court relied on this point, however, it did not 
really decide that reinstatement was an available remedy. If a plaintiff is only 
permitted to complain about the fact that the employer currently has in force an 
unlawful policy, and if the only remedy the court may award is an order 
assuring the plaintiff that, if he applies for the job again, he will not be 
subjected to that policy, then the court does not have the power to award 
reinstatement. A reinstated employee gets his job back until he is fired for a 
valid reason; he does not merely get a chance to compete for the job with other 
applicants.435 
The court in Doe might have said instead that the defendant had miscon-
ceived the nature of the claimed duty: the plaintiff in such cases seeks to enforce 
the defendant's primary obligation to employ him until he is fired for valid 
430. See Thomson v. Harmony, 65 F.3d 1314, 1317 n.l, 1320-21 (6th Cir. 1995) (reinstatement and 
expungement); Cross v. State Dep't of Mental Health, 49 F.3d 1490, 1503 (11th Cir. 1995) (reinstate-
ment); Ramirez v. Oklahoma Dep't of Mental Health, 41 F.3d 584, 589 (lOth Cir. 1994) (reinstate-
ment); Williams v. Kentucky., 24 F.3d 1526, 1543 (6th Cir. 1994) (reinstatement and expungement); 
Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 433 (8th Cir. 1989) (expungement); Coakley v. Welch, 877 F.2d 304, 
306-07 (4th Cir. 1989) (reinstatement); Barnes v. Bosley, 828 F.2d 1253, 1257 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(reinstatement); Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d 843, 848 (7th Cir. 1987) (reinstatement); Elliott v. 
Hinds, 786 F.2d 298, 301-02 (7th Cir. 1986) (reinstatement and expungement); Dwyer v. Regan, 777 
F.2d 825, 836 (2d Cir. 1985) (reinstatement); Cf Russell v. Dunston, 896 F.2d 664, 667-68 (2d Cir. 
1990) (reinstatement to medical leave status prospective); Hall v. Medical College of Ohio at Toledo, 
742 F.2d 299, 307 (6th Cir. 1984) (reinstatement of student prospective). 
431. 817 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd, 131 F.3d 836, 839 (1997). 
432. See id. at 79. 
433. Doe, 131 F.3d at 841. 
434. /d. at 841 & n.3. 
435. See NLRB v. Textile Mach. Workers, 214 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1964) (discussing differences 
between reapplying for previously-held job and reinstatement); Greenspan v. Automobile Club of 
Mich., 495 F. Supp. 1021, 1051-52 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (distinguishing reapplication from reinstate-
ment). 
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reasons, and a court that orders reinstatement merely requires prospective 
compliance with that primary duty. The few courts that have delved into the 
issue have reasoned along these lines.436 But, as in the habeas context, other 
factors discourage the courts from viewing employment discrimination cases 
this way. For example, federal law sometimes entitles even employees-at-will to 
reinstatement if they were unlawfully fired. One can perhaps say that even 
at-will employees have a right to continue to be employed until fired for valid 
reasons, but that characterization seems forced. Since such employees could be 
fired for any reason not excluded by federal law, or even for no reason at all, 
one is at least tempted to say that their right to get their job back exists solely by 
virtue of the employer's prior violation of federal law and is thus a secondary 
right. Characterizing these claims as attempts to enforce a primary right to 
continued employment is additionally in tension with established principles of 
federal jurisdiction. An employee's right to his job is usually a creature of state 
law; in such cases, federal law operates merely to make some reasons for 
termination unlawful. If we regarded the employee's complaint as an attempt to 
enforce the employer's duty to employ him until fired for valid reasons, the 
federal issue would appear to arise in replication to the defendant's answer to a 
well-pleaded complaint raising a state-law claim, thus presenting the same 
jurisdictional problem that arose in the Mottley case.437 The well-pleaded 
complaint rule nudges the court to view the case as one to enforce a federal 
right to be free of discrimination in employment, and thus to view reinstatement 
as a remedy for a past breach of that obligation. There is of course no reason 
why the case cannot be viewed one way for purposes of the well-pleaded 
complaint rule and another way for Eleventh Amendment purposes, just as there 
is no reason release from incarceration cannot be viewed at the same time as 
both a remedy for the state's violation of federal law and as the enforcement of 
the state's primary obligation not to incarcerate persons except in certain 
circumstances. But, as in the habeas context, the fact that the posited test 
requires the courts to resist ingrained ways of viewing a lawsuit increases the 
risk of erroneous decisions and thus reduces the rule's appeal. 
436. See, e.g., Elliott v. Hinds, 786 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The goal of reinstatement ... is 
to compel the state official to cease her actions in violation of federal law and to comply with 
constitutional requirements. As long as the state official keeps him out of his allegedly tenured position 
the official acts in what is claimed to be in derogation of [the plaintiff's] constitutional rights."). Even 
the appeals court in Doe, before it strayed, seemed to look in this direction. 131 F.3d at 841 
("[R]einstatement would simply prevent the prospective violation of [plaintiff's] rights which would 
result from denying him employment in the future."). 
437. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). A special federal question 
statute confers jurisdiction over employment claims based on Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). 
But other federal claims must rely on the general federal question statute. For example, an employee 
who claims that he was fired in violation of the First Amendment would not be able to rely on Title VII. 
The well-pleaded complaint rule may well be inapplicable to all cases in which state employees claim 
they were fired in violation of federal law, since all such cases may well fall within the scope of§ 1983. 
But my point is more general: the well-pleaded complaint rule (as applied to private employees 
claiming they were fired in violation of federal law) predisposes federal courts against viewing such 
cases as suits to enforce a primary right to be employed until validly fired. 
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The posited rule must undergo even further tinkering to explain the benefits 
cases. Recall that John Jordan in Edelman argued that the state had invalidly 
failed to pay him past-due benefits. Under the posited rule, a court may order 
the defendant to comply in the future with his primary obligation, but it may not 
redress a past violation of the primary obligation. Thus, the court may order 
future compliance with the obligation not to incarcerate the petitioner, or with 
the obligation to employ the plaintiff, but it may not award a remedy for the past 
violations of those obligations. The question is whether a court order requiring 
the defendant to pay Jordan his past-due benefits was simply an order requiring 
specific performance of the primary obligation, or was an improper attempt to 
redress a past violation of the primary obligation. 
The Court in Edelman regarded the order as retrospective because the 
obligation to pay had accrued in the past, but this does not explain why the 
obligation was not deemed a continuing one. The obligation to pay money by a 
certain date does not typically end when the due date has passed; indeed, it 
usually grows the longer it remains unfulfilled. An accrual test, moreover, does 
not help explain why habeas and reinstatement relief are prospective. Although 
the meaning of the term "accrual" can vary with the context, as the term is 
typically understood it would be difficult to deny that a prisoner's right to be 
free of incarceration "accrued" before the court's order requiring his release, or 
that the employee's right to his job accrued before the court ordered his 
reinstatement. 438 
The Court's adoption of an accrual test suggests that it viewed the relevant 
primary obligation as the obligation to pay money by a certain date, an 
obligation that becomes impossible to perform after the date's passage. The 
obligation to pay the money after the date, on this view, would be a secondary 
obligation replacing the primary obligation to pay on time. But even if consid-
ered a remedial obligation, it is one that duplicates the primary obligation in 
every respect except the date. Clearly, the fact that the ordered conduct is taking 
place later than it should have cannot be enough to render the obligation a 
secondary one under the posited rule. Assume that X is under an obligation to 
build Y a house by date Z. If Z passes and X has not built the house, a court 
order requiring X to pay Y damages for the period before the court's order in 
which Y was without a house would clearly be retrospective relief, but I doubt 
that anyone would ~egard an order requiring X to build the house to be 
438. An obligation is usually said to have accrued when it "matures" or "vests," see Whitney Bros. 
Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 860, 862 (D. Alaska 1963) ("maturing"); 
Alker v. United States, 38 F.2d 879, 883 (E.D.N.Y. 1930), affd, 47 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1931) ("vesting"), 
or when every event necessary to entitle the plaintiff to demand from the defendant the conduct he asks 
the court to order has occurred, see, e.g., Swank v. Mortgage Inv. Co. of El Paso, 83 F.2d 868, 869 (5th 
Cir. 1936). The term "accrued" might perhaps be understood in such a way as to require the analysis 
suggested below, but that is only because the term is so versatile. The concept of accrual thus does not 
help reconcile the cases unless the particular sense of the concept is spelled out, as I do below. Once 
that is done, the term becomes superfluous. (Its usefulness as shorthand is vitiated by its vagueness.) 
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retrospective. Yet, if the date of performance were regarded as an unseverable 
part of the primary obligation, then the court did more than simply order X to 
perform the primary obligation.439 
This hypothetical suggests that an order requiring the belated performance of 
a primary obligation is prospective and that Edelman should therefore have 
come out the other way. But this overlooks a critical analogy between the type 
of relief found unavailable in Edelman and a type of relief that is unavailable to 
a state prisoner unlawfully in custody. Recall that such a prisoner is entitled to 
be set free, but not to compensation for the part of his life he spent behind bars. 
In a crucial way, the benefits denied in the Edelman case are analogous to the 
lost portion of the prisoner's freedom, while the benefits due in the future 
correspond to the future liberty the prisoner is entitled to recover. That is not 
because the benefits were payable in the past, but because the obligation to pay 
the benefits was imposed for the purpose of entitling the beneficiary to the 
means of subsistence for a given period of his life, and at the time the court 
issued its order, that period had passed. This insight suggests a technique for 
squaring the benefits cases with the rule proposed above to explain the habeas 
cases: when the primary obligation is an obligation to pay money, the obligation 
must be "pierced" to expose its underlying purpose; this purpose should be 
treated as the primary obligation, and the obligation to pay money should be 
treated as secondary. The obligation to pay benefits thus becomes an obligation 
to provide the means of support for a specific portion of the beneficiary's life, 
and an order to pay benefits is prospective to the extent the relevant portion of 
the beneficiary's life has not yet passed. The technique may seem contrived, but 
there is something to be said in its defense. Money is typicaily a substitute for 
something else. Its value is not intrinsic; it has value because of what one can 
exchange it for.440 The nature of the obligation to pay money thus invites the 
sort of piercing the posited rule contemplates.441 
439. We might say that the obligation to do something by a certain date is in fact two separate 
primary obligations: the obligation to do something and the obligation to do it by a given date. Specific 
performance of the first obligation is still possible, and a court order requiring such performance is 
prospective. Compliance with the latter obligation is impossible, and so the court can award only 
compensation. 
440. See F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECf OF MONEY 26 (4th ed. 1982) ("[M]oney is 'wealth power', 
is 'purchasing power in terms of wealth in general.' "); id. at 28 ("[A]ccording to its intrinsic nature 
money represents purchasing power."). 
441. A similar but distinct approach would be to conceive the right to money as a right to enjoy 
money over a given period of time. If the plaintiff claims a right to enjoy the money in the future, then 
the relief is prospective. The unavailability of past-due benefits in Edelman would, under this test, flow 
from the conclusion that the right to the benefits Jordan was seeking was a right to enjoy money during 
a limited period-the period during which the money was to provide his subsistence. Under this test, 
however, monetary relief would ordinarily be fully available, as ordinarily the right to money is the 
right to enjoy it over one's lifetime and to pass it on to one's heirs. Although it is plausible to infer that, 
when Congress created the right to benefits, it intended to establish a right to enjoy money during a 
more limited period, no such inference can be drawn about an ordinary plaintiff's right to damages from 
a tortfeasor. A test under which the right to damages would emerge as prospective relief cannot be right, 
as damages are regarded as the prototypical form of retrospective relief. Moreover, this test seems to 
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In sum, it appears that the Supreme Court's results in the habeas cases and the 
benefits cases, as well as the uniform results of the lower courts in the 
reinstatement cases, can be reconciled according to a rule that turns on prospec-
tivity: The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a court from ordering a state 
official to comply in the future with a primary obligation imposed by federal 
law (as distinguished from a secondary or remedial obligation), or from award-
ing compensation for anticipated future violations of such an obligation,442 but 
it does prohibit courts from awarding redress for past violations of such an 
obligation. However, this rule succeeds in reconciling the habeas and benefits 
cases only if the concept of "primary" obligations is understood in a quite 
specific sense. The heavy lifting under this rule is done by the distinction 
between primary and secondary rights and obligations, a distinction that will not 
be familiar to courts or litigants. Moreover, the rule uses these terms in 
not-entirely-intuitive senses. In the habeas and reinstatement contexts, the rule 
requires the courts to conceive of the claims in ways that are in tension with 
how other doctrines will encourage them to conceive the claims. In the benefits 
context, the conceptualization of the primary right seems contrived, if not 
downright fanciful. These drawbacks alone may or may not be fatal to the 
posited rule, but to the list of drawbacks we must add one that is weighty 
indeed: the rule fails to explain the results in the desegregation cases. 
B. ACCOMMODATING MILLIKEN AND THE DESEGREGATION CASES 
1. Under the Posited Test 
The prospectivity rule posited above reconciles the cases by isolating the 
defendant's primary obligation and the plaintiff's correlative primary right, and 
collapse the Eleventh Amendment issue into the question whether the remedy is available in the first 
place. Jordan was seeking retrospective relief under this test because Congress did not intend to give 
him a right to enjoy the money after the subsistence period elapsed. The latter conclusion seems 
identical to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to give him a right to damages. If Congress had 
intended to give him a right to damages, then it by definition intended to give him the right to enjoy the 
money after the end of the subsistence period. A rule under which the states' obligation to pay damages 
from the state treasury turned on congressional intent to create a right to damages would be inconsistent 
with the idea that the Eleventh Amendment limits Congress's power in this regard. But cf infra note 
452 (discussing Professor Burnham's argument that this is in fact the test under Edelman). 
442. This aspect of the rule isn't required by the Supreme Court's decisions. Indeed, as explained in 
Part VI, leaving this part out may help explain Papasan. It may also explain dictum in decisions of the 
lower courts. For example, in the employment context, if reinstatement becomes impossible or 
unfeasible for some reason, then awarding money in lieu of reinstatement (a remedy known as "front 
pay") would be barred. Some courts have apparently concluded, tentatively and without analysis, that 
front-pay is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Grantham v. Trickey, 21 F.3d 289, 296 n.5 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (front pay "probably is barred by the Eleventh Amendment"). But cf Barnes v. Bosley, 828 
F.2d 1253, 1257-58 (8th Cir. 1987) ("back pay" awarded prospectively). If front pay is barred, 
however, it would not be because such a remedy is retrospective but because it is a secondary or 
remedial right as opposed to the primary right itself. I have included this clause in the posited rule 
because I am attempting to frame a comprehensive rule that turns on prospectivity. A rule barring 
prospective secondary remedies such as front pay but permitting prospective primary remedies such as 
reinstatement would not tum on prospectivity. 
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asking whether the plaintiff seeks relief for a past or a future violation of that 
right. An employee's primary right under this test is his job and so he is entitled 
to have the job restored but not to compensation for the past deprivation of his 
job. The state prisoner complaining of the deprivation of his primary right to 
liberty is entitled to have that right restored for the future but not to compensa-
tion for the past loss of it. These rights are "primary" in the sense that they exist 
without regard to any previous violation of the law by the state. A secondary 
right, by contrast, is a right that exists only by virtue of the fact that the 
defendant violated a primary obligation and thus infringed a primary right.443 
The right to back pay is a secondary right; the state is obligated to pay it only 
because the state violated the primary obligation to employ the plaintiff. The 
secondary right is a substitute for the primary right. It seeks to compensate for 
the primary right's loss.444 
The analysis suggested in the last section reconciles the benefits cases with 
the reinstatement and habeas cases, albeit uneasily, but it cannot accommodate 
Milliken. Recall that in Milliken the substantive law violated by the defendants 
was the law prohibiting the state from maintaining a system of de jure segrega-
tion.445 The Court upheld certain remedies, including the institution of remedial 
reading programs, that were avowedly for the purpose of "compensating" the 
victims of past legal violations. In doing so, it made clear that the remedies 
were permissible only because there had been a violation of the law in the past. 
The Court stressed that, in the abstract, the Constitution does not require any 
particular level of racial mixing.446 Without the prior history of de jure segrega-
tion or another similar constitutional violation, the measures upheld by the 
Court in Milliken would have been impermissible. 
Subsequent cases attempt to explain Milliken as having merely required the 
state to bring itself into compliance with its constitutional obligations. In United 
States v. Fordice, the Court expressed the duty of a state that had maintained a 
system of de jure segregation as the duty to take "affirmative steps to dis-
mantle" that system.447 "If the state does not discharge this duty," the Court 
wrote, "it remains in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. " 448 It described 
the constitutional violation as the state's "perpetuation" of the system of de jure 
segregation.449 Relying on Fordice, the Seventh Circuit has explained Milliken 
as simply ordering state officials to bring their future conduct into compliance 
with their Fourteenth Amendment duty to take "affirmative steps to discharge 
443. See supra text accompanying notes 422-26 and accompanying text. 
444. The right to front pay is also a secondary obligation, as it substitutes for the primary right, but it 
is nevertheless available under the posited rule because it compensates for the future loss of the primary 
right. But cf Grantham, 21 F.3d at 296 n.5 (suggesting that front pay is barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment). 
445. 418 U.S. at 745. 
446. See id. at 740-41. 
447. 505 U.S 717, 725 (1992). 
448. /d. at 727. 
449. /d. at 728. 
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their duty to dismantle the dual school system that its laws helped to create and 
maintain. " 450 Even more pointedly, the district court in Paraguay v. Allen 
distinguished Milliken on the ground that "the defendants were perpetuating a 
system of de jure segregation. They were in violation of federal law at the 
precise moment when the case was filed." 451 
It is true that the defendants in Milliken and other desegregation cases were in 
violation of federal law at the moment the suit was filed, but the federal law 
they were violating was federal remedial law. One could equally say that, by 
failing to pay the plaintiffs past-due welfare benefits, the state defendants in 
Edelman were in violation of federal law when the suit was filed. 452 It is also 
true that, if the defendants in Fordice did not discharge their duty to take 
affirmative steps to dismantle a system of de jure segregation they had erected, 
they were in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but, again, they were in 
violation of secondary or remedial obligations imposed by that Amendment. 
The same can be said about the Fordice Court's characterization of the violation 
in that case as the "perpetuation" of a system of de jure segregation. By 
"perpetuation" the Court could have meant one of two things. If the defendants 
were perpetuating the system by continuing to enforce laws requiring segrega-
tion or otherwise performing acts that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
if performed by state officials who had not previously violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, then a court order requiring the ceasing of th~t conduct would be 
prospective under our rule, as it would merely require compliance in the future 
with primary legal obligations. But if the defendants were perpetuating the 
system of de jure segregation by not dismantling it, by not eliminating its 
450. Parents for Quality Educ. with Integration, Inc. v. Indiana, 977 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1992). 
451. Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1273. 
452. Professor Burnham once argued that the reason the relief was allowed in Milliken but not in 
Edelman was that in the former case federal law (the Fourteenth Amendment) required the states to 
provide the relief the Court upheld, whereas the relevant federal statutes in Edelman did not clearly 
require the relief the plaintiffs sought. See William Burnham, Federal Court Remedies for Past 
Misconduct by State Officials: Notice Relief and the Legacy ofQuern v. Jordan, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 53, 
98-100 (1984). On this view, neither Milliken nor Edelman turns on retrospectivity or prospectivity; 
indeed, on this view, neither was an Eleventh Amendment decision at all. Professor Burnham seems to 
be saying that the Eleventh Amendment permits a remedy as long as federal law requires the states to 
provide it. This view, however, was rejected in Green, since Congress had by then made it clear that the 
states were obligated to provide a retrospective remedy (as Burnham himself argued, id. at 99), yet the 
Court found the suit in federal court to be barred. See also Jackson, supra note II, at 71-72. (Professor 
Burnham was counsel to the plaintiffs in Green, see 474 U.S. at 65.) 
As discussed in Part I, on one view of the Eleventh Amendment, saying that there is Eleventh 
Amendment immunity is the same thing as saying that federal law does not establish the requested 
remedy against the state. Nevertheless, in a case such as Milliken, it still makes sense to separate the 
question whether the Fourteenth Amendment contemplates a particular type of remedy from the 
question whether the state is immune from this remedy under the Eleventh Amendment. The remedial 
principles of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to local officials as well as state officials, and local 
officials are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1704 n.IOO. 
If the Fourteenth Amendment requires a remedy but the Eleventh shields state officials from the 
remedy, then, under the "immunity-from-remedy" view, local officials are obligated to provide the 
remedy but state officials are not. 
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continuing effects, then a court order requiring them to stop "perpetuating" 
would be retrospective. It would be affording a remedy for a past violation of 
primary obligations.453 The Court in Fordice was clearly using the term in the 
second sense. It specifically "reject[ed] the position" that the defendants were 
required to eliminate "present discriminatory effects [regardless of] whether 
such consequences flow from policies rooted in the prior system." 454 
Green and Papasan emphasize that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the 
courts from ordering a halt to an ongoing violation of federal law. For the 
reasons explained above, this has to be understood to include only violations of 
primary legal obligations. Under this rule, the courts would be permitted to 
order state officials to stop enforcing their laws establishing a system of de jure 
segregation, and to stop any other conduct that would violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment if performed by a state that had not previously violated the 
Amendment. But Milliken clearly authorizes more than that. In the words of the 
Court, the state officials were required to "restore the victims of discriminatory 
conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such 
conduct." 455 If this form of relief is permitted by the Eleventh Amendment, 
however, the Edelman plaintiffs should have recovered their past-due benefits, 
the unlawfully fired employee his back-pay, and the unlawfully incarcerated 
prisoner compensation for the years of earnings he missed, not to mention the 
years of lost liberty. In short, if the relief upheld in Milliken is prospective, then 
the relief denied in Edelman was prospective, and it would be difficult to 
conceive of any relief-or at least any nonmonetary form of relief-that would 
be retrospective. 
2. A Possible Alternative Test 
The test suggested in the last section took as its starting point the Green 
Court's approach to prospectivity, turning on the time of the relevant legal 
violation. Focusing on the legal violation led us to conclude that secondary or 
remedial obligations could not count as the relevant violation, and this in turn 
led to a rule that turned on the distinction between primary and secondary 
obligations. If this tes~ fails to explain Milliken, then perhaps an alternative 
approach not focusing on the time of the legal violation will. The following 
hypothetical suggests another problem with the test proposed above: it seems to 
characterize as retrospective a form of relief most people would, I think, regard 
as prospective. The hypothetical also suggests that some forms of relief requir-
ing the defendant to "undo" a past violation of a primary obligation should be 
regarded as prospective. In the end, though, an alternative test building on this 
insight also fails to explain Milliken. 
453. Otherwise, the court in Edelman could have circumvented the Eleventh Amendment by 
ordering the defendants to stop "perpetuating" their violation of their duty to pay the plaintiffs the 
benefits that they had failed to pay before the court order. 
454. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 730 n.4. 
455. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 746. 
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Assume the law prohibits person B from polluting person A's lake. Assume 
further that person B violates this obligation by emitting certain effluents into 
the lake. Would a court order requiring B to clean up the lake be prospective or 
retrospective relief? I believe most people would regard such an order as 
prospective. The order, after all, gives A her pristine lake, but only for the 
future. The unlawful injury she suffered during the period in which the lake was 
polluted remains unredressed. The relief A would be getting is precisely analo-
gous to the relief Y obtained when the court ordered X to build the house he 
should have built earlier.456 
Under the test elaborated in the previous section, however, an order to clean 
up the lake would apparently be retrospective. Under that test, relief is prospec-
tive if it requires compliance in the future with-that is, specific performance 
of-a primary obligation, or a substitute for the future performance of such an 
obligation. In this case, however, the primary obligation is the obligation not to 
pollute. The obligation to clean up the lake appears to be a secondary obliga-
tion: it is an obligation that exists only by virtue of the duty-holder's prior 
violation of her primary obligation. A court order requiring that the lake be 
cleaned up appears to order specific performance of a secondary obligation. As 
we saw, however, secondary obligations are by their nature continuing ones; if 
an order requiring the performance of a secondary obligation were prospective 
merely because the secondary obligation is a continuing one, then all suits 
would be suits seeking prospective relief.457 
It may be possible to characterize the primary obligation in our pollution 
example in such a way as to satisfy the test for prospective relief described in 
the previous section. If we regarded the effluents as extensions of B, one might 
say that B is currently violating his primary obligation not to pollute the lake. 
Because his stuff (the effluents) is currently polluting the lake, we might say 
that B himself is currently polluting the lake. A court that orders B to clean up 
the lake is, on this view, merely requiring B to stop his present "pollution" of 
the lake by getting his stuff out of it. There is some appeal to this characteriza-
tion. By analogy, one might say that if I drive my car onto your property and 
leave it there, a court order requiring me to get my car off your property is 
merely requiring prospective compliance with my primary obligation not to 
456. See supra text accompanying note 439. 
457. One might attempt to characterize the remedy in our hypothetical as prospective under the test 
discussed in the last section by characterizing the primary right as a right to a clean lake. But, even 
though we might say that A has a right to a clean lake, we cannot say that B has an obligation to keep 
A's lake clean. If the effluents had been emitted by C, B would have had no obligation to clean the lake 
up. We might attempt to elide this problem by recharacterizing the relevant right as the right to a lake 
unpolluted by B; the relevant obligation would then become the obligation to give A the benefit of a 
lake unpolluted by B. But this is the same as the obligation not to pollute A's lake. The attempted 
recharacterization is not just awkward, it "solves" the problem merely by incorporating the remedy into 
the definition of the primary right. This tack is of course available in every case, and thus, again, would 
render every lawsuit a suit for prospective relief. 
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trespass. This characterization would permit us to retain the "primary obliga-
tion" test posited above. 
But even if we rejected that test, the pollution example does not yield a test 
that would explain the result in Milliken. A court order requiring the clean-up of 
the lake "undoes" the violation to the extent of giving the rightholder now what 
she was entitled to earlier. Thus, A was given her right to a lake unpolluted by 
B. This test stops short of proving too much only because A still lacks a remedy 
for the period of time in which she was deprived by B of her right to an 
unpolluted lake. The hypothetical suggests the following test: Relief is prospec-
tive if it restores the rightholder to the position she would have been in at the 
time of the violation had the violation not occurred, but disregarding differences 
in the plaintiffs' situation resulting from the lapse of time. Thus, A gets her clean 
lake, but no compensation for the fact that she is now older and a portion of her 
life elapsed during which she was unable to enjoy the lake in its unpolluted 
state. Similarly, a wrongfully incarcerated prisoner gets her freedom, but no 
compensation for the fact that a portion of her life elapsed in which she was 
prevented from enjoying such freedom. A wrongfully fired employee gets her 
job back, but no compensation for the period of her life in which she was denied 
thejob.458 
This test cannot explain the result in Milliken, however. The legal violation in 
Milliken was de jure segregation. Under the alternative test just described, 
persons subjected to unlawful de jure segregation would be entitled to be placed 
in the position they were in. before the violation took place, except that they 
cannot be compensated for the period of time in the past in which they were 
denied the right to be in such position. With respect to the obligation not to 
engage in de jure segregation, this test yields the same result as the test posited 
previously: the plaintiffs are entitled not to be subjected to de jure segrega-
tion.459 But the Court in Milliken approved a court order awarding more than 
that. It said that the plaintiffs were entitled to be compensated for the unlawful 
segregation they were subjected to in the past. In the Court's words, they were 
entitled to be "made whole."460 A "make whole" remedy by definition compen-
sates for past deprivations. Indeed, a "make whole" remedy is complete relief. 
If a "make whole" remedy is prospective and thus permissible, then no 
category of remedy is retrospective and thus barr.ed. 
458. If the prisoner had her leg broken while in prison, an order requiring that the leg be mended 
would not be retrospective, since it places her in the position she occupied before the violation (i.e., 
possessing an unbroken leg), while not compensating her for the time in the past during which she 
lacked an unbroken leg. However, an unlawfully fired employee would apparently not be entitled to lost 
seniority, since that is something she did not enjoy at the time of the violation. 
459. This result suggests that the difference between this alternative test and the one elaborated in 
Part VA is not that great. Indeed, the close analogy between the polluted lake hypothetical and the 
belated housebuilding hypothetical suggests that our different conclusions about whether the court was 
ordering the specific performance of a primary right results only from the absence of apt words in the 
~nglish language (perhaps any language) to describe B's primary right vis-a-vis A in a way that 
captures its similarity toY's primary right vis-a-vis X. 
460. See supra text accompanying note 170. 
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VI. RESTORING COHERENCE TO Ex PARTE YOUNG DOCTRINE 
If the Supreme Court's decisions cannot be reconciled using the standard the 
Court has purported to apply, what should be done? The Court has a duty to 
guide the conduct of the lower courts, and to do so the Court must articulate the 
law in a manner that is at least moderately coherent and intelligible. The 
Supreme Court has emphasized that "doctrinal consistency ... is required when 
sensitive issues of federal-state relations are involved." 461 Continuing to adhere 
to a comprehensive prospective-retrospective test without disavowing holdings 
that clash with such a test produces only confusion and ultimately leads to 
arbitrary results. 
In this Part, I consider four ways to address the coherence problem posed by 
the Court's decisions. The first option, which I call the "Kennedy approach," 
consists of jettisoning the analytical structure the Court has purported to apply 
and replacing it with something entirely new. The second option, which I call 
the "O'Connor approach," is to retain a comprehensive prospective-retrospec-
tive distinction as the "ordinary" rule, but carve out an exception for desegrega-
tion cases such as Milliken. The third option is to retain a comprehensive 
prospective-retrospective distinction but overrule Milliken. The final option is to 
revert to the original holding of Edelman, under which only certain forms of 
monetary relief are barred. I conclude that the last option is superior to the 
others. 
A. THE KENNEDY APPROACH 
One way to solve the coherence problem would be to replace the current test 
with something completely different. I call this the Kennedy approach because 
it resembles what Justice Kennedy proposed in Coeur d'Alene.462 The new 
approach need not be a case-by-case approach of the sort Kennedy proposed, 
but, since a case-by-case approach is what Kennedy proposed, I shall begin by 
examining the merits of this approach. This examination shows not just that a 
case-by-case approach is ill-suited to the Eleventh Amendment area, but also 
that drastic repudiation of existing doctrine-indeed, any narrowing of the Ex 
parte Young exception-would be inconsistent with the Court's reasons for 
adhering to the Hans interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. 
A case-by-case balancing approach would solve the coherence problem in the 
461. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S 1032, 1039 (1983). 
462. There was some ambiguity in his opinion about whether Justice Kennedy proposed his 
case-by-case balancing approach only for suits seeking prospective relief or for all Ex parte Young 
suits. See supra note 293 and accompanying text. If he intended merely to add another hurdle to be 
overcome by litigants seeking prospective relief, his proposal would not have completely avoided the 
coherence problems discussed above. It would, however, have reduced the scope of the problem: 
although courts would still have had to find the relief to be prospective before permitting the suit to go 
forward, they would not have had to apply the prospective-retrospective test before dismissing on 
Eleventh Amendment grounds. At any rate, the option I consider in this section would dispense entirely 
with the prospective-retrospective test and replace it with a case-by-case approach. 
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sense that the Court's holdings would all be reconcilable with the test the Court 
purports to apply. But that is because virtually any set of results can be said to 
be consistent with such an approach, and therein lies one of its ftaws.463 Such an 
approach offers minimal guidance to the decisionmaker and little, if any, 
certainty and predictability to those whose rights and obligations the law 
supposedly regulates. The well-known practical problems with a case-by-case 
approach,464 render it particularly unsuitable for jurisdictional issues (which is 
what Justice Kennedy (at least sometimes) believes the Eleventh Amendment to 
be). Potential litigants would be able to tell whether a federal court has 
jurisdiction only by bringing suit in federal court and awaiting the court's 
decision, wasting significant time and money to find out whether the court 
regards the case as worthy of federal attention. Nor is the approach particularly 
attractive to the states supposedly protected by the Amendment, for they too 
cannot be certain of their immunity without first litigating the issue. A. case-by-
case approach eliminates clashes between the legal standard and the case 
results, but only by eliminating the legal standard. The case results will continue 
to be arbitrary-will indeed become more arbitrary-when measured against 
any given standard. Justice Kennedy himself acknowledged that "clarity and 
certainty [are] appropriate to the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional in-
quiry, " 465 but unfortunately his approach would dispense with both. 
A case-by-case approach begins to differ from totally discretionary, ad hoc 
decisionmaking only to the extent the Court identifies the general purposes or 
interests underlying the law, or the factors or considerations to be taken into 
account and some rough idea about how they are to be weighed. Unfortunately, 
the Court itself (at least the portion of the Court currently in the majority on 
Eleventh Amendment questions) is a long way from having a well-developed 
sense of what its Eleventh Amendment doctrine is supposed to accomplish. 
Just how far the Court is from having a firm grasp of the issues in this area is 
illustrated by the inconsistent positions its opinions espouse on such basic 
questions as what the Eleventh Amendment immunizes the states from when it 
applies.466 Even individual Justices oscillate between the forum-allocation view 
and the immunity-from-remedy view. Take Justice Kennedy. In the majority 
opinion he authored in Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commis-
sion,467 he clearly embraced the forum-allocation view.468 On the other hand, he 
463. Cf Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 821 n.l (1986) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) ("[W]e could reconcile many of the inconsistent results that have been reached under 
§ 1331 with [the majority's] test. But this is so only because a test based on an ad hoc evaluation of the 
importance of the federal interest is infinitely malleable .... [I]f one makes the test sufficiently vague 
and general, virtually any set of results can be 'reconciled.' "). 
464. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733-34 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987). 
465. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2040. 
466. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
467. 502 u.s. 197 (1991). 
468. The Court had held in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 
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concurred in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 
which adopts the immunity-from-remedy view.469 He also joined the majority 
opinions in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. 470 and Seminole Tribe, 
both of which are in conflict with the forum-allocation view.471 
In Coeur d'Alene, Justice Kennedy purported to leave this question open, but 
his analysis was in fact inconsistent with the forum-allocation view.472 He 
argued that the availability of a state court forum should be regarded as a reason 
favoring the dismissal of suits on Eleventh Amendment grounds.473 Under the 
forum-allocation view, however, the states are always required to entertain 
federal claims against themselves in their own courts.474 If a state court forum 
will be available in every case, then the availability of a state forum cannot help 
separate the cases in which federal jurisdiction is appropriate from those in 
which it is not. Justice Souter's dissent made this point, noting that General Oil 
Co. v. Crain475 had held that, under the Supremacy Clause, state courts are 
obligated to entertain suits seeking an injunction requiring a state official to 
comply with federallaw.476 Instead of maintaining (as he did in Hilton) that the 
state courts are obligated to entertain federal claims against the states and that it 
is the role of the Supreme Court to ensure they do; Justice Kennedy took the 
position in Coeur d'Alene that the states have the option to entertain such claims 
or not, and that it is the role of the lower federal courts under Ex parte Young to 
fill the enforcement gap created when the state courts elect not to provide a 
forum.477 In fact, there is evidence that Justice Kennedy's opinion at one point 
included language to the effect that Crain had -been "overruled" or "aban-
doned" by later cases.478 In the end, however, his opinion purports to reserve 
U.S. 468, 471-72 (1987), that the Eleventh Amendment barred from the federal courts suits against the 
states by private individuais to enforce rights under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, but in Hilton 
the Court said that such suits must be entertained by the state courts under the Supremacy Clause, 502 
U.S. at 207 (citing Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367-68 (1990)). 
469. 491 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The opinion 
states that the Eleventh Amendment "automatically assur[es] that private damages actions created by 
federal law do not extend against the States," and prevents the federal government from "confer[ring] 
upon private individuals federal causes of action reaching state treasuries." /d. at 35. 
470. 513 U.S. 30 (1994). 
471. See Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1731-32, 1738-40 (discussing Hess); id. at 1717-22 (discussing 
Seminole Tribe). 
472. 117 S. Ct. at 2035. 
473. See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
474. Of course, the state courts are required to award relief only if federal law requires it, but (under 
the forum-allocation view) this is a question about 'which the Eleventh Amendment has nothing to say. 
The state courts may dismiss on the merits but they must entertain the claim-that is, they may not 
dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. 
475. 209 U.S. 211 (1908). 
476. See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2057. 
477. See supra note 318. 
478. This is suggested by the phrasing of a footnote in Justice Souter's dissent. Justice Souter writes: 
"Nor was General Oil overruled or otherwise 'abandoned' by Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. 
Musgrove." Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2057 n.14. Since neither Justice Kennedy nor Justice 
O'Connor claimed that Crain had been overruled or abandoned, it is strange that Justice Souter chose to 
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this question.479 Without knowing the answer to such a basic question, however, 
the lower courts can be expected to have a difficult time applying Justice 
Kennedy's case-by-case balancing approach in a way that rationally advances 
the purposes of the law in this area.480 
The current deficiencies of the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence 
counsel against adopting a case-by-case approach now, but these deficiencies 
can and should be addressed by the Court quite apart from the need to clarify 
the scope of the Ex parte Young doctrine. There is a more fundamental reason 
for the Court not to throw out the analytical scheme the Court has developed in 
this area, at least not in a way that threatens to expand the scope of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity: Jettisoning the established analytical structure for deter-
mining the applicability of the Ex parte Young exception in favor of an 
approach that narrows that exception would be inconsistent with the reasons the 
Court has given for adhering to Hans. 
As discussed in Part I, Eleventh Amendment scholars have made a strong 
case that the Hans Court erred when it held that the Eleventh Amendment 
applies in suits "arising under" federal law. Had the Court adopted the diversity 
interpretation, there would of course be no need for an Ex parte Young excep-
tion.481 In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,482 and later in Welch, four 
Justices adopted the diversity theory and voted to overrule Hans.483 In the latter 
case, Justice Scalia reserved judgment on the question, noting that "the correct-
ness of Hans as an original matter, and the feasibility, if it was wrong, of 
correcting it without distorting what we have done in tacit reliance upon it" 
were "complex ... questions" that he was unwilling to address unnecessar-
ily.484 The other Justices were evenly divided on the issue, but it is important to 
deny the point. The fact that he uses quotation marks around "abandoned" suggests that an earlier 
version of Justice Kennedy's opinion made that claim. 
479. See 117 S. Ct. at 2035, noting that Justices Kennedy and Rehnquist "express no opinion as to 
the circumstances in which the unavailability of injunctive relief in state court would raise constitu-
tional concerns under current doctrine." 
480. The Court's failure in Green and Papasan to account for the line of cases permitting personal-
capacity damage actions against state officials in describing the purposes served by its Ex parte 
Young/Edelman doctrine, see supra text accompanying notes 125-33, is another example of just how far 
it has to go to meet the essential preconditions for an even arguably acceptable case-by-case balancing 
approach. 
481. Vicki Jackson has argued that, even if the Court were to adopt the diversity interpretation and 
thus overrule Hans, it might properly retain a version of the Edelman rule as a matter of federal 
common law. Jackson, supra note 11, at 88-93. To the extent the Court continued to adhere to Edelman 
as a matter of federal common law after overrruling Hans, there would admittedly be a need for a 
federal-common-law version of the Ex parte Young exception. It is important to note, however, that the 
version of Edelman Professor Jackson defends (a} is entirely subject to congressional abrogation, and 
(b) would bar only suits for money damages and similar damage-like remedies. See id. 
482. 473 U.S. 234 (1985). 
483. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 298-302 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Welch, 483 U.S. at 519-21 (Brennan, 
J ., dissenting). 
484. Welch, 483 U.S. at 496 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment on the 
ground that the statute did not purport to make states liable in damages. See id. 
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note the nature of their disagreement. Justice Powell, wntmg for the four 
Justices voting not to overrule Hans, examined the historical material relied on 
by the dissenters and found that it merely "show[ed] that-to the extent this 
question was debated-the intentions of the Framers and Ratifiers were ambigu-
ous. " 485 He then noted the importance of stare decisis to the rule of law,486 and 
concluded that "[t]he arguments made in the dissent [fell] far short of justifying 
such a drastic repudiation of this Court's prior decisions."487 In particular, 
Justice Powell rejected the dissenters' argument that the Eleventh Amendment's 
effect was "pernicious" because it allowed states to escape the consequences of 
their illegal actions.488 In this connection, he noted that "[r]elief may be 
obtained through suits against state officials rather than the State itself, or 
through injunctive or other prospective remedies. " 489 
In Union Gas, Justice Scalia ultimately came out against overruling Hans, 
and his dissenting opinion in that case was subsequently endorsed by a majority 
in Seminole Tribe. 490 The question, as Justice Scalia viewed it, was whether a 
waiver of state immunity in suits based on federal law was "implicit in the 
constitutional scheme."491 He emphasized that "[u]ndoubtedly the Constitution 
envisions the necessary judicial means to assure compliance with the Constitu-
tion and laws," 492 but, he observed, it does not follow that the Constitution 
authorizes private suits against the states themselves.493 Instead, in addition to 
suits by the federal government, it permits suits seeking "a federal injunction 
against the state officer, which will effectively stop the unlawful action,"494 and 
suits seeking "money damages against state officers . . . under 42 U.S. § 
1983."495 Finally, Justice Scalia noted that, even if he was wrong about what 
the Framers deemed "inherent in the constitutional scheme," "the question is at 
least close." 496 Hence, the case for overruling Hans fails on stare decisis 
grounds, given that Hans had repeatedly been reaffirmed by the Court and relied 
on by Congress in enacting statutes.497 Like Justice Powell, Justice Scalia did 
not defend the correctness of Hans so much as conclude that overruling 
precedent was not justified. Part of the reason it was not justified was that the Ex 
parte Young exception alleviated the rule-of-law problems that would otherwise 
485. !d. at 484. 
486. See id. at 494-95. 
487. !d. at 495. 
488. /d. at 487. 
489. /d. at 488. 
490. Seminole Tribe, 5 I 7 U.S. at 62-66. 
491. Union Gas, 49I U.S. at 33. 
492. !d. 
493. See id. at 33-34. 
494. /d. at 34. 
495. /d. 
496. /d. 
497. See id. at 34-35. 
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have been posed by the states' immunity.498 
Like the Court in Welch and Union Gas, the commentators are divided 
between those who would overrule Hans499 and those who would tolerate Hans 
because of its age and because, in light of the exceptions, it is not as pernicious 
as its detractors claim.500 Few affirmatively defend the Hans holding. Justices 
and commentators defend limits on the federal government's power to impose 
obligations on the states in the first place, but it is difficult to defend a regime in 
which federal law validly imposes obligations on the states but federal courts 
lack the power to entertain suits against the states to enforce those obligations. 
The most that even Hans' defenders have been able to claim for the regime it 
establishes is that changing it at this late date is unwarranted because its effects 
are not that bad in light of the exceptions that have been recognized, most 
importantly the Ex parte Young exception. 
Stare decisis is, of course, a valid, indeed weighty, reason for adhering to a 
prior decision.501 But a doctrine whose reason for being is merely that the 
matter has already been so decided is clearly not a doctrine that warrants 
expansion. When the problems created by the doctrine are so readily understood 
and its benefits so difficult to articulate, the case for keeping the doctrine within 
its current bounds, or even contracting it, is at its strongest. If the case for 
adhering to the Hans version of the Eleventh Amendment hinges ultimately on 
the rule of law benefits of respecting precedent, it would be "error coupled with 
irony"-to paraphrase Justice Kennedy502-to throw out wholesale the estab-
lished analytical scheme for determining the scope of the Amendment's applica-
bility to suits against state officials. It would be doubly ironic to throw it out in 
favor of an approach as offensive to the rule of law as case-by-case balancing. 
And, given that the Ex parte Young exception was expressly relied on to 
demonstrate that Hans' effects were not all that bad,503 it would be triply ironic 
to replace the existing analytical scheme with an approach that narrows the Ex 
parte Young exception. 504 
498. See id. at 34. See also Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131 n.I6 (relying on availability of Ex 
parte Young relief in defending Hans interpretation of Eleventh Amendment). · 
499. These include most of the proponents of the diversity interpretation. See Vazquez, supra note 5, 
at 1694-99. 
500. These include John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 
VA. L. REv. 47, 53-54 (1998); William P. Marshall, The Diversity of the Eleventh Amendment: A 
Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1372, 1375 (1989); and Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1804-06. 
501. But cf Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897) ("[I]t 
is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry 
IV."). 
502. See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2037. 
503. See supra notes 489 & 498 and accompanying text. 
504. One is reminded here of Justice Powell's suggestion in Welch that Chief Justice Marshall had 
employed a sort of bait-and-switch tactic. See Welch 483 U.S. at 482 n.ll. Powell was comparing 
Marshall's narrow interpretation of state sovereign immunity in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 
264, 382-83, 412 (1821), with the broader interpretation he had championed at the Virginia ratifying 
convention. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 482 n.ll. The Justices who rebuffed the proponents of the diversity 
HeinOnline  -- 87 Geo. L.J. 89 1998-1999
1998] PROSPECTIVE-RETROSPECTIVE DISTINCTION 89 
B. THE O'CONNOR APPROACH 
The fact that the law in this area serves primarily the interests underlying the 
doctrine of stare decisis tends to support the retention of a comprehensive 
retrospective-prospective distinction, but, as explained above, retaining this test 
without explaining how the holding in Milliken squares with it vitiates these 
rule-of-law benefits. The O'Connor approach attempts to stipulate away this 
problem. Under this approach, the Court would continue to adhere to a compre-
hensive prospective-retrospective distinction as the "ordinary" rule, but it 
would recognize an exception for Milliken-type cases, just as Justice O'Connor 
in Coeur d'Alene recognized an exception for disputes about sovereignty over 
submerged lands. 
If the Court adopted this strategy, the lower courts would continue to have to 
distinguish prospective from retrospective relief in most cases. This would not 
be easy even if we stipulated away the problem of accounting for Milliken. As 
already explained, the definition of "prospective" must be broad enough to 
encompass the form of relief sought in the typical habeas case, yet not so broad 
as to encompass past-due welfare benefits.505 The difficulty of articulating and 
applying such a test counsels against the adoption of the O'Connor approach. 
But there is a more fundamental problem. There is something deeply unsatis-
fying about the O'Connor approach. We expect our courts to provide reasons 
for treating cases differently. Even Justice O'Connor offered a reason (albeit an 
unsatisfying one) for the exception she adopted in Coeur d'Alene.506 The 
impulse to rationalize the law is so strong that the lower courts have already 
begun to treat the sovereignty-over-submerged-lands exception recognized in 
Coeur d'Alene as merely an instantiation of a more general rule.507 Over time, 
then, the O'Connor approach begins to resemble the Kennedy approach and so 
becomes unacceptable for the same reasons. As exceptions to the "ordinary" 
rule multiply, professions of continued faith in that rule ring increasingly 
hollow. Soon it becomes apparent to all that the rule itself does little work, and 
the question becomes whether there is any pattern or logic to the exceptions. If 
there is, then that pattern or logic yields the true rule. If there is not, then what 
we have is ad hoc decisionmaking inconsistent with the premises of the rule of 
law. I shall accordingly reject the O'Connor approach and proceed to compare 
the unqualified version of the comprehensive prospective-retrospective distinc-
tion508 with the original Edelman holding. 
theory in reliance-on the existence of the Ex parte Young exception might similarly be accused of 
baiting and switching if they were now to narrow significantly the Ex parte Young exception. 
505. See supra Part VA. 
506. 117 S. Ct. at 2044-45 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
507. In ANR Pipeline Co. v. Lafaver, 150 F.3d at 1190 (lOth Cir. 1998), for example, the Tenth 
Circuit read Coeur d'Alene to hold that Ex parte Young is inapplicable to cases that implicate "special 
sovereignty interests." 
508. Unqualified, that is, except for the exception Justice O'Connor recognized in Coeur d'Alene. 
My criticism of what I have called the O'Connor approach can also be directed to some extent to the 
actual holding of Coeur d'Alene. My conclusion in Part III that Justice O'Connor's approach was 
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C. OVERRULING MIWKEN 
A third way to address the coherence problem would be to bite the bullet and 
adopt a comprehensive prospective-retrospective distinction even if it means 
overruling Milliken's Eleventh Amendment holding. A threshold problem with 
this approach, as with the O'Connor approach, is that we would be left with a 
test that rests on an unfamiliar, counterintuitive, and difficult-to-apply distinc-
tion between primary and secondary obligations. For this reason, adopting this 
approach would probably not produce much doctrinal coherence. Indeed, even 
with Milliken alive and well and cutting the other way, the courts in the Allen 
and Woods cases reached the wrong result, and the Court of Appeals in Doe 
went astray. This suggests, perhaps ironically, that overruling Milliken would· 
make doctrinal matters worse. Even if it were possible to resolve this problem 
by adopting a straightforward version of the prospective-retrospective distinc-
tion consistent with the habeas and benefits cases, however, overruling Milliken 
would be a bad way to address the coherence problem. In the end, this approach 
should be rejected for the reason we rejected the Kennedy approach: it unneces-
sarily narrows the Ex parte Young exception. 
What it would mean to overrule Milliken depends on which of the two views 
about the nature of Eleventh Amendment immunity is correct. Under the 
forum-allocation view, the states would still be obligated to afford the remedies 
upheld in Milliken, and state courts would be required under the Supremacy 
Clause to entertain suits against state officials (indeed, suits against the states 
themselves) seeking such relief. If they do not entertain the case or award the 
remedy, the Supreme Court would retain the power to reverse their judgments. 
Under the immunity-from-remedy view, on the other hand, overruling Milliken 
would mean that the remedies upheld in that case would not be available against 
state officials (or the states themselves). Where, as in Milliken, local officials 
were jointly responsible, the remedy would be ayailable against them. But if 
state officials were solely responsible, the remedy would be entirely unavail-
able. 
The current uncertainty about the nature of Eleventh Amendment immunity 
complicates any effort to assess whether overruling Milliken would advance the 
interests underlying the Eleventh Amendment more than it would undermine the 
interests underlying the Ex· parte Young exception. The Eleventh Amendment 
contravenes the interests underlying Ex parte Young in subtly different ways 
depending on which view is adopted. Under the immunity-from-remedy view, 
Ex parte Young averts the undermining of federal interests that would occur if 
no federal court were available to afford certain remedies for the violation by 
states of their federal obligations. Under the forum~allocation view, Ex parte 
Young guards against the more subtle manifestations of state court hostility to 
preferable to Justice Kennedy's was not intended to suggest that it was also preferable to Justice 
Souter's, nor is it inconsistent with my point here that, if exceptions proliferate, Justice O'Connor's 
approach and Justice Kennedy's begin to resemble one another. 
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federal rights or inexpertise in federal law or policy that could not easily be 
corrected by the Supreme Court on appeal. The interests protected by the 
Eleventh Amendment also differ . depending on which of the two views is 
adopted. As I have explained elsewhere, if the Amendment serves merely to 
channel suits against states into the state courts, which are obligated by the 
Supremacy Clause to afford whatever remedies substantive federal law requires, 
subject to Supreme Court review, then, contrary to what the_ Court frequently 
says,509 the Amendment does not in fact protect state treasuries.510 Under the 
forum-allocation view, therefore, the Amendment serves merely to protect the 
states' dignitary interests. If the immunity-from-remedy view is correct, how-
ever, the purpose of Eleventh Amendment immunity could in theory be to 
protect state treasuries as well as their dignity. 
Under either theory, it is difficult to say whether overruling Milliken would 
advance the interests underlying the Eleventh Amendment more than it would 
undermine the interests underlying the Ex parte Young exception. If the rem-
edies approved in Milliken were in theory required but were enforceable as an 
original matter only in state courts, there would be reason to fear that the 
relevant federal interests would be undermined in state courts in a way that 
could not easily be corrected on appeal by the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court today cannot realistically review cases to correct case-specific mistakes. 
The likelihood that state courts will make such mistakes would appear to be 
higher in cases requiring the sort of structural relief upheld in the Milliken case 
than in cases involving more conventional remedies, as the state courts have 
less experience with these remedies than do the federal courts. The opportunity 
to manifest hostility to federal rights would also appear to be greater with 
respect to structural remedies, as fashioning such remedies involves the exercise 
of a greater measure of discretion. On the other hand, if Milliken were over-
ruled, the state courts would inevitably obtain more experience with these sorts 
of remedies. And structural remedies are more intrusive than ordinary remedies, 
so the offense to the dignity of the states, and to federalism interests more 
generally, is arguably greater when federal courts award such remedies. 
If overruling Milliken means immunizing states and state officials from these 
sorts of remedies altogether, the interest in protecting state treasuries would be 
advanced by such a move, since these sorts of remedies cost money. But 
overruling Milliken seems an arbitrary way to advance this interest. Prospective 
relief of the sort allowed by Ex parte Young can be expected to be as expensive 
as the relief approved in Milliken or the relief barred in Edelman, if not more 
so.511 The fact is that the prospective-retrospective distinction is not tailored to 
advance the interest in protecting state treasuries. A sort of reverse jurisdictional-
509. See supra note I 19 and accompanying text. 
510. See Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1725, 1731-32. 
511. See Jordan v. Weaver, 472 f'.2d 985, 991 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Jackson, supra note 11, at 90 & n.361. 
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amount rule would advance that interest more rationally, but no one advocates 
it. The interest in stopping ongoing violations of federal law is not served by the 
sort of relief upheld in Milliken if this interest extends only to ongoing viola-
tions of primary obligations. But, as we have seen, this is not the only 
"supremacy" interest underlying the law in this area. The official-liability cases 
show that the law also seeks to protect the supremacy of federal law by 
deterring violations. But the interest in deterring violations of federal law does 
not justify the relief awarded in Milliken. To the extent the acts found illegal in 
that case were consistent with the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court at 
the time the acts were performed, they could not reasonably have been deterred. 
On the other hand, where deterrence is possible, it should be achievable through 
a regime holding individual officials personally liable in damages.512 The 
Milliken opinion confirms that the remedies awarded in that case were not 
intended to deter. The Court made it clear that the remedies were designed to 
compensate the victims of past violations.513 As already noted, the Milliken 
decision itself shows that the Court in Green erred when it said that the interest 
in compensation is always insufficient to overcome the interests underlying the 
Eleventh Amendment. On the other hand, the qualified immunity cases show 
that the interest in compensating victims can sometimes be subordinated to 
sovereignty interests, broadly understood.514 The Court has not had occasion to 
explain the relationship between Milliken's Eleventh Amendment holding and 
the qualified immunity cases. 
The frustrating inconclusiveness of the foregoing analysis is attributable in 
part to the absence thus far of a baseline-that is, the lack of a basis for 
assigning weight to the competing interests. As noted in Part I, advocates of the 
diversity theory acknowledge that the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment 
intended to protect the states' treasuries, but they maintain that, for the Framers, 
that interest may have been outweighed in all cases arising under federal law by 
the need to give efficacy to the federal obligations of the states.515 If the 
diversity theory is right, then the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to any 
suits challenging state official action as a violation of federal law. The Supreme 
Court declined the invitation to overrule Hans, but it did not conclude that the 
diversity theorists were wrong about original intent. The Court's conclusion that 
the evidence on this question was "ambiguous" means that the Hans interpreta-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment does not rest on original intent either. Since Ex 
parte Young is made necessary by Hans, and Edelman by Ex parte Young, it 
follows that the line between Ex parte Young and Edelman cannot rest on 
original intent. The Court decided to adhere to Hans, despite the problems it 
creates and the ambiguity of its support, for stare decisis reasons and because 
512. See Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1801-04. 
513. See supra text accompanying notes 165-73. 
514. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32. 
515. See supra text accompanying note 122-23. 
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the Ex parte Young exception (among other doctrines) alleviates the problems 
Hans creates. Our baseline, therefore, ·must be existing doctrine. This does not 
mean that all the details of existing doctrine are fixed in stone, but it does rule 
out drastic change, and it all but rules out any change that would narrow the Ex 
parte Young exception. 
If this is the right benchmark, then overruling Milliken is a bad way to solve 
the coherence problem not just because such a move is unlikely to achieve 
much doctrinal coherence, but also because it would narrow the scope of Ex 
parte Young. That Milliken has been relied upon in numerous subsequent 
desegregation cases516 is just one indication that overruling it would produce a 
significant narrowing of Ex parte Young. 517 Indeed, reconsidering Milliken 
appears to be outside the universe of doctrinal changes the Court seems even 
remotely willing to contemplate. Seven Justices seem prepared to overlook the 
obvious difficulties Milliken poses to what they regard as a "basic principle of 
federallaw." 518 In Coeur d'Alene, only Justice Kennedy and the Chief Justice 
even came close to acknowledging the conflict between Milliken ·and the 
established analytical framework,519 and their response was to abandon the 
516. See, e.g., United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992); Parents for Quality Educ. with 
Integration, Inc. v. Indiana, 977 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1992); Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 
1988); Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3rd Cir. 1986); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984); 
Kozera v. Spirito, 723 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1983); Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750 (3rd Cir. 1978). 
517. The number of published decisions citing Milliken's Eleventh Amendment holding is likely to 
understate the decision's significance, however. Cases involving relief falling squarely within the scope 
of the ruling are likely to be settled without trial, or decided summarily by the court. Published opinions 
on the relevant issue are likely to result only in cases that test the limits of the Milliken rule. 
Articles discussing the importance of the second Milliken decision include Patricia A. Brannan, 
Missouri v. Jenkins; The Supreme Court Reconsiders School Desegregation in Kansas City, Criteria for 
Unitary Status, and Remedies Reaching Beyond School District Lines, 39 How. L.J. 781, 785-93 (1996) 
(describing Milliken as a landmark decision which has retained its importance despite skepticism in the 
Court concerning desegregation decrees); Nathaniel R. Jones, Milliken v. Bradley: Browns Troubled 
Journey North, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 49, 53-54 & n.32 (1992) (importance of Milliken's Eleventh 
Amendment holding in the desegregation of northern schools); Public School Desegregation - With-
drawal of Judicial Control, 106 HARV. L. REv. 249, 257-58 (1992) (Milliken's significance in authoriz-
ing courts to develop plans to remedy de jure segregation); Gerald W. Heaney, Busing, Timetable, 
Goals, and Ratios: Touchstones of Equal Opportunity, 69 MINN. L. REv. 735, 774-81 (1985) (types of 
remedies authorized by Milliken will help the education of minority students in the North); see also 
Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REv. 828, 863 & n.I35 (1983) 
(citing Milliken for the proposition that injuries caused by discrimination can only be cured by 
addressing the original constitutional violation). 
518. The concurring Justices in Coeur d'Alene used this term to describe the prospective-
retrospective rule, see 117 S. Ct. at 2045 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The dissenting Justices would 
probably not disagree with this characterization, as they objected to the concurring Justices' adoption of 
an exception to this rule. 117 S. Ct. at 2052-54 (Souter, J ., dissenting). 
519. They did so by suggesting that Milliken actually turned on the importance of the Fourteenth 
Amendment rights at issue rather than on the prospective nature of the relief sought. As noted, this does 
not necessarily eliminate the prospective-retrospective distinction; indeed, Kennedy and Rehnquist 
appear to have proposed superimposing an ad hoc balancing approach over the prospective-
retrospective standard as an additional hurdle to be overcome by litigants seeking prospective relief. 
But, as discussed above, if Milliken involved prospective relief, then all cases involve prospective 
relief. If so, then the prospective-retrospective test excludes no cases, and only the ad hoc balancing 
analysis does any work. 
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established analytical framework. If drastic repudiation of precedent were appro-
priate, however, then overruling the problematic Hans decision would be the 
more justified move. The Court's decision to adhere to Hans for stare decisis 
reasons is defensible, but only if Ex parte Young retains its current scope. 
At any rate, achieving coherence without narrowing Ex parte Young is far 
preferable to an approach that would narrow that exception. I show in the next 
section that the alternative of adhering to Edelman's original holding is superior 
not just because it would preserve Ex parte Young in more or less its current 
state, but also because it promises greater doctrinal coherence . than the other 
options. 
D. THE ORIGINAL EDELMAN HOLDING 
. 
The test originally adopted in Edelman, under which only retrospective 
monetary relief is barred, explains Milliken as well as the benefits cases, the 
habeas cases, and the reinstatement cases, and preserves the Ex parte Young 
exception largely within its current contours.520 To the extent this interpretation 
of Edelman continued to rely on a vague <:listinction between prospective and 
retrospective relief, the coherence problem would not go away completely. 
Even with these difficulties, however, the original holding of Edelman would be 
preferable from the perspective of doctrinal coherence, as limiting the scope of 
the rule would limit the scope of the problem. More important, limiting the 
prospective-retrospective distinction to suits seeking monetary relief makes it 
possible to define "prospective" in a way that minimizes these difficulties. 
Nevertheless, if a key interest in this area is doctrinal stability and continuity, 
a test that explains Papasan as well as the other Supreme Court cases is better 
than one that does not, other things being equal. As we saw in Part II, under the 
accrual test adopted in Edelman and the other benefits cases, Papasan should 
have come out differently, as the plaintiffs in Papasan were seeking (inter alia) 
an order requiring the defendant to disburse in accordance with federal law 
amounts that had not yet accrued. This section considers whether there is a test 
that reconciles Edelman with Papasan. It also considers another possible objec-
tion to the prospective-retrospective distinction as applied to monetary relief: its 
apparent overinclusiveness. Addressing the latter objection suggests a test that 
would square Papasan with Edelman. This test, however, places Papasan in · 
conflict with Milliken to the extent Papasan purported to apply to nonmonetary 
forms of relief. Limiting Papasan to suits seeking monetary relief makes 
possible an understanding of the case that would be consistent with both 
Edelman and Milliken. In the end, I conclude that Edelman's accrual test is 
preferable even though it would require overruling Papasan's holding on the 
520. To the extent the Supreme Court's post-Edelman dicta narrowed Ex parte Young by embracing 
a rule barring all retrospective relief, reverting to Edelman's original holding would broaden Ex parte 
Young. Change in this direction would, of course, be perfectly consistent with the Court's reasons for 
adhering to Hans. 
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trust claim. More important, however, I also conclude that limiting Edelman to 
suits seeking monetary relief is preferable to the three options discussed above, 
whether we adhered to the original accrual test or adopted the version that 
would square Edelman with Papasan in part. 
We focused in Part Von the underinclusiveness of a blanket prospective-
retrospective distinction. But such a rule may also be overinclusive to the extent 
it permits suits seeking prospective monetary relief, for even the least controver-
sially "retrospective" of remedies--damages-is often prospective in important 
senses. Consider this hypothetical: A state official violates federal law and in the 
process injures B, a pianist, to such an extent that her hand has to be amputated. 
If B sues the state official seeking damages from the state treasury, most courts 
would not hesitate to dismiss the suit on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Yet, in 
a similar suit against a private tortfeasor, the remedy for such an injury would 
consist not only of damages to compensate B for the pain she suffered at the 
moment she was physically being injured, but also compensation for her loss of 
earning potential from the time of the injury forward, as well as, more generally, 
for the loss of her ability to enjoy life during that period. Isn't the damage remedy 
"prospective" to the extent it compensates her for the decrease in her earning 
potential and loss of happiness from the time of the court order forward? 
Doesn't that relief correspond exactly (along the dimension of time) to the state 
prisoner's freedom from the time of the court's order onward? If a court order 
restoring that freedom is prospective relief, then why isn't an order awarding B 
a monetary substitute for lost future earning potential also prospective? Prospec-
tivity fails to explain why the latter order is barred. 
There appear to be two ways to reconcile the unavailability "prospective" 
damages for the pianist with the availability of prospective monetary relief in 
benefits cases. The first is to replace the rule barring retrospective monetary 
relief with a rule barring "damage-like" monetary relief-that is, relief in 
which money functions as a "substitute [] ... for the original condition or thing 
to which the plaintiff was entitled." 521 Under this rule, the suit would be barred 
if the plaintiff's right to money is a secondary or remedial right. If the right to 
receive money is itself the primary right, however, a court order requiring the 
defendant to pay it prospectively with state funds would not be barred.522 Under 
this test, money as a substitute for a primary right would be barred, even if 
"prospective" in the sense that our amputee's damages were, but money as the 
primary right could be awarded prospectively. 
521. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES§ 3.1, at 209 (2d ed. 1993). 
522. This analysis is in tension with our earlier characterization of the primary right in benefits cases 
as a right to subsistence rather than the right to receive money, but we recognized above that this 
characterization seemed contrived. Moreover, it was contrived for the purpose of reconciling the 
benefits cases with the habeas cases along the dimension of prospectivity. If we limited Edelman to 
suits seeking monetary relief, such a reconciliation would be unnecessary. But cf infra note 523 
(Congress's purpose would still have to be consulted under this rule to determine whether primary 
obligation occurred in past). 
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This test explains not just the benefits cases and the "prospective damages" 
hypothetical, it may also explain the Papasan holding. The Court in Papasan 
appeared to be heavily influenced by the idea that, if the plaintiffs prevailed, the 
state would have had to use its own resources to replace the trust corpus-that 
is, land conveyed by the federal government, the proceeds of which were 
invested and lost during the Civil War. To the extent the Court relied on this 
factor, it seems to have applied a rule permitting a court to order the specific 
performance of the defendant's primary obligation, but not a substitute for that 
obligation. The Court appears to have conceived the primary obligation at issue 
in Papasan as the obligation to use the land (or the proceeds) for the plaintiffs' 
benefit. Since neither the land nor the proceeds existed any longer, however, the 
plaintiffs were seeking a substitute, and the Court appears to have concluded 
that such relief is barred. 
This test resembles but modifies in an important way the rule posited in Part 
V to explain the habeas and benefits cases. That rule permitted the court to order 
either the specific performance of a primary obligation due in the future or the 
performance of a substitute for the performance of a primary obligation due in 
the future. 523 The rule now suggested to explain Papasan simply eliminates the 
option of ordering a substitute for the primary right.524 But recall that we 
included this clause because otherwise the test would not tum on prospectivity. 
Dropping the clause means that we are replacing the prospectivity test with a 
rule categorically barring orders requiring the performance of secondary obliga-
tions. Even if the defendant is violating or threatening to violate a primary 
obligation due in the future, the court may not award a remedy other than the 
specific performance of the primary obligation. Thus, if an employee was 
unlawfully fired, but reinstatement becomes unfeasible, the court may not award 
the remedy of "front pay" in lieu of reinstatement. In that situation, the court 
would still be able to award reinstatement, which would strengthen the em-
ployee's hand in negotiating a monetary settlement. But where, as in Papasan, 
performance of a primary obligation due in the future has become impossible, 
the court would not be able to award any remedy. The remedy would be 
unavailable not because it is retrospective or monetary, but because it is 
secondary as opposed to primary. 
That this test explains Papasan is a virtue from the perspective of "fitting" 
current case law, but this benefit is vitiated by the fact that a flat prohibition of 
secondary remedies would be inconsistent with Milliken, for the Court in 
523. Although usually a court order requiring the late performance of a primary obligation would be 
regarded as prospective, the unavailability of past-due benefits would be explicable as the application of 
a special rule for primary obligations to pay money. In such cases, the prospectivity of the obligation 
turns on the purpose of the obligation, and in the case of benefits, prospectivity turns on whether the 
benefits were to provide subsistence in the past or in the future. 
524. A substitute that is nonmonetary would not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment under a rule 
limiting Edelman to suits seeking monetary relief. Since the Court in Papasan found nonmonetary 
relief to be barred by the Eleventh Amendment, however, explaining Papasan requires us to drop the 
option of a nonmonetary substitute for the primary obligation. 
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Milliken upheld an order requmng the defendants to perform a secondary 
obligation. This problem can be avoided by rejecting Papasan to the extent it 
bars secondary nonmonetary relief. But even this limited version of the Papasan 
test is difficult to justify. Both Edelman and Papasan involved a federal 
obligation to supply a continuing stream of money in the. future, but under this 
test the court would have the power to enforce this obligation in one context but 
not the other. Doctrinally, the discrepant results are traceable to the fact that in 
one case the obligation to pay money from the treasury was the primary 
obligation whereas in the other case the primary obligation was the obligation to 
use the land, or income from the land, for the plaintiffs' benefit, and the 
obligation to pay money from the treasury is a substitute. This seems an 
inadequate justification for treating the two cases differently, given that the need 
to use money from the state treasury arose only because the state's officials lost 
the corpus through unwise investments. Additionally, such a test is unappealing 
because it rests on the unfamiliar and difficult distinction between primary and 
secondary obligations.525 
A second way to reconcile the benefits cases with the prospective damages 
hypothetical would be the test the Court adopted in Edelman: retrospective 
monetary relief is barred, and retrospectivity turns on the time the obligation to 
pay accrues. We rejected the accrual test above because it failed to explain the 
habeas and reinstatement cases,526 but limiting the prospective-retrospective test 
to suits seeking monetary relief means that these cases need no longer be 
regarded as suits for prospective relief. We are thus free to adopt a different 
definition of prospectivity. The accrual test adopted in the benefits cases ex-
plains why "prospective" damages are retrospective. Even though the damages 
are in part for the purpose of compensating for future earning potential and 
future happiness, the obligation to pay them accrues at the time of the injury.527 
525. Such a rule would also appear to be easily manipulable by Congress. The characterization of 
the relief sought in Papasan as secondary turns on a definition of the primary obligation as the 
obligation to use income from the land itself or its proceeds for the plaintiffs' benefit. On this view, 
once the land or proceeds are lost, the obligation to use money to replace the lost sums is secondary or 
remedial. This may or may not have been an accurate characterization of the obligation Congress had 
created, but, had Congress been aware of the Court's test, it could as easily have defined the primary 
obligation as the obligation to use for the plaintiffs' benefit an amount of money equal to the estimated 
income from the relevant tract of land, whether or not the land continued to be owned by the state. If 
the right had been so defined, the plaintiffs in Papasan would have been seeking to enforce a primary 
obligation. If this were enough to satisfy the posited test barring secondary monetary relief (and it is 
difficult to understand why it would not be), then the test in this context amounts to little more than a 
clear statement rule. 
526. See supra text accompanying note 438. 
527. See DOBBS, supra note 521, § 3.1, at 208 ("(T]he damages award is traditionally made once, in 
a lump sum to compensate for all the relevant injuries, past and future."). The time the liability accrues 
should be distinguished from the time the loss accrues. Cf id. ("[T]he damage remedy is not payable 
periodically as the loss accrues, unless a statute so provides.") The vagueness of the concept of accrual 
may reduce the appeal of this test, but this problem can easily be addressed by the Supreme Court. The 
Court might, for example, adopt an interpretation of accrual under which the time of accrual is the time 
payment is due. Better yet, it could replace the time-of-accrual test with a time-of-payment test. 
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As explained above, the accrual test requires a different result in the Papasan 
situation, but that is arguably a point in its favor.528 
There are potential problems with an accrual test, but they seem less severe 
than the problems with the test barring all monetary relief except the specific 
performance of a primary obligation to pay money. Assume, for example, that 
the federal government obligates the states to provide benefits in the form of a 
one-time lump-sum payment instead of in monthly installments, and the state 
defaults. Under the accrual test, this obligation is retrospective and thus unen-
forceable once the time of payment has passed. A test that looks to the purpose 
of the obligation and regards it as prospective to the extent the money is for the 
purpose of providing subsistence in the future seems preferable. But this test 
fails to explain the unavailability of prospective damages. In any event, Con-
gress is unlikely to want to adopt a lump-sum regime, and if it does want to, it 
remains free to attempt to secure the states' waiver of their Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity in exchange for federal funds. 529 
It may thus be preferable to adhere to the unvarnished Edelman test even 
though it means rejecting Papasan insofar as it bars secondary monetary relief. 
Overruling this aspect of Papasan is not as problematic as overruling Milliken 
for several reasons. First, this aspect of Papasan has not been the basis of 
subsequent Supreme Court or lower court holdings; indeed, Papasan has not 
been widely read to adopt such a test. Second, and more importantly, overruling 
Papasan would not narrow the Ex parte Young exception, and thus would not be 
in conflict with the Court's reasons for adhering to Hans. Finally, as discussed 
above, saving Papasan would require a rule barring all remedies ordering the 
performance of secondary obligations, but such a rule would be in conflict with 
528. A rule barring only monetary relief seems a bit silly if it prohibits someone from maintaining a 
suit for monetary damages but ·allows her to pursue the same suit by substituting a request for, say, land 
or goods. We may be justified in treating a claim seeking land or goods in this context as requesting 
monetary relief, as the land or goods would be functioning essentially as money. Doing so, however, 
blurs the distinction between monetary and nonmonetary relief and thus reduces the appeal of the rule I 
propose. We might instead say that such a suit is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but fails under 
the law of remedies. Only rarely will that law entitle someone to "compensation" in the form of land or 
goods, or in any form other than money. See DoBBS, supra note 521, at 209. But regarding this issue as 
one of nonconstitutional remedial law would permit Congress to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment 
limits on its powers by making the states liable for land or goods instead of money. Solving this 
problem appears to require an extension of the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits seeking land or goods 
in circumstances where traditional remedial law would have provided only for money damages. It is 
unclear how Papasan would have come out under this test. The plaintiffs' claim for land in that case 
was less transparently an end run around a rule barring money damages than that of our hypothetical 
circumventor. 
529. I doubt that Congress would have the power to obligate the states to pay benefits of this sort 
except in exchange for federal funds. Another problem with the accrual test is that the obligation to pay 
money in exchange for goods or services would be unenforceable once the goods are transferred or the 
services rendered. See New York City Health & Hosps. v. Perales, 50 F.3d 129, 130 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(obligation to reimburse health care providers "accrues" wht;n services rendered). But this is not a 
significant problem in the scheme of things, as a person dealing with the state in consensual transac-
tions of this sort retains the option of not transferring the goods or rendering the services until after 
payment has been made. 
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Milliken, and overruling Milliken is certainly less defensible than overruling 
Papasan. Milliken would not prevent us from saving Papasan insofar as it bars 
secondary monetary relief, but saving half a holding seems like an exceedingly 
weak basis for adopting a test that is otherwise as unappealing as the one under 
consideration. 
In the end, though, the decision to limit the prospective-retrospective distinc-
tion to suits seeking monetary relief is of far greater moment than the choice 
between the version on the limited test that would reject Papasan's holding on 
the trust claim in whole and the version that would reject it only in part. 
Regardless of which of·the two versions were adopted, limiting Edelman to 
monetary relief would be far superior to the other possible responses to the 
coherence problem posed by the prospective-retrospective distinction. 
The more difficult question is whether Edelman's limitation of the Ex Parte 
Young exception should be retained even to that extent. The policy justification 
for this limitation is not self-evident. As noted, Edelman doesn't seek to identify 
the cases involving the greatest incursions on the state treasury,530 and arguably 
the states' dignitary interest is adequately protected in all suits against state 
officials simply because the states themselves are not formal parties.531 The 
Court in Edelman relied on its own past statements about when a suit against a 
state official is "really" against the state, but Pennhurst appeared to obviate that 
question, and for good reason. Pennhurst's analysis thus offered an opportunity 
to reconsider Edelman.532 The Court declined to do so based on its view that 
such a move would eviscerate the Eleventh Amendment. 533 This would be true, 
however, only if the Amendment was designed to reach suits under federal law 
in the first place-in other words, if the diversity theory were rejected. Because 
overruling Edelman would be tantamount to embracing the diversity theory, 
Edelman is part and parcel of the Court's decision not to adopt that interpreta-
tion of the Amendment. In the end, therefore, Edelman is justified for the same 
reasons, and to the same extent, the Court was justified in declining to overrule 
Hans. 
As discussed above, the Court decided not to adopt the diversity theory 
largely for stare decisis reasons and in reliance on the existence of the Ex parte 
Young exception and the availability of damage actions against state officials 
personally.534 The availability of the latter form of relief elucidates the strongest 
case for retaining Edelman insofar as it precludes suits seeking money from the 
530. See supra text accompanying note 511. 
531. Sometimes, protecting someone's dignity is merely a matter of observing formalities. Thus, 
this may be an area in which "elementary mechanics of captions and pleading" do make a difference. 
Cf Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2034 (Kennedy, J.) ("The real interests served by the Eleventh 
Amendment are not to be sacrificed to elementary mechanics of captions and pleadings). 
532. Cf Shapiro, supra note 107, at 84 (suggesting, hopefully, that Pennhurst's analysis "could lead 
to the abandonment of the questionable distinction between prospective relief requiring substantial state 
expenditures and retrospective monetary relief for harm done"). 
533. See supra text accompanying note 116. 
534. See supra text accompanying notes 30, 495. 
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state treasury. First, this aspect of Edelman is supported by tradition: suits 
seeking damages for a state official's violation of federal law have traditionally 
been handled through an officer-liability regime.535 Second, the availability of 
damages from the state official alleviates the policy problems with prohibiting 
suits seeking money from the state treasury. As already noted, Edelman, so 
construed, would not categorically bar any form of relief; it would merely 
identify the proper defendant in a suit seeking damages and damage-like 
monetary relief. It should be possible to craft an officer-liability regime that 
would secure the efficacy of the federal legal obligations of the states.536 
Finally, the officer-liability cases offer a strong coherence-based reason for 
keeping Edelman: together, Edelman and the officer-liability cases yield a rule 
of supreme simplicity-suits seeking money damages from the officer are 
permitted (subject to a nonconstitutional doctrine of official liability), while 
suits seeking money damages from the state are not. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has sought to show that the comprehensive prospective-
retrospective test the Court purported to reaffirm in Coeur d'Alene as the 
"ordinary" rule-indeed, as a "basic principle of federal law" -actually came 
about through inadvertent and unexamined extensions, largely in dicta, of a rule 
barring only retrospective monetary relief. It has also attempted to show that, 
far from requiring a "straightforward inquiry," a comprehensive rule that truly 
turned on prospectivity would be analytically complex and difficult to apply. 
The rule has seemed straightforward only because, until recently, most courts 
and commentators have understood it as a rule barring only certain forms of 
monetary relief. The Court's more recent formulations of the test, focusing the 
courts' attention on whether the violation of law of which the plaintiff com-
plains is ongoing or not, has begun to produce results, such as that in Breard, 
which are not only problematic, but also, once one considers that petitions for 
habeas corpus fall within the Ex parte Young exception, demonstrably wrong. 
One of the main problems with the Court's test is that it is highly indetermi-
nate. A single count in a complaint may be said to be complaining of past and 
future violations of federal law simultaneously, and thus to be seeking relief that 
may be characterized as both retrospective and prospective. So far, the Court 
has failed to provide a reasoned basis for choosing among the competing 
characterizations. If it attempts to make its test more determinate, moreover, it 
will find that there is no version of a test turning on "prospectivity" that can 
explain the results it has reached in this area. There are a number of ways for 
the Court to try to restore coherence to the doctrine, but most of the options 
would narrow the Ex parte Young exception and would thus be inconsistent with 
535. See generally Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled 
Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77 (1997). 
536. See Vazquez, supra note 5, at 1801-04. 
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the Court's stated justification for adhering to the Hans interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment in face of the challenge posed by the diversity theorists. 
The Court's best option is to revert to the original holding of Edelman, under 
which only retroactive monetary relief would be barred. 
By narrowing Ex parte Young, the Court in Coeur d'Alene took a (small) step 
in the wrong direction, but its decision to craft a narrow exception rather than 
apply the prospective-retrospective distinction was an unwitting recognition of 
the poverty of the test it purported to reaffirm as the "ordinary" rule. If it 
reverted to Edelman's original holding, by contrast, it would be embracing a test 
that, by contrast, actually does some work. Reverting to Edelman's original 
holding, moreover, would make it possible to replace a rule posing analytical 
difficulties of Herculean dimensions with a test turning on a distinction that 
comes close to being as simple as that between night and day. 
